Belief Dynamics: (Epistemo)logical Investigations by Tamminga, Allard
Belief Dynamics
ILLC Dissertation Series 2001-08
For further information about ILLC-publications, please contact
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Plantage Muidergracht 24
1018 TV Amsterdam
phone: +31-20-525 6051
fax: +31-20-525 5206
e-mail: illc@wins.uva.nl
homepage: http://www.illc.uva.nl/
Belief Dynamics
(Epistemo)logical Investigations
Academisch Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. J.J.M. Franse ten overstaan
van een door het college voor promoties
ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar
te verdedigen in de Aula der Universiteit
op dinsdag 13 november 2001, te 10.00 uur
door
Allard Martijn Tamminga
geboren te Nijmegen
Promotor: Prof. dr. F.J.M.M. Veltman
Co-promotor: Prof. dr. H. Rott
Afdeling Wijsbegeerte
Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Nieuwe Doelenstraat 15
1012 CP Amsterdam
Copyright c© 2001 by Allard Tamminga
Cover design by [lowresmedia.com]
Cover photos by Roesmann/Essamba Arts
Printed and bound by Febodruk, Enschede
ISBN: 90–5776–075–4
Notre teˆte est ronde pour permettre a` la pense´e de changer de direction.
Francis Picabia
v
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 General Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Truth as Limit of Inquiry? 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 C.S. Peirce’s Theory of Scientific Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.2 Deduction, Induction, and Abduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Truth in Terms of Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 The T–I Conditional versus Bivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 The I–T Conditional is Wide of the Mark . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3 Isaac Levi’s Epistemology: A Critique 29
3.1 Isaac Levi’s Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.1 Non-Deductive Logic and the Belief-Doubt-Belief Model . 29
3.1.2 Epistemic States and Their Representations . . . . . . . . 33
3.1.3 Revision of Corpora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1.4 Two Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 A Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.1 Corpora? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.2 Contextual Parameters? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
vii
4 Finite State Belief Dynamics 61
4.1 Paraconsistent Belief Revision? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.1.1 A Novel Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2.1 An Algorithm for Finding φ’s Minimal Valuations . . . . . 67
4.2.2 Finite States and Their Determiners . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2.3 Finite States: Information Span . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Operations of Information Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.1 Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.2 Contraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.3 Revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Extractors: Operations of Belief Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.1 Making K⊥ Consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4.2 Selecting K⊥’s Most Consistent Valuations . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5.1 Finite State Belief Revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5.2 Relative Trustworthiness of the Sources . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5.3 Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5 Conclusion 91
5.1 Summary of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A A Natural Deduction System for First Degree Entailment 95
A.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.1.1 First Degree Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.1.2 Combined Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.2 Language and Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.3 A Natural Deduction System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A.4 Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.5 Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.6 Rejection Eliminated? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Bibliography 111
Samenvatting 119
viii
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, thanks are due to my promotor, Frank Veltman, and to my
co-promotor, Hans Rott. I thank them for the freedom of research they granted
me, for their continuing encouragement, and for their constructive criticisms.
Second, I wish to thank Johan van Benthem, Wiebe van der Hoek, Erik
Krabbe, Michiel van Lambalgen, and Martin Stokhof, for their willingness to
participate in the reading committee.
Third, I thank Koji Tanaka for being the co-author of the Appendix. More-
over, I thank Walter van der Star for translating the second and third chapters
of my dissertation into English.
Lastly, the following people discussed parts of the thesis with me and thus
helped me to improve on the final text: Paul Dekker, Eduardo Ferme´, Jelle
Gerbrandy, Carin Gotlieb, Paul Harrenstein, Wolfram Hinzen, Else de Jonge,
Theo Kuipers, Karen Kwast, Rosja Mastop, Breannda´n O´ Nualla´in, Jeanne Pei-
jnenburg, Graham Priest, Harry Stein, Anne Troelstra, and Sjoerd Zwart. The
conversations with them has made the writing of this thesis an enjoyment.
Parts of my thesis have been published as articles in journals. I would like
to thank the journals for their kind permission to include these articles in the
present thesis. Chapter 2 appeared in Dutch as ‘Waarheid als limiet van on-
derzoek: de ontoereikendheid van Charles Sanders Peirce’ waarheidsopvatting’
in the Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 93, 2001, pages 73–92.
The Appendix, the result of joint work with Koji Tanaka, appeared in 2001 as
‘A Natural Deduction System for First Degree Entailment’ in the Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic 40, 1999, pages 258–272.
Amsterdam amt
September, 2001.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General Overview
This thesis deals with the dynamics of belief. In three interconnected, though
independent studies, a viable alternative to foundational approaches in episte-
mology is explored. Rather than accept the research agenda dictated by tradi-
tional epistemology, with its stress on the pursuit of conditions under which our
beliefs are justified or even true, the present work follows the lead of American
pragmatism, and focusses on the articulation and defense of criteria according to
which a change of mind may be judged legitimate.
The second and third chapters discuss the attempts of two pragmatist philoso-
phers, Charles Sanders Peirce and Isaac Levi, to formulate and to formalize the
belief-doubt-belief model, a model that sets out to set forth systematically the
optimal strategies according to which to change our minds.
In the course of this undertaking, more and more logical considerations come
to the fore, culminating in a discussion and an evaluation of formal systems for
belief change. It is argued that belief change systems, despite the naturalistic
setting in which they were first conceived, have outgrown their pragmatist origin
and have metamorphosed into a branch of philosophical logic, where empirical
considerations have become obsolete. To restore the connection between logical
theory and epistemological practice, a case is made for reformulations of belief
change systems that are cleared from elements that obstruct practical applications
and empirical tests.
In the fourth chapter, a belief change system is presented that (1) uses finite
representations of epistemic states, (2) can deal with inconsistencies adequately,
(3) has finite operations of change, (4) can do without, but does not rule out,
extra-logical elements, and (5) only licenses consistent beliefs. An Appendix,
where the underlying logic of the belief change system of the fourth chapter is
studied proof-theoretically, concludes the thesis.
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1.2 Summary
In order to pave the way for more fruitful logical and epistemological investiga-
tions within the pragmatist tradition in philosophy, the second chapter clears the
ground from metaphysical entanglements that result from the wish to construct
theories of truth and reality, a wish that has, by and large, dominated the in-
terests of pragmatist philosophers (and not only them) until the present day. A
focus on the necessary and sufficient conditions for a statement to be true or
on a conception of reality which is adequate to a preferred reading of the truth
predicate still obfuscate research in contemporary epistemology, as they tend to
restrict philosophical research to questions which have resisted plausible answers
for ages.
Hence, the second chapter purports to show that Peirce’s metaphysical aspi-
rations for definitions of truth and reality in terms of a theory of inquiry cannot
coherently be met by a pragmatist theory of knowledge. In order to come to grips
with Peirce’s definition of truth as the ideal limit of inquiry, a succinct exposition
of Peirce’s theory of inquiry and his philosophical logic is given. Attention is paid
to deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning and their interrelations, so as
to be in a position to sketch Peirce’s early ideas concerning the pragmatist belief-
doubt-belief model, a model that will be the guiding line of this thesis. With his
investigations into that model, Peirce aimed to articulate the ‘method of science’,
a method that enables us to adapt our present pattern of expectations for the
better in case of surprising or even contrary experience. Peirce maintained that
if we would consciously follow the method of science, we would ultimately reach
a pattern of expectations that would never be thwarted by any future experience.
Since such a pattern of expectations would lead to the very same practical con-
sequences as a true ‘theory of the world’, to borrow a phrase of Quine’s, Peirce’s
pragmatist stand on meaning forbids him to withhold the predicate ‘true’ from
that pattern of expectations. Thus Peirce accounts for the notion of truth.
In the remainder of the second chapter, the arguments of the foremost rep-
resentative of a group of contemporary apologists of Peirce’s account of truth,
Cheryl Misak, are subjected to scrutiny and found to be insufficient: the princi-
ple of bivalence is defended improperly and her main argumentation for a Peircean
account of truth turns out to be incompatible with a pragmatist epistemology.
Hence, Peircean accounts of truth are found to be inadequate. Rather than accept
the problem setting of traditional philosophy, with its focus on truth and reality,
and plead, in the face of the failure of Peircean accounts of truth, for some alter-
native view on truth, the chapter ends with a plea for a more modest approach. It
is proposed to retain as much as possible of Peirce’s dynamic theory of scientific
method, that is, his belief-doubt-belief model, and to focus, unencumbered by the
traditional philosophical quest for truth, on the technicalities of contemporary
accounts of belief change that are the proper heirs of Peirce’s belief-doubt-belief
model.
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The third chapter critically studies the logical epistemology of Isaac Levi,
the American pragmatist philosopher who took the lead in defining the field in
philosophical logic which has become known under the name belief change. Levi
sets out to formalize Peirce’s and Dewey’s belief-doubt-belief model, using classical
logic, probability theory, and decision theory.
As an introduction, Levi’s fundamental tenets are placed within the context
of American pragmatism. As we saw in the second chapter, Peirce kept the 19th
century English school of logic’s theoretical interest in non-deductive forms of
reasoning alive, and, apart from that, was interested in a systematical theory
with which rational changes of belief could be captured. Levi shares Peirce’s
predilections, but he is, unlike Peirce, not interested in furnishing an account
of truth based on his pragmatist epistemology. Alternatively, Levi sets out to
formulate and to defend criteria under which a change of belief must be judged
an improvement.
In order to do so, Levi first needs a device to represent epistemic states. He
opts for corpora, that is, sets of sentences closed under logical deduction. Two his-
torical reasons and one pragmatical reason for this choice are set forth. Since Levi
has chosen corpora to represent epistemic states, he is able to interpret changes
of epistemic states in terms of transitions from one corpus to another. One of the
central claims of Levi’s work on belief change is that all transitions of corpora
can be reduced to two basic types of transition: expansion and contraction.
In expansion, a sentence is added to an agent’s present corpus. Levi defends,
using arguments from decision theory, conditions under which such an addition is
legitimate. His criterion stipulates whether a proposed expansion is legitimate by
weighing the informational value of the sentence to be added against its plausibil-
ity. Moreover, Levi discusses the logic of expanding a corpus by a sentence, once
the expansion is judged legitimate. Next, an integrated perspective on contrac-
tion is developed. In contraction, a sentence is skipped from an agent’s present
corpus. Parallel to his account of expansion, Levi proffers criteria under which a
contraction is legitimate or even, in a special case, required. Unlike the logic of
expansion, the corpus that results from a contraction is not immediately given,
once it has been judged legitimate to contract our current corpus with some sen-
tence. Several corpora, all of them subsets of the corpus to be contracted, fulfill
the logical requirements for the envisaged contraction. Levi advises to adopt the
corpus that not only fulfills these requirements, but minimizes the loss of infor-
mational value as well. An application of Levi’s theory of belief change to two
central problems in philosophical logic, to wit, modal and conditional statements,
completes the exposition of his theory of knowledge.
In the second part of the third chapter, Levi’s logical epistemology is critically
evaluated. First, we discuss Levi’s claim that an epistemic state can be repre-
sented by a corpus. It turns out to be impracticable to decide which sentences are
part of the corpus and which are not. Second, Levi’s assumption that a system
of parameters has been given at the outset is examined. As both his account
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of expansion and his account of contraction are based on a previous assessment
of the informational value parameter, we focus on the question of how such an
assessment is to be put into practice. A similar strategy is used in the criticism
of the measure of boldness, a parameter that plays a role in judging envisaged
expansions. Surprisingly, the desired resulting corpus is the clue to assess the
values of the parameters.
As a consequence, contrary to Levi’s repeated claim that his criteria for
changes of belief are normative, his theory lacks normative force, at least as
long as it remains to be seen how the initial values of the parameters figuring in
his system can be assessed in a reliable and convincing way. Moreover, even if
Levi’s system is interpreted as a description of actual reasoning practices, as long
as the parameters withstand an assessment which is independent of the result of a
change of belief, Levi’s theories cannot be put to an empirical test. In conclusion,
a case is made for a theory of belief change that can do without extra-logical
considerations which elude assessment, so as, on the one hand, to avoid the ra-
tionalistic mode of argument that has been typical of contemporary belief change
literature, and, on the other hand, to pave the way for investigations into the
empirical adequacy of proposed theories of belief change.
The fourth chapter expounds a belief change theory that, on the one hand,
unlike standard systems for belief change, can do without extra-logical consid-
erations, and, on the other hand, is able to cope with inconsistent information.
Moreover, the beliefs that are licensed by the information offered always are con-
sistent. Hence, the theory has two levels: a basic level dealing with the dynamics
of possibly inconsistent information, and an upper level that extracts a set of
consistent beliefs from the basic level.
On the basic level, first, a method is set forth, using first degree entailment as
underlying logic, to represent possibly inconsistent information by a finite state,
which consists of exactly all valuations that are minimally required to validate
the information offered. An algorithm to find a formula’s finite state is given.
Next, an operation for expanding a finite state by a formula is defined. A rep-
resentation theorem, showing that the expansion operation satisfies the intuitive
requirements for expansion, provides a characterization of the expansion opera-
tion. A contraction operation, by which a formula can be deleted from a finite
state, follows. Interestingly, the contraction operation does not presuppose – the
presupposition is ubiquitous in theories of belief change that have been motivated
by the works of Levi and of Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson – an extra-
logical element such as a choice function or an ordering of (sets of) sentences.
Moreover, the expansion and the contraction operation are each other’s duals. A
representation theorem characterizing the contraction operation in terms of a set
of postulates completes the discussion of contraction. Remarkably, the postulates
have been formulated in terms of the information span of a finite state, a property
of finite states that has no counterpart in standard possible world semantics.
On the upper level, four extractors, operations retrieving a set of consistent
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‘plausible’ beliefs from a finite state, are studied. In cases where the finite state
is consistent, all extractors yield the same result. If, however, the finite state is
inconsistent, the resulting sets of ‘plausible’ beliefs generally do not coincide.
Two basic extractors are discussed, the first a translation of a proposal of
Restall and Slaney’s to the present context of finite states, the second amounting
to a contraction of the finite state to which the extractor was to be applied, with a
formula indicating which literals behave inconsistently in that finite state. As the
extractors give rise to non-monotonic inference operations, some proof-theoretical
properties of the two basic extractors are discussed. Next, a selection function
that chooses the most consistent elements from a finite state is set forth. This
function can be used to preprocess the finite state, before applying one of the two
basic extractors. Hence, four different extractors have been defined. Finally, the
relative strength of the four extractors is assessed.
The Appendix, the result of a collaboration with Koji Tanaka from Macquarie
University in Sidney, consists of an original proof-theoretical study of the para-
consistent and relevant logic first degree entailment, fde for short, which was the
underlying logic of the system of belief change that was propounded in the fourth
chapter. In a sense, this logic is a generalization of classical propositional logic
(cpl), since it does not only consider total and consistent valuations as in cpl, but
partial or inconsistent valuations as well. Hence, all inferences that are valid in
fde are valid in cpl. The converse does not hold: for instance, fde does not have
any tautologies and neither the disjunctive syllogism, nor the ex falso quodlibet
rule of cpl hold true in fde.
The Appendix opens with a brief history of fde. Two logical semantics have
been proposed for fde, a two-valued one by Routley and Routley and a four-valued
one by Dunn. Here, we adopt the latter, four-valued semantics. Then, ‘combined
systems’, proof-theories pioneered by ÃLukasiewicz, are discussed briefly. In com-
bined systems both accepted and rejected formulas can be derived, distinguished
in the derivation as they are preceded by a sign (‘`’ for acceptance, ‘a’ for rejec-
tion) which indicates their status. This idea will be used in developing the natural
deduction system for fde. Next, after presenting the language and the four-valued
semantics of fde, a Gentzen-style natural deduction system for fde is presented.
Soundness is proved more or less standardly. Completeness is proved via Henkin’s
method, though the construction used in the proof of the embedding lemma had
to be adapted to meet the requirements of the subsequent model-existence lemma,
where a four-valued model is required.
Chapter 2
Truth as Limit of Inquiry?
2.1 Introduction
In 1913, in his thesis De kennisleer van het Anglo-Amerikaansch pragmatisme
(The Epistemology of Anglo-American Pragmatism), Tobias Muller puts forward
a bold proposition that, although the arguments presented by Muller are now
outdated, surely deserves to be reconsidered: “Pragmatism is essentially a ref-
ormation of logic”. In this chapter I will set out which reforms of traditional
logic were advocated by the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce, how
he attempted to explain the concept of truth by means of his logic, and why the
latter undertaking is doomed to fail.
In the second half of the 19th century, both the foundations of traditional
logic and those of the traditional ideal of knowledge, that had been laid down
by Aristotle in his Analytica priora and his Analytica posteriora, were beginning
to crack as a result of the constant erosion caused by new developments in the
sciences. It became clear that modern mathematical reasoning could hardly be
represented by the limited range of forms of reasoning provided by Aristotelian
syllogistic, while the evidence postulate of Aristotle’s ideal of knowledge was being
undermined by such developments as the discovery of non-Euclidian geometries.
The demise of the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge provoked a lively debate on the
‘crisis of science’, the ‘crisis of certitudes’, or even a ‘crisis of culture’, a discussion
which was not restricted to a single philosophical school. To a large extent, early
twentieth century philosophy consisted of an attempt to define its own position
in the light of these crises in an intellectually sound (or unsound!) way.
In order to get some sort of overall view of the purpose and extent of the
reform of traditional logic that Peirce had in mind, it is essential to make an
excursion into the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge. Aristotle’s own position is not
adequately represented when it is understood as an “axiomatisation of scientific
method”, because it describes “the foundations of, and accordingly the require-
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ments for, irrefutable knowledge” (episteˆmeˆ),1 independently of the way in which
this knowledge is acquired. It should be seen as an ideal of necessarily true and
unshakable knowledge, an ideal that is compatible with different theories about
the way in which that knowledge is attained. Evert Willem Beth gives the fol-
lowing description of that which he – somewhat misleadingly – calls “Aristotle’s
theory of science” [Beth, 1959, p. 31–32]:
A deductive science is a system S of sentences, which satisfies the
following postulates:
(I) Any sentence belonging to S must refer to a specific domain of
real entities;
(II) Any sentence belonging to S must be true;
(III) If certain sentences belong to S, any logical consequence of these
sentences must belong to S;
(IV) There are in S a (finite) number of terms, such that
(a) the meaning of these terms is so obvious as to require no
further explanation;
(b) any other term occurring in S is definable by means of these
terms;
(V) There are in S a (finite) number of sentences, such that
(a) the truth of these sentences is so obvious as to require no
further proof;
(b) the truth of any other sentence belonging to S may be es-
tablished by logical inference starting from these sentences.
The postulates (I), (II), and (III) will be called, respectively, the re-
ality, the truth, and the deductivity postulate. The postulates (IV)
and (V) together constitute the so-called evidence postulate; the fun-
damental terms and sentences, referred to in postulates (IV) and (V),
are called the principles of the science under consideration.
For centuries, Euclidean geometry and Archimedean statics have prevailed as
showpieces of the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge. In this connection we also have
to mention Spinoza’s Ethica and Newton’s Principia. Only in the nineteenth
century did developments in the different sciences – including the discovery of
non-Euclidean geometries by Bolyai and Lobachevsky2 – undermine the evidence
postulate, as a consequence of which the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge itself
finally fell into disfavour.
1See [De Rijk, 1988, p. 8].
2See [Beth, 1950, Chapter 1].
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The success of the sciences had already forced philosophers to revise their un-
derstanding of science – since the beginning of the twentieth century, a dynamic
conception of science in all its diversity has become generally accepted –, but
only recently, the collapse of the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge gave rise to a
new epistemology. Until now the revolution in epistemology has not been fully
realized, a fact that can be partially explained by the aforementioned compati-
bility between a dynamic scientific practice, in which the evidence postulate no
longer plays a part, and a static ideal of knowledge, in which necessity is still
conceived as a characteristic of truth.
A second reason that can be put forward is the circumstance that the Aris-
totelian ideal of knowledge has long persevered in philosophy as the methodolog-
ical backbone of so-called ‘philosophical disciplines’ (such as philosophical logic,
philosophical theory of space, and philosophy of nature in the first half of the
twentieth century3), thus preserving the scientific ring of metaphysics.4
However, the illusive character of this preservation immediately comes
to light when we examine what is actually being offered under the lofty
heading of ‘philosophical discipline’. It then becomes clear that all it
involves is a collection of notions that have been discarded by the
‘sciences’. [Beth, 1964, p. 33]
A third argument for the slow propagation of a new epistemology is the fact
that modern (post-Fregean, ‘mathematical’) logic, an instrument that played a
crucial part in the development of analytical philosophy, originated from the study
of mathematical reasoning. The logical investigations of Frege and Russell, who
criticized traditional logic on the grounds of its failure to describe mathemati-
cal reasoning adequately and who consequently developed new logics that were
more suited for the task, produced logical systems that were concerned with the
modelling of reasoning within a relatively small and atypical field of scientific
knowledge, inasmuch as it was cumulative and deductive, namely mathematics.
The triumph of this mathematically oriented logic led to the idea that ‘mathe-
matical logic’ could serve as an instrument for the analysis of human knowledge
as such (Russell’s ‘logical atomism’ comes to mind). However, Hans Reichenbach
justly writes:
The way to a consistent empiricism is open only to those who are
ready to interpret empirical knowledge in its own right, to abandon
the prejudice that mathematics is the prototype of all knowledge.
[Reichenbach 1948, p. 142]
3See [Beth, 1964, p. 38]. Contemporary philosophical logic bears hardly any similarity to its
prewar namesake.
4Remnants of the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge are also found in the attempts at Letzt-
begru¨ndung by early twentieth-century analytic philosophers, with the exception of Otto Neurath
and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz.
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Fourthly, the clear inadequacy of ‘mathematical logic’ in the fields of knowl-
edge and communication outside mathematics has given rise to a vast number of
esoteric logics for a broad range of large and small tasks, and that in turn has
favoured the independence of contemporary philosophical logic, which has almost
entirely freed itself from epistemology.
In his inquiries into the conditions of human cognition during his naturalistic
period (from circa 1870 to the 1880s), Charles Peirce combined a systematic
interest in non-deductive logics with an unfortunately not altogether consistent
rejection of the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge. It is notable that precisely Peirce’s
attempts to define the traditional epistemological concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’
have flourished in contemporary epistemology, while almost everyone has turned a
blind eye to the new epistemological perspectives opened up by his pragmatism.5
In the following section, Peirce’s philosophy of logic is summarized so that we
can get a grip on his attempts to conceive truth as the limit of scientific inquiry.
The final section is a refutation of the arguments of a contemporary advocate of
a Peircean account of truth.
2.2 C.S. Peirce’s Theory of Scientific Inquiry
All the familiar handbooks on the history of logic, whose authors unanimously
restrict the domain of logical inquiry to mathematical reasoning, traditionally
present Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) as co-founder of the theory of rela-
tions and as a researcher in the field of Boolean algebra: the logical operator
‘neither. . . nor. . .’ with its remarkable properties had already been discovered by
Peirce round 1880,6 while Peirce’s notation of logical quantifiers (Π for the uni-
versal and Σ for the existential quantifier), which was implemented by his pupil
O.H. Mitchell in 1883, independently of Frege, quickly became current among
algebrists.7 The game theoretical interpretation of logical quantifiers, propagated
by Paul Lorenzen and Jaakko Hintikka in the second half of the twentieth century,
was also pioneered by Peirce.8
Nevertheless, there is something to be said against the image presented by
historians of Peirce’s philosophy of logic. Recent history of logic has mainly
highlighted the historical run up to succesful developments in mathematical logic
and, as a consequence, divergent views have been eclipsed.
From the beginning Peirce, who like Frege and Russell was a critic of tradi-
tional logic, followed in the footsteps of the English school of logic, that pursued
5Isaac Levi’s pragmatist epistemology is an important exception.
6Since 1913, H.M. Sheffer has been wrongly credited with the discovery of the fact that the
operators of classical propositional logic can be defined with only one operator. The Sheffer
stroke ‘not both. . . and. . .’ is the dual of Peirce’s operator. See [Kneale and Kneale, 1962,
p. 423].
7[Putnam, 1982].
8[Hilpinen, 1982].
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“a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific
investigation”, and had a broader perspective of human reasoning than his math-
ematically oriented colleagues: the justification of scientific knowledge – a central
problem in Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft – became the focal point of his
philosophical interests.
In the first article of the lectures series Illustrations of the Logic of Science,
published in 1877 and 1878, in which Peirce’s aim is to describe “the method
of scientific investigation”, he submits that before we can understand human
reasoning, we must acquaint ourselves with the fact “that there are such states
of mind as doubt and belief – that a passage from one to the other is possible,
the object of thought remaining the same, and that this transition is subject to
some rules which all minds are alike bound by” (CW 3, 246).9 Following this
observation, Peirce, in accordance with Alexander Bains’s definition of belief as
“that upon which a man is prepared to act”, considers the practical difference
between doubt and belief:
Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions. [...] So it is
with every belief, according to its degree. The feeling of believing is
a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature
some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such
an effect.
[...] Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle
to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; while the latter is
a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid, or to
change belief into something else (CW 3, 247).10
Doubt can only exist thanks to a background of established beliefs, which together
form a pattern of expectations.11 An unforeseen experience – an infringement of
the pattern of expectations – breeds true doubt: “A true doubt is [...] a doubt
which really interferes with the smooth working of the belief-habit” (CP 5.510).
Our beliefs are shaken by this unforeseen experience, which after all in some way
9‘CW m, n’ refers to page n of volume m of the Writings of Charles S. Peirce; ‘CP m.n’
refers to section n of volume m of the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce; and ‘NE m,
n’ refers to page n of volume m of Peirce’s The New Elements of Mathematics.
10“And what, then, is belief? [...] We have seen that it has just three properties: first, it
is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it
involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit.” (CW 3,
263.)
11“[T]here is but one state of mind from which you can ‘set out,’ namely, the very state of
mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do ‘set out’ – a state in which you are
laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if
you would [...] Do you call it doubting to write down on a piece of paper that you doubt? If so,
doubt has nothing to do with any serious business. [...] [T]here is much that you do not doubt,
in the least. Now that which you do not at all doubt, you must and do regard as infallible,
absolute truth.” (CP 5.416.)
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must be accounted for – an undesirable situation that can only be remedied by
logic, which, according to Peirce, “may be defined as the science of the laws of
the stable establishment of beliefs” (CP 3.429).
Reluctantly, Peirce chooses the term inquiry for the “struggle to attain a
state of belief”, a struggle that is provoked by the stimulus of doubt, and he
states: “The sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion” (CW 3, 248).
Most importantly, Peirce finds the question whether the belief that has thus been
reached is true irrelevant for the study of inquiry, “for as soon as a firm belief
is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false” (CW 3,
248). This judgement clears the path for Peirce’s pragmatist account of truth: a
definition of truth in terms of inquiry.
Subsequently, four different methods with which our opinions can be settled
are individually reviewed: ‘the method of tenacity’, ‘the method of authority’, ‘the
a priori method’ (in which logical deduction already plays a part), and last but
not least, ‘the method of science’. Since the first three methods, albeit in different
ways, are all subject to the whims and fancies of man, and, as opposed to the
method of science, only strengthen a preconceived opinion and therefore cannot
guarantee the reliability of their results, Peirce rejects them and then favours the
method of science, that “tends to unsettle opinions at first, to change them and
to confirm a certain opinion which depends only on the nature of investigation
itself” (CW 3, 17):
To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should
be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by
some external permanency – by something upon which our thinking
has no effect. [...] It must be something which affects, or might
affect, every man. And, though these affections are necessarily as
various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be such
that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is
the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more
familiar language, is this: There are real things, whose characters are
entirely independent of our opinions about them; those realities affect
our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are
as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of
the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really
are, and any man, if he have sufficient experience and reason enough
about it, will be led to the one true conclusion. (CW 3, 253–254)12
Reality, even though it only shows its true face once ‘the final opinion’ has been
reached, and scientific method are the bulwarks that enable us to systematize the
12Cf. “[W]e may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody
may think them to be.” (CW 3, 271.)
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surging sea of subjective experience.13 As reality only becomes known once our
permanently ongoing inquiries have been completed, a description of that reality
should play no part in the investigation of scientific method.
2.2.1 Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning
Peirce, who is rarely consistent in his terminology, distinguishes two main classes
of inferences in scientific method: on the one hand there are explicative, analytic,
or deductive inferences,14 and on the other hand, ampliative, synthetic, or induc-
tive inferences (later, in the 1878 essay ‘Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis’,
Peirce subdivides the latter class into (1) the class of inductive inferences and (2)
the class of abductive inferences, also termed ‘hypothesis’). Although in math-
ematics, of which probability theory is a part, it is possible to limit the study
of proofs to the examination of deductive reasoning, “the only inferences which
increase our real knowledge” are synthetic inferences, as “the facts summed up in
the conclusion are not among those stated in the premises” (CW 3, 297).15 The
Kantian Peirce considers finding an answer to the question as to how synthetic
inferences are possible to be “the lock upon the door of philosophy” (CW 2, 268).
Peirce’s essay ‘The Probability of Induction’ is devoted to the following key
question: can synthetic inferences be reduced to analytic inferences? Despite
the fact that, in an earlier essay, Peirce commits himself to a different point of
13Quine goes even further and claims that our methods and techniques are also eligible for
revision: “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of ge-
ography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and
logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change
the picture, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience.”
[Quine, 1953, p. 42.] It would be a misconception, based on a sloppy interpretation of Peirce’s
views on quantitative induction, to state, as Ernest Nagel did, that Peirce “maintained that the
logical canons and methods of scientific inquiry have themselves been obtained in the course of
inquiry, and that they are ‘self-corrective’ – both in the sense that hypotheses about statistical
or other properties of populations can be improved by continued use of those logical methods, as
well as in the sense that limitations and defects in those methods can be discovered in the very
process of using them, and can be remedied by supplementing established methods with new
ones suggested by problems encountered in inquiry.” [Nagel, 1982, p. 308.] According to Peirce,
reality and logic lie outside the domain of change. For a critique of Nagel’s interpretation, see
[Misak, 1991, Chapter 3, notably p. 111–119].
14As said before, deduction already plays a part in the ‘a priori method’, with which Peirce
particularly refers to philosophical systems that seem to comply with the Aristotelian ideal of
knowledge discussed in our introduction. According to Peirce, it is in fact the evidence postulate
that plays tricks on the method we use to settle our opinions: “The most perfect example of it
[the a priori method; amt] is to be found in the history of metaphysical philosophy. Systems of
this sort have not usually rested upon any observed facts, at least not in any degree. They have
chiefly been adopted because their fundamental propositions seemed ‘agreeable to reason’” (CW
3, 252). Among others, Peirce’s logic can be seen as an attempt to eradicate the subjectivist
appeal to evidence or insight in epistemology and to locate the actual underlying rules of these
faculties.
15Making a diagnosis is a good example of ampliative reasoning.
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view,16 deductive reasoning certainly does not lay down the standard for the
judgement of all reasoning: “[I]t is only an absurd attempt to reduce synthetic
to analytic reason” (CW 3, 301). Peirce arrives at this negative conclusion after
discussing as clearly and as forcibly as possible the most eligible candidate for an
eventual reduction, the ‘frequency theory of probability’,17 in which, in accordance
with Venn, probability is interpreted “as the proportion of times in which an
occurence of one kind is accompanied by an occurence of another kind” (CW 3,
291). Nevertheless, there are clearly unbridgeable differences between analytic
and synthetic reasoning,18 differences that Peirce articulates as follows:
When we draw a deductive or analytic conclusion, our rule of inference
is that facts of a certain general character are either invariably or in
a certain proportion of cases accompanied by facts of another general
character. Then our premise being a fact of the former class, we
infer with certainty or with the appropriate degree of probability the
existence of a fact of the second class. But the rule for synthetic
inference is of a different kind. [...] [S]ynthetic inference is founded
upon a classification of facts, not according to their characters, but
according to the manner of obtaining them. Its rule is, that a number
of facts obtained in a given way will in general more or less resemble
other facts obtained in the same way; or, experiences whose conditions
are the same will have the same general characters.
[...] [I]n the case of analytic inference we know the probability of
our conclusion (if the premises are true), but in the case of synthetic
inferences we only know the trustworthiness of our proceeding. As all
knowledge comes from synthetic inference, we must equally infer that
all human certainty consists merely in our knowing that the processes
by which our knowledge has been derived are such as must generally
have led to true conclusions. (CW 3, 305)19
16In ‘The Doctrine of Chances’, Peirce verges on a reductionism which he then fervently
refutes in the next essay. He writes: “The theory of probabilities is simply the science of logic
quantitatively treated” (CW 3, 278), and on top of that he adds (after all, the first quote
certainly does not rule out a qualitative logic): “The general problem of probabilities is, for a
given state of facts, to determine the numerical probability of a possible fact. This is the same
as to inquire how much the given facts are worth, considered as evidence to prove the possible
fact. Thus the problem of probabilities is simply the general problem of logic.” (CW 3, 278.)
17The term is from [Kneale, 1949, p. 150].
18See also Peirce’s explanation in CW 3, 324–325.
19The reader’s attention should be drawn to the epistemic component of synthetic inferences,
which after all are based on “a classification of facts [...] according to the manner of obtaining
them.” See also Hookway, who writes about synthetic inferences: “According to Peirce, their
ampliative character is reflected in the fact that whether an inductive or hypothetical argument
is a good one depends on the non-existence of some other knowledge”. [Hookway, 1985, p. 31–
32.]
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Now that the attempt to base inductive inference solidly on probability theory
has run aground, Peirce reassures the reader: after all, the trustworthiness of
inductive reasoning can be substantiated with the concept of limits: “Though a
synthetic inference cannot by any means be reduced to deduction, yet that the
rule of induction will hold good in the long run may be deduced from the principle
that reality is only the object of the final opinion to which sufficient investigation
would lead” (CW 3, 305). Nevertheless, knowledge acquired through the ‘logic
of science’ is especially susceptible to error because of its essentially synthetic
character:
That we ever do discover the precise nature of things, that any in-
duction whatever is absolutely without exception, is what we have no
right to assume. (CW 3, 317)
2.2.2 Deduction, Induction, and Abduction
The special nature of Peirce’s logical investigations into the conditions of induc-
tion and abduction can be better understood by setting these investigations off
against for example Russell’s ideas concerning the relation between reason and
intuition. Russell, who like Peirce is convinced of the untenability of the Aris-
totelian ideal of knowledge, in which reliance on intuition is essential in order to
justify the fundamental principles, writes in his well-known essay ‘Mysticism and
Logic’ of 1914:
Instinct, intuition, or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which
subsequent reason confirms or confutes; but the confirmation, where
it is possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other
beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonising, controlling force
rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realm, it
is insight that first arrives at what is new. [Russell, 1917, p. 13]
Russell banishes insight from the realm of reason, so that any investigation into
the conditions on the basis of which insight is reached is out of the question. Only
once insight has been found, its tenability is tested by rational means.20
In his 1868 essay ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’,
Peirce targets different claims concerning intuition and denies that we have an
“intuitive faculty of distinguishing intuitive from mediate cognitions” (CW 2,
200). He points out that many supposed intuitions imperceptibly are still the re-
sult of reasoning,21 and this encourages him to include these cognitive phenomena
20Reichenbach’s distinction between ‘context of discovery’ and ‘context of justification’ also
should be understood in this context.
21Peirce’s thesis of the omnipresence of reasoning in the acquisition of knowledge is exemplified
in the following quotes: “[W]hen the reasoning is easy and natural to us, however complex may
be the premises, they sink into insignificance and oblivion proportionally to the satisfactoriness
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in the domain of logic and consequently to champion the systematic investigation
of non-deductive types of inference: according to Peirce, logic is “the doctrine of
truth, its nature and the manner in which it is to be discovered” (CW 3, 14).
In the 1866 Lowell Lectures, Peirce already distinguishes between two types of
ampliative inference, induction and hypothesis, a distinction that is made within
the framework of Aristotelian syllogistic. Even in 1878, Peirce maintained –
falsely, for that matter – that “all inference may be reduced in some way to
Barbara” (CW 3, 323), but, with the considerations of the previous subsection in
mind, he keeps his options open: “[A]s long as the is [the copula in Barbara; amt]
is taken literally, no inductive reasoning can be put into this form” (CW 3, 324).
Nevertheless, the logical form to which inductive reasoning as well as abductive
reasoning can be reduced is still linked to the form of the syllogism. After all,
Peirce’s examples only include propositions in subject-predicate form, and each
inference invariably consists of two premises and one conclusion. Consequently,
combinatorics show us that this straitjacket not only suits Barbara, the patron
saint of deductive reasoning, but that it also fits the two ‘new’ types of reasoning,
induction and abduction. Therefore, the strength of Peirce’s distinctions does
not necessarily reside in the recognition of the latter two types of reasoning, but
rather in the independent status that Peirce gives them, and as a result, in the
incitement to investigate under which conditions these types of reasoning are
sound.
As an introduction to the definition of inductive and abductive inference,
Peirce first discusses deductive reasoning, which is characterized by “the applica-
tion of general rules to particular cases”, and comes up with the following example
(which is not, strictly speaking, of the form Barbara):
Deduction
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
Case. — These beans are from this bag.
.˙. Result. — These beans are white.
In an earlier article from the same lectures series, in which induction is instead
examined in a more statistical context, Peirce, priding himself on originality,
defines an inductive inference as follows:
The inference that a previously designated character has nearly the
same frequency of occurence in the whole of a class that it has in a
sample drawn at random out of that class is induction. (CW 3, 313)
Such an inference “only has its full force when the character concerned has been
designated before examining the sample” (CW 3, 316), a reference by Peirce to
of the theory based upon them” (CW 2, 199), and “there is no judgment of pure observation
without reasoning” (CW 3, 300).
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the difference in forcefulness between the following considerations: (1) predicting
that half the beans from a given bag of beans are white, then seeing that approx-
imately half the beans from a handful of beans from the given bag are white, and
concluding that half the beans from the bag concerned are white; and (2) seeing
that approximately half the beans from a handful of beans from a given bag of
beans are white and concluding that half the beans from the bag concerned are
white. The latter reasoning is obviously the weakest.
This striking distinction is no longer found in the essay ‘Deduction, Induction,
and Hypothesis’, in which the definition of inductive reasoning is adapted to a
syllogistic context: “[I]nduction is the inference of the rule from the case and
result”. A little further on, we read:
Induction is where we generalize from a number of cases of which
something is true, and infer that the same thing is true of a whole class.
Or, where we find a certain thing to be true of a certain proportion
of cases and infer that it is true of the same proportion of the whole
class. (CW 3, 326)
This description serves to elucidate the following example:
Induction
Case. — These beans are from this bag.
Result. — These beans are white.
.˙. Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
Abductive reasoning, here still termed ‘hypothesis’ by Peirce, actually consists
of “the inference of a case from a rule and result” and is somewhat clarified by
the following words:
Hypothesis is where we find some very curious circumstance, which
would be explained by the supposition that it was a case of a certain
general rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition. Or, where we
find that in certain respects two objects have a strong resemblance,
and infer that they resemble one another strongly in other respects.
(CW 3, 326)
Peirce illustrates his claims with the following reasoning:
Abduction
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
Result. — These beans are white.
.˙. Case. — These beans are from this bag.
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Then Peirce comes up with a condition by which abductive inferences, which in
current literature on argumentation theory are also discussed under the overall
heading ‘inferences to the best explanation’, can be properly evaluated, even if
they are only “a weak kind of argument”:
When we adopt a certain hypothesis, it is not alone because it will
explain the observed facts, but also because the contrary hypothesis
would probably lead to results contrary to those observed. (CW 3,
328)
According to Peirce, the following clearer rules should be adopted “in order that
the process of making an hypothesis should lead to a probable result”:
1. The hypothesis should be distinctly put as a question, before mak-
ing the observations which are to test its truth. In other words, we
must try to see what the result of predictions from the hypothesis will
be.
2. The respect in regard to which the resemblances are noted must be
taken at random. We must not take a particular kind of predictions
for which the hypothesis is known to be good.
3. The failures as well as the successes of the predictions must be hon-
estly noted. The whole proceeding must be fair and unbiased. (CW
3, 331)
However, there is also a condition that hypotheses have to meet before they
can even be allowed to serve as a conclusion of an abductive inference: it must
be possible to verify whether the abductive inference, of which the hypothesis
concerned is the conclusion, complies with the rules mentioned above, that is, the
hypothesis must make predictions that are verifiable. In short, it must comply
with Peirce’s pragmatic maxim: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably
have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then,
our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (CW
3, 266).22 Hypotheses without any practical effects cannot be evaluated correctly
using the rules of abduction. The admissibility of an hypothesis is determined by
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, the tenability of an hypothesis is (among other things)
determined by the said three conditions of abduction.23
By way of conclusion, Peirce discusses at some length the similarities, but
especially the differences between induction and abduction. With regard to their
role in the formulation of scientific theories, Peirce claims (note the epistemic
component in both cases):
22Unlike the verification criterion advocated by certain members of the Vienna Circle, hy-
potheses in the field of logic and mathematics also come under Peirce’s pragmatic criterion. It
would be getting too far off the subject to discuss Peirce’s philosophy of mathematics here.
23Misak gives a list of Peirce’s abduction criteria and their locations [Misak, 1991, p. 99] that
would have relished Lakatos, but unfortunately she confuses the admissibility and the tenability
of hypotheses.
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By induction, we conclude that facts, similar to observed facts, are
true in cases not examined. By hypothesis, we conclude the existence
of a fact quite different from anything observed, from which, according
to known laws, something observed would necessarily result. The
former, is reasoning from particulars to the general law; the latter,
from effect to cause. The former classifies, the latter explains. (CW
3, 332)
Abductive reasoning allows us to conclude facts that are beyond direct observa-
tion,24 which makes abduction an indispensable part of scientific method.
Our forever temporary beliefs determine the expectations on which our actions
are based. An unforeseen experience undermines our beliefs, so that an inquiry
is needed to re-establish the lost equilibrium and to overcome the doubt caused
by the unforeseen experience. Such an inquiry follows certain specific rules that
can be formulated and that are subdivided into three main types: abduction, de-
duction and induction. (Qualitative) induction provides us with classifications of
our observations, expressed in ‘empirical formulæ’. In turn, these often not fully
accurate generalizations (our observations are often inaccurate) serve as a basis
for an explanatory hypothesis that is tested by checking whether the predictions
derived from this hypothesis add up. (Quantitative) induction plays a part in
testing the hypothesis. Although essentially uncertain, the result of this inquiry,
precisely due to the fact that it has undergone the procedure followed and thus
warrants a ‘maximum of expectation’ and a ‘minimum of surprise’, supplies a
sufficient basis for our thoughts and actions, until once again an unforeseen expe-
rience compels us to start a new inquiry. By open-mindedly and conscientiously
following this procedure of ‘belief–doubt–belief’, we would eventually arrive at a
set of beliefs that no experience can contradict, a pattern of expectations that
will never have any surprises in store for us: the Truth.
2.3 Truth in Terms of Inquiry
Among all the current philosophical wrangling about truth, there are several
authors calling themselves pragmatists, who maybe do not actually define, but
at least provide an account of the concept of truth or of the somewhat broader
‘warranted assertability’ more or less in terms of a theory of scientific inquiry, and
whose work is within the scope of the subject matter discussed in this chapter.25
24Cf. “The great difference between induction and hypothesis is, that the former infers the
existence of phenomena such as we have observed in cases which are similar, while hypothesis
supposes something of a different kind from what we have directly observed, and frequently
something which it would be impossible for us to observe directly.” (CW 3, 335–336.)
25[Jardine, 1986, p. 21–35]; [Misak, 1991, passim] and [Misak, 1998]; [Putnam, 1981, p. 49–
74] and [Putnam, 1990, p. 223] (in the preface to Realism with a Human Face, Putnam rejects
interpretations of his definition of truth as “an idealization of rational acceptability” in terms
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From this literature I have selected Cheryl Misak’s study Truth and the End of
Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth (1991), because she undertook not only to
make a meticulous reconstruction of Peirce’s doctrines, but also to defend them.
In this section I will weigh her arguments on a gold platter to see if they have
the right content.
As noted before, Peirce, who attempted to describe inquiry without reference
to the concept of truth, insists on understanding truth (and falsehood) in terms of
inquiry: “[T]he ideas of truth and falsehood, in their full development, appertain
exclusively to the scientific method of settling opinion.” (CW 3, 272) It will be
clear – just a minimum of historical awareness will do – that the relation between
truth and inquiry cannot simply be situated in the assumption that the results of
scientific investigation are true. Peirce, who was familiar with the developments
in the sciences of his time, seized the opportunity to argue for his explication of
truth in terms of inquiry as follows:
[A]ll the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of
investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution
to every question to which they can be applied. [...] They may at
first obtain different results, but, as each perfects his methods and his
processes, the results will move steadily towards a destined centre. So
with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most
antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by
a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This
activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to
a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification
of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no
natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate
opinion. This great law is embodied in the conception of truth and
reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain
reality. (CW 3, 273)
This is a remarkable definition, not only because of the deterministic character
attributed to inquiry, but also because of the fact that Peirce’s explication of
truth in terms of inquiry fully depends on an ostensibly mathematical concept of
limits, a concept that is fundamental to crucial aspects of Peirce’s work.26
of a Peircean ideal limit of inquiry); [Reynolds, 2000].
26In his article ‘The Doctrine of Chances’, after pointing out that human life is finite (“death
makes the numbers of our risks, of our inferences, finite, and so makes their mean result uncer-
tain” (CW 3, 283–284)), Peirce discusses the way in which, in the long run, a probability can
be assigned to a probabilistic inference: “I can see but one solution of it. It seems to me that
we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited.
They must not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This community,
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In her Truth and the End of Inquiry, Misak supports a favourable interpreta-
tion of Peirce’s explication of the concept of truth, an explication that, according
to her, should not be interpreted as a definition of truth, but as a supplement
to Tarski’s correct but empty convention T .27 In Misak’s argument, well in-
terspersed with quotations, Peirce’s deliberations with regard to the concept of
truth are eventually condensed into the following two subjunctive conditionals,
that however do not have an equal status: the first, the so-called T–I conditional
(from truth to inquiry) is a regulative assumption, the second, the I–T conditional
(from inquiry to truth), a claim:
(T–I) if H is true then if inquiry relevant to H were pursued as far as it
could fruitfully go, H would be believed. [Misak, 1991, p. 43]
(I–T) if, if inquiry relevant to H were to be pursued as far as it could
fruitfully go, thenH would be believed, thenH is true. [Misak, 1991,
p. 46]
2.3.1 The T–I Conditional versus Bivalence
Misak defends her refusal to assume the burden of proof for the T–I conditional
by denying that it is a claim: according to her, we have to take into account the
possibility that this conditional does not apply, a possibility of which Peirce was
also aware. Namely, if indispensable material concerning a certain hypothesis has
been lost once and for all, it is very unlikely that an endless series of investigations
will finally provide definitive proof for or against the hypothesis concerned. Peirce
writes:
again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of beings with whom we can come
into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, however vaguely, beyond this
geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole
world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the
social principle.” (CW 3, 284.) A little further on he writes: “But all this requires a conceived
identification of one’s interests with those of an unlimited community.” (CW 3, 285.) Induction,
too, is eventually justified with a reference to the final opinion: “[T]hat the rule of induction
will hold good in the long run may be deduced from the principle that reality is only the object
of the final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead.” (CW 3, 305.)
27Misak remarks that “Tarski leaves open what it takes for a given sentence (or object) to
satisfy the condition” [Misak, 1991, p. 127] and “the Tarski-style definition tells us nothing
substantial about the property truth. Like the correspondence formula, it does not tell us what
to expect of true hypotheses and it does not tell us how to go about inquiring into the truth
of hypotheses. [...] In its efforts to refrain from invoking anything mysterious it fails to engage
the truth with anything so as to give us a grasp of the predicate ‘is true’” [Misak, 1991, p. 128].
Wright contests these statements in the first chapter of [Wright, 1992].
As a matter of fact, Tarski’s convention T is not ‘correct’; after all, it cannot handle the liar’s
paradox. Successful attempts to sidestep this problem with a fixed-point construction stem
from [Kripke, 1975].
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But I may be asked what I have to say to all the minute facts of history,
forgotten never to be recovered, to the lost books of the ancients, to
the buried secrets. [...] Do these things not really exist because they
are hopelessly beyond the reach of our knowledge? (CW 3, 274)
Here the principle of bivalence,28 not to be confused with the principle of the
excluded middle,29 comes into play. After all, if we are unable to gather enough
evidence in regard to a certain hypothesis H, H could, if we strictly apply the
definition, be neither true nor false, which is inconsistent with the principle of
bivalence that states that each hypothesis is either true or false.30
The solution for this problem that Nicholas Jardine puts forward in The For-
tunes of Inquiry (1986) – “we must imaginatively escape from the spatio-temporal
limitations on the evidence-gathering capacities of ourselves and other physi-
cally possible inquirers. The fiction of time-travel provides [...] precisely what
is needed” [Jardine, 1986, p. 30] – is evidently rejected forthright by Misak.31
Because Misak sees no other way out, the possibility is kept open that some ques-
tions may never be answered,32 which implies that there is no need to look for
arguments to substantiate the T–I conditional. Still, Peirce and Misak do not
throw in the towel:
Logic requires us, with reference to each question we have in hand, to
hope some definite answer to it may be true. That hope with reference
to each case as it comes up is, by a saltus, stated by logicians as a law
concerning all cases, namely the law of the excluded middle. (NE iv,
xiii)33
28In this connection, Crispin Wright uses the word completeness: “The requirement of com-
pleteness would be that, for each statement, either it or its negation must be justified under
epistemically ideal circumstances.” [Wright, 1992, p. 39.]
29The principle of the excluded middle, according to which each statement H ∨ ¬H is true,
can be maintained in the absence of the principle of bivalence. For technical details, see Bas
van Fraassen’s study on supervaluations [Van Fraassen, 1966].
30Hookway remarks: “It is a prima facie implausible feature of the doctrine that it suggests
that there is no fact of the matter whether such propositions are true.” [Hookway, 1985, p. 38.]
It may be clear that on the grounds of Peirce’s conception of reality a correspondence theory
of truth is not an option for Peirce: “[H]ow futile it was to imagine that we were to clear up
the idea of truth by the more occult idea of reality!” (CP 1.578.)
31“A strategy involving counterfactual bravado abandons the pragmatist’s commitment to say
something about the relationship between truth and inquiry [...] and replaces it with a claim
about what the relationship between truth and inquiry would be if inquiry were something it
is not.” [Misak, 1991, p. 153–154.]
32Peirce notes: “We cannot be quite sure that the community ever will settle down to an
unalterable conclusion upon any given question. Even if they do so for the most part, we have
no reason to think the unanimity will be quite complete, nor can we rationally presume any
overwhelming consensus of opinion will be reached upon every question.” (CP 6.610.)
33Cf. “[I]t is unphilosophical to suppose that, with regard to any given question (which
has any clear meaning), investigation would not bring forth a solution of it, if it were carried
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Misak promptly promotes this hope to the status of a regulative assumption –
assumptions do not have to be defended – in inquiry, and even speaks of “the hope
of bivalence” [Misak, 1991, p. 147], so that the principle of bivalence is secured:
The inquirer must assume, for a hypothesis which is thought to be
objective, that there is a chance that inquiry would eventually settle
on its truth-value. [Misak, 1991, p. 141]
However, Misak does not blindly rely on the charity of the reader and presents
him with a somewhat contrived consideration: “The fact that the regulative as-
sumption is foolish with respect to a particular issue will coincide with the fact
that no one will inquire into that issue.” [Misak, 1991, p. 157.] Furthermore,
Misak expresses the opinion that we have no right to claim that a certain hy-
pothesis will never have any truth-value, because after all, the T–I conditional
shows us that first the final opinion has to be reached before we can justify such
a claim. “But since the antecedent of this conditional [that is, the consequent of
the T–I conditional; amt] is about what would be the case if inquiry were pushed
indefinitely far, we can never assert it is fulfilled.” [Misak, 1991, p. 156].
Can the principle of bivalence be defended more convincingly and without
astute quiddities? In his ‘What Price Bivalence?’, Quine commends bivalence as
a basic characteristic of our classical theories of nature:
It has us positing a true-false dichotomy across all the statements
that we can express in our theoretical vocabulary, irrespective of our
knowing how to decide them. In keeping with our theories of nature
we have viewed all such sentences as having factual content, however
remote from observation. In this way simplicity of theory has been
served. [Quine, 1981, p. 36]
The gist of the principle of bivalence is that we assume that even statements
whose evidence has been lost once and for all are nevertheless either true or false:
We declare that it is either true or false that there was an odd number
of blades of grass in Harvard Yard at the dawn of Commencement Day,
1903. The matter is undecidable, but we maintain that there is a fact
of the matter. [Quine, 1981, p. 32]
Quine does not feel inclined to defend bivalence by shielding it from possible
criticism, as Misak did with her ‘hope of bivalence’. Because Misak, as we shall
see, rejects the epistemological holism on which Quine’s defence of the principle
of bivalence is based, it is not open to her to follow Quine’s plausible strategy in
order to strengthen her rather feeble position:
far enough.” (CW 3, 274.) On other crucial points of argument in his epistemology, Peirce
also addresses the hope that everything will turn out all right in the end. Thus “hope in the
unlimited continuance of intellectual activity” (CW 3, 285) is Peirce’s final resort for the defence
of the possibility to attribute a probability to inferences.
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The question about the grass of 1903 hinged, one felt, on a robust
matter of fact. Still, being clearly indecidable, the question makes
empirical sense to us only by analogy and extrapolation. It makes
sense because we often do count things, and are prepared even to
count present blades of grass. We project these vivid notions into
the inaccessible past as a matter of course, such is the organisation of
our system of the world. [...] This undecidable question [...] makes
empirical sense to us only by virtue of the devious connections between
our systematic theory of the world and the various observations to
which the system as a whole is answerable. [Quine, 1981, p. 35]
2.3.2 The I–T Conditional is Wide of the Mark
Let us now take a closer look at the I–T conditional and try to beat the pragma-
tists at their own game. Royce and Russell had already stated that the antecedent
of the I–T conditional could not be a material implication, and in this chapter we
will demonstrate that even a pragmatist cannot pull it off with a counterfactual.
It may be useful to start with Misak’s argumentation for her pragmatist ac-
count of truth. The main argument for the I–T conditional runs as follows:
suppose we have exhaustively investigated an hypothesis H and have come to the
conclusion that H is the case. Then it could not be that a possible experience,
whatever its origin may be, could still undermine this conclusion, since this would
only mean that our inquiries have not been fully exhaustive. Peirce’s pragmatic
principle (“there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything
but a possible difference of practice” (CW 3, 265)) prohibits us to withhold the
predicate ‘true’ from H.34 Peirce writes:
To believe the absolute truth would be to have such a belief that
under no circumstance, such as would actually occur, should we find
ourselves surprised. (MS 693, 166) [Misak, 1991, p. 87]
As stated, Royce and Russell make clear that the implication in the antecedent
of our conditional cannot be a material implication:35 Royce and Russell ask
whether beliefs are in fact true as long as the possibility still exists that the final
opinion may never be reached.36 Their argument can be strengthened as follows:
34Misak rhetorically asks: “When we have beliefs that would forever withstand the tests of
experience and argument, what is the point of refusing to confer upon them the title ‘true’?”
[Misak, 1991, p. 47.]
35See also Hookway 1985, 38–39.
36William Kneale takes it one step further: “It is surely false, however, that the possibility
of rational action in the circumstances we are considering depends on the prospects of survival
of the human race. And even if we were sure that the human race would survive for ever and
were animated by the most devoted altruism, we could attach no meaning to the promise of an
advantage which was to be realized only at the end of infinite duration.” [Kneale, 1949, p. 166.]
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suppose that our investigations relevant to H will never be completed. Then, of
course, the fact also applies that our investigations relevant to ¬H will never be
completed. In that case, the statements “inquiry relevant to H has been pursued
as far as it could fruitfully go” and “inquiry relevant to ¬H has been pursued as
far as it could fruitfully go” are both false. Therefore, the material implications
“if inquiry relevant to H has been pursued as far as it could fruitfully go, then
H is believed” and “if inquiry relevant to ¬H has been pursued as far as it could
fruitfully go, then ¬H is believed” are both true. Now, suppose that the I–T
conditional is correct. Then we have, firstly “if, if inquiry relevant to H has
been pursued as far as it could fruitfully go, then H is believed, then H is true”
and secondly, “if, if inquiry relevant to ¬H has been pursued as far as it could
fruitfully go, then ¬H is believed, then ¬H is true”. With modus ponens, it now
follows that “H is true” and “¬H is true”, which obviously was not intended.
So understanding the implication in the antecedent of the I–T conditional as a
material implication just will not wash; after all, it cannot be argued that the
final opinion will always be reached.
Misak repeatedly claims that the problem mentioned above disappears like
snow in summer if the antecedent of the I–T conditional is a subjunctive condi-
tional. Though he does not mention Misak, Crispin Wright (his critique is aimed
primarily at Peirce’s account of truth) attacks this claim in his Truth and Objec-
tivity (1992). Wright sidesteps Quine’s second dogma – the dogma of reductionism
– by advocating a holistic approach to evidence: “[A]ny piece of information may,
in the context of an appropriate epistemic background, be relevant to any partic-
ular belief.” [Wright, 1992, p. 45.]37 This means, according to Wright, that we
can only speak of “epistemically ideal circumstances” if we have all the empirical
information at our disposal.
[I]t is hard to see how a subject who somehow accomplished a Peircean
state of comprehensive empirical information, could have any intima-
tion that she had done so. By what principle could a subject discount
the idea that there was still more to learn? But that reflection sets
up a tension within any account of truth of the Peircean sort. For the
idea that what is true is what a subject meeting certain conditions, C,
would be in a position to acknowledge directly requires that a subject
who was actually in conditions C – a subject of whom it was true that
she was in conditions C – would be in position to acknowledge the fact.
If such an acknowledgment would be impossible, then the antecedents
of the subjunctive conditional which, on a Peircean view, explicate
37Contrary to Misak, Christopher Hookway seems to regard Peirce’s account of truth as
holistic: “Peirce defends a substantive theory of truth, which sees as true those propositions
that enter into some ideally coherent body of opinions.” [Hookway, 1985, p. 70.] Because, as we
shall see, it has no bearing on the purpose of our argument whether Peirce’s position is holistic
or not, the issue will not be pursued here.
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what it is for a thought to be true, are uniformly false on purely con-
ceptual grounds. Since the status of subjunctive conditionals with
conceptually impossible antecedents is, by and large, extremely moot,
that is bad news for Peircean views of truth. [Wright, 1992, p. 46]
In her recent ‘Deflating Truth: Pragmatism vs. Minimalism’ (1998), Misak de-
fends herself against this ostensibly devastating criticism by saying that “the
pragmatist can and should stay away from the ideas of total evidence and epis-
temically ideal conditions. Inquiry [...] is not to be thought of as global, complete
inquiry, where every question is decided, including the question of whether inquiry
is complete.” [Misak, 1998, p. 413.] In short, Misak rejects Wright’s argumenta-
tion, because Wright postulates a holism in regard to relevance that Misak does
not share. However, Misak leaves the reader in the dark about arguments against
this holism (a hiatus that seriously weakens her argument), but aside from that,
she overlooks the fact that Wright’s pitfalls also function without the postulation
of holism.
I will now demonstrate that Misak’s defence is incomplete to say the least,
while I suspect that it can only be supplemented coherently if pragmatism is
renounced. Let us assume, like Misak, that we can never be sure whether or not
our inquiry relevant to an hypothesis H has been exhaustive:
The pragmatist is a fallibilist and will simply agree that a person could
never know that inquiry into a given question (never mind inquiry tout
court) had been pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. [Misak, 1998,
p. 414]38
The pragmatist programme prohibits us to attribute any truth to the statement
“inquiry has been pursued as far as it could fruitfully go”, because after all, “what
is incapable of being known is [...] not real at all” (CW 3, 319) and “cognizability
(in its widest sense) and being are not merely metaphysically the same, but are
synonymous terms” (CW 2, 208).39 This cripples Misak’s pragmatist account of
truth: the assumption with which the main argument for the I–T conditional
starts, namely that our inquiries relevant to hypothesis H have been absolutely
exhaustive, immediately leads to a contradiction, from which everything follows,
at least in standard logics. Each counterfactual with that same antecedent is
therefore true, and so the sentences “if, if inquiry relevant toH were to be pursued
as far as it could fruitfully go, then H would be believed, then H is true” and “if,
38Cf. “[S]ince the antecedent of this conditional is about what would be the case if inquiry
were pushed indefinitely far, we can never assert that it is fulfilled.” [Misak, 1991, p. 156.]
39See also: “[I]f in respect to some question – say that of the freedom of the will – no matter
how long the discussion goes on, no matter how scientific our methods may become, there never
will be a time when we can fully satisfy ourselves either that the question has no meaning, or
that one answer or the other explains the facts, then in regard to that question, there certainly
is no truth.” (CP 5.565.)
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if inquiry relevant to H were to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go, then H
would be disbelieved, then H is true” are equivalent under Misak’s assumption
that we can never know whether our inquiries relevant to a certain question have
been exhaustive. In short, even without referring to some form of holism, Wright’s
argument works.40
Of course, this attack may be parried with the claim that it is in fact possible
to know whether we have reached the final opinion relevant to a certain question.
This is the path Crispin Wright takes following his critique of Peircean theories of
truth so as to give the skeleton of his ‘minimalist’ programme some flesh by con-
structing at least one possible truth predicate. Wright, who apparently subscribes
to Putnam’s statement that “the justification conditions for sentences change as
our total body of knowledge changes, and cannot be taken as fixed once and for
all” [Putnam, 1983, p. 85], sidesteps this problem by coming up with his own
candidate – superassertibility – for a truth predicate:
A statement is superassertible [...] if and only if it is, or can be, war-
ranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny
of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms
of improvement of our information. [Wright, 1992, p. 48]
Wright claims to be using the concepts ‘information state’ and ‘improvement’
in a purely formal sense, but fails – and that is the long and the short of it –
to frame those terms in a formal theory. Many often crucial questions therefore
remain unanswered: first, if Wright wishes his truth predicate ‘superassertibility’
to give out more than just the aura of a gratuitous suggestion, he will be re-
quired to answer the following question: given an information state σ, in which a
proposition φ is warranted, how can it be demonstrated (or refuted) that for each
improvement (whatever it may be) σ′ of σ the proposition φ is still warranted?
In Quine’s view, however, such a proof can never be provided: “Any statement
can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere
in the system.” [Quine, 1953, p. 43.] If Quine and Wright were to solve this
conflict of opinions, it is not a feasible option to forsake Wright’s minimalist
programme and resort to the endorsement of an overall philosophical system
– in that way, the adversaries would only entrench themselves –; it would be
preferable to investigate whether our methods of inquiry actually can warrant
the permanence that Wright desires and that Quine detests: this is a problem of
logic.
Secondly: suppose that a proof exists for the permanence of a given proposi-
tion φ, can this proof be extended to a statement about superassertible proposi-
40A second, if somewhat insipid objection lies in the annoying circumstance that the truth
(Misak disguises this problem by speaking of correctness [Misak, 1991, p. 69]) of the I–T condi-
tional, like the truth of all other statements, can only be determined once our inquiries into I–T
have been completed, regardless of any convincing argument that may have been put forward
presently.
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tions independently of Wright’s theory of the improvement of information states
and of propositions warranted by information states? (For example: exactly all
tautologies are superassertible, as they are in update semantics [Veltman, 1996].)
In this case, what is the rationale of Wright’s theory, if we can establish the char-
acteristic to be defined independently of his proposals? Without an elaborate
and well-argued formal theory of the phenomena that have been discussed, we
are unable to judge Wright’s argument, and as a result his considerations remain
sterile.
Furthermore, isn’t Wright just attempting to give an interpretation of the tra-
ditional static concept of truth?41 Should we still be taking such a notion of truth
seriously when attempting to develop a consistently naturalistic epistemology?
2.4 Conclusion
As we have seen, the strong need that many philosophers feel to interpret the tra-
ditional, static notions of truth and reality that are linked with the Aristotelian
ideal of knowledge, cannot be satisfied by Peirce’s theory of scientific inquiry.
However, in spite of his incoherent theorizing in this matter, Peirce’s attempts to
understand human cognition from a fundamentally dynamic perspective deserve
every credit, not lastly because they offer us an alternative for the Aristotelian
ideal of knowledge. Before tackling the tricky themes of theoretical philosophy
and rushing into definitions of the concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’, it is advisable
to gain a thorough understanding of the dynamics of human cognition. Only when
we have articulated the mechanisms of the acquisition and revision of knowledge
with sufficient accuracy, will we be able, on the basis of these formal-logical in-
vestigations, to provide a more than tentative answer to well-defined and detailed
epistemological questions concerning the relation between ‘warranted assertabil-
ity’ and ‘truth’.
41“The idea of a statement whose complete and final warrant is wholly available to the speaker
himself no matter what happens – or of a speaker who neither needs nor can benefit from the
data of others – is precisely the old notion of knowledge which is private and incorrigible.”
[Putnam, 1987, p. 53.]
Chapter 3
Isaac Levi’s Epistemology: A Critique
3.1 Isaac Levi’s Epistemology
Isaac Levi, professor at the Columbia University of New York since 1970, is first
and foremost a philosopher for technicality buffs: using a rather idiosyncratic
terminology based on logic and probability theory, he puts forward his episte-
mological tenets in a voluminous series of publications. Levi defends a radical
new perspective on a number of traditional epistemological issues, while firmly
re-establishing the bond between logic and epistemology, which has been increas-
ingly loosening during the past forty years. Furthermore, Levi is the main pioneer
and initiator of contemporary logical-philosophical research into belief change.
Levi places himself explicitly within the tradition of American pragmatism. Ac-
cordingly, some of the keynotes of Levi’s epistemology can only be understood
properly when placed against the background of American pragmatism.
3.1.1 Non-Deductive Logic and the Belief-Doubt-Belief
Model
The lawyers and scientists who in January 1872 founded the ‘Metaphysical Club’,
the cradle of American pragmatism, set out to combine the work of the British
psychologist Alexander Bain, who defined ‘belief’ as “that upon which a man is
prepared to act”, with considerations concerning the philosophy of law and the
theory of evolution in order to arrive at an overall theory of human thinking.
From the very beginning, the members of the club, among which William James
(1842–1910) and, albeit much later, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) would
gather most laurels, rejected the ubiquitous tenet that true knowledge is to be
modelled after mathematics.1
1The lawyer Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., one of the six key members of the Metaphysical
Club, writes in his The Common Law from 1881: “The law embodies the story of a nation’s
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One of the results of this heresy, which no American pragmatist would ever
repudiate, was that the field of logic, as opposed to the logical inquiries of Frege
and the early Russell, came to include not only mathematical reasoning, but, in
Peirce’s words, ‘the method of scientific investigation’ as well. John Dewey (1859–
1952) later explicitly advocated an even wider domain for logic: the very logic
of inquiry which leads to scientific results was also the methodological backbone
of ‘common sense’.2 Levi, whose continuity thesis owes much to the American
pragmatist tradition, is of the opinion that from a methodological point of view,
the same mechanisms underlie both ‘scientific inquiry’ and ‘practical deliberation’:
The difference between theoretical inquiry and practical deliberation
is a difference in goals and not a difference in the criteria for rational
choice that regulate efforts to realize these goals. [Levi, 1980, p. 73] 3
The first consequence of this wider interpretation of the field of methodological
inquiry was that the pragmatists, beginning with Peirce, placed non-deductive
reasoning, such as induction and abduction, at a central place of logic. However,
attempts of early American pragmatists to characterize non-deductive inferences
remained informal until the publication of Dewey’s methodological magnum opus
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in 1938. By that time, the necessary groundwork
had been done in Europe. Bertrand Russell and Rudolf Carnap grappled in vain
with formal solutions to justify, among others, generalizations: Russell’s Our
Knowledge of the External World (1914) en Carnap’sDer logische Aufbau der Welt
(1928) showed the failure of the endeavour to uncover the mechanisms by which
we acquire knowledge of the world on the basis of observations and making use of
the then recent instruments of mathematical logic and set theory. It emerged that
the conditions under which tentative extensions of our beliefs, such as for example
inductive inferences, are justified, could not be tackled with mathematical logic
and set theory. In 1950, Rudolf Carnap, who had been teaching at the University
of Chicago since 1936, presented in his Logical Foundations of Probability an
epoch-making treatment of non-deductive reasoning based on probability theory:
inductive logic was born. Isaac Levi was one among many working within this
development through many centuries and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is we must know
what it has been, and what it tends to become.” Quoted in [Kuklick, 1977, p. 50–51].
2According to Arthur Danto, this continuity thesis in the field of methodology is character-
istic for naturalism: “Naturalism [...] is a species of philosophical monism according to which
whatever exists or happens is natural in the sense of being susceptible to explanation through
methods which, although paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences, are continuous
from domain to domain of objects and events.” Quoted in [Keil and Schna¨delbach, 2000, p. 20].
Levi for his part actually sees the continuity thesis as the pivot of pragmatism: “What is ‘prag-
matic’ about pragmatism is the recognition of a common structure to practical deliberation and
cognitive inquiry in spite of the diversity of aims and values that may be promoted in diverse
deliberations and inquiries.” [Levi, 1991, p. 78.]
3See also [Levi, 1980, p. 16–19 and 23].
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philosophical research program which was especially strong during the seventies
and eighties.
The rejection of the axiomatic ideal as a standard for all knowledge4 in com-
bination with the acceptance of an evolutionist perspective, also had a second
consequence. While many epistemologists, including logical empiricists, focused
their attention mainly on the justification of the results of the acquisition of
knowledge, concentrating on the rational reduction of these results to their origins
(basic principles, Protokollsa¨tze, or sensory stimuli), the American pragmatists
chose a different perspective. Mainly through their agency, the process of belief
change became a respectable subject for epistemological study. In Levi’s opinion,
pedigree epistemology – Levi’s condescending expression for the epistemological
enterprise of justifying our beliefs by tracing them back to their origins by means
of a rational reconstruction – has proven to be a dead end. As an alternative
program, Levi suggests to investigate under which circumstances a change of our
current state of knowledge is justified:
Whatever its origins, human knowledge is subject to change. In sci-
entific inquiry, men seek to change it for the better. Epistemologists
ought to care for the improvement of knowledge rather than its pedi-
gree. [Levi, 1980, p. 1]
Levi, an advocate and pioneer of a normative approach in which adjustments
of epistemic states are investigated using a logical apparatus, aims at formulating
criteria under which a change of knowledge is also an improvement. It is not
Levi’s aim to describe how our knowledge actually changes,5 but how it reasonably
should change:
The central problem of epistemology ought to be [...] to provide a
systematic account of criteria for the improvement of knowledge. Al-
ternatively stated, the problem is to offer a systematic characteriza-
tion of conditions under which alterations in a corpus of knowledge
are legitimate or are justified. [Levi, 1976, p. 1]
Although Levi was not the first to put knowledge change on the logical agenda,
he is certainly the main initiator of its systematic investigation. Levi’s philo-
sophical forebears Peirce and Dewey already propagated a dynamic approach to
4Levi writes: “Following the tradition of Peirce and Dewey, I reject the requirement of
self-certified first premises and principles for justifications of belief.” [Levi, 1991, p. 4.]
5Since Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), in which he defends
a “new historiography of science”, it is accepted practice to explain belief changes in terms
of ‘revolutionary’ paradigm shifts. Context independent rational factors are supposed to only
play a marginal part in the explanation of paradigm shifts, since paradigms before and after a
scientific revolution appear to be incommensurable. Levi underplays the significance of these
“changes in conceptual framework” – “there are no revolutionary changes or, at any rate,
there should not be” [Levi, 1980, p. 68] – and actually wants to investigate, given a conceptual
framework, into the criteria on the basis of which our beliefs ought to be changed and improved.
Within such a conceptual framework all epistemic states are commensurable [Levi, 1991, p. 65].
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knowledge with their belief-doubt-belief model, which should be understood as the
first attempt at a logical description of the process of knowledge change. This
model can be broadly outlined as follows: our actual state of knowledge forms
a pattern of expectations, on which we base our actions. As long as we have
no reasonable cause to doubt (parts of) this current epistemic state, it makes no
sense to feign some Cartesian doubt, since after all there is “much that you do
not doubt, in the least. Now that which you do not at all doubt, you must and
do regard as infallible, absolute truth.” (Peirce, CP 5.416.) Nevertheless, change
is sometimes required. An experience “which really interferes with the smooth
working of the belief-habit” (Peirce, CP 5.510), and which therefore, unlike an
academic doubt, causes true doubt, shakes our opinions so that an inquiry be-
comes necessary to re-establish the lost equilibrium and to overcome the doubt
caused by this unforeseen experience. This inquiry will lead to a new state of
belief which, since it is the result of a procedure executed in accordance with the
rules of methodology, will constitute a firm and sufficient basis for our thoughts
and deeds, until an unforeseen experience forces us again to an inquiry.6 While
Peirce and Dewey focussed on a meticulous investigation of the criteria for knowl-
edge change,7 some of Levi’s other predecessors achieved an informal description
at most.8
6According to Levi, this model is “the greatest insight in the pragmatist tradition”
[Levi, 1991, p. 163].
7Dewey’s activities in the field of logic cover his whole philosophical career and find their
culmination in his work Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938). His earlier logical-philosophical
investigations are embodied in the Studies in Logical Theory (1903), in his more pedagogi-
cally oriented study How We Think (1910), and in the Essays in Experimental Logic (1916).
[Burke, 1994] gives a survey and a defence of Dewey’s studies in logic.
8See [James, 1907, p. 34–35]: “The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he
meets a new experience that puts them to a strain. [...] The result is an inward trouble to
which his mind till then has been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying
his previous mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we
are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to change first this opinion, and then that (for they
resist change very variously), until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the
ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some idea that mediates between the
stock and the new experience and runs them into one another most felicitously and expediently.
This new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves the older stock of truths with
a minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty, but
conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible. An outre´e explanation, violating
all our preconceptions, would never pass for a true account of a novelty. We should scratch
round industriously till we found something less excentric. The most violent revolutions in an
individual’s beliefs leave most of his old order standing. [...] New truth is always a go-between,
a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum
of jolt, a maximum of continuity.”
See also [Quine, 1953, p. 42]: “[T]otal science is like a field of force whose boundary condi-
tions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in
the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements.
Ree¨valuation of some statements entails ree¨valuation of others, because of their logical inter-
connections – the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system,
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Five years after the publication of Levi’s The Enterprise of Knowledge (1980),
in which formal criteria for rational revisions of epistemic states are defended,
Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson published a very elegant formalization
of some of the logical prerequisites for Levi’s ideas on knowledge change: the
harmonious overture to what has by now built up to a discipline of symphonic
proportions within the philosophy of logic, a discipline that is designated by the
terms ‘belief revision’, ‘belief change’ and ‘theory change’.9
In the past fifteen years, logical research into belief change has boomed, pro-
ducing a considerable amount and diversity of formal systems. Although there
have been elegant and ‘deep’ results and successful attempts at partial systemati-
zation,10 the reasons and motives for the construction of many systems frequently
leave much to be desired: often one tiny little problem gives rise to yet another
new system.11 As Levi is not only an initiator of research into belief change, but
also its most philosophical advocate – Levi is almost the only one to propound a
philosophical embedding for formal theories of belief change12 –, we will subject
Levi’s proposals for the modelling of belief change to a critical examination, hop-
ing that the conclusions that will be reached can be extrapolated to competing
systems for belief change, so that we can get a clearer picture of this branch of
philosophical logic.
3.1.2 Epistemic States and Their Representations
Before we actually can write down anything sensible about the mechanisms of
belief change, we must first know what is supposed to change. Levi distinguishes
between epistemic states (‘states of full belief’), our true states of knowledge on
the one hand, and representations of epistemic states (‘corpora’) on the other.
Although in his The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing (1991), Levi has gone
to many lengths to define and defend his preferred notion of ‘epistemic state’,13
we shall adopt Levi’s own policies for treating contraction and conditionals, and
concentrate on Levi’s proposals concerning the representations of epistemic states
certain further elements of the field. Having ree¨valuated one statement we must ree¨valuate some
others, which may be statements logically connected with the first or may be the statements of
logical connections themselves.”
9[Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson, 1985] For an introduction, see [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988]
and [Hansson, 1999c].
10See [Rott, 1991], [Rott, 1992], and [Rott and Pagnucco, 1999].
11See for instance [Ferme´ and Hansson, 1999], in which the system, that, unlike other systems
of belief change, is able to accept a part of the new information, is illustrated with the following
example: “One day when you return back from work, your son tells you, as soon as you see
him: ‘A dinosaur has broke grandma’s vase in the living-room’. You probably accept one part
of the information, namely that the vase has been broken, while rejecting the part of it that
refers to a dinosaur.” [Ferme´ and Hansson, 1999, p. 331.]
12[Friedman and Halpern, 1999] outlines two alternative ‘embeddings’.
13See especially [Levi, 1991, §§ 2.1–2.4].
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as well as their dynamics.
It goes without saying that a choice for certain types of representations of epis-
temic states has far-reaching consequences. Although there is some contention
about the most suitable kinds of representations,14 the similarities between the
positions defended by logicians overrule the differences. Most protagonists, in-
cluding Levi, share the presupposition that epistemic states should be represented
by structured sets of descriptive sentences.
Why has this idea been such a resounding success? The promotion of this
tendency to represent our knowledge as a structured set of descriptive sentences
was mainly due to the leading role that philosophy of science, which was grafted
on neo-positivism, played in the development of epistemology in the twentieth
century. Originally, the members of the Vienna Circle subscribed to the tradi-
tional ideal of knowledge, although they gradually gave up the requirement to
provide a Begru¨ndung of science. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian ideal of knowl-
edge15 has in its fall not dragged down the idea that our knowledge ultimately
forms a coherent whole of descriptive sentences. The fall of the Aristotelian idea
has only fundamentally changed this idea. This coherence consists and consisted
of ‘inferential’ relations between descriptive sentences. During the twentieth cen-
tury, both the propositional attitude towards sentences included in a system of
knowledge and their inferential relations have been reassessed. If it was formerly
thought that all true sentences could be assigned a specific place in the fabric
of our knowledge by working out which axioms and corollaries (or in the case of
logical empiricists such as Moritz Schlick, which Konstatierungen) were needed
to justify them with the help of the canons of reasoning mechanisms, now we
give preference to the metaphor of a web of belief in which sentences which are
held to be true are ordered according to their “relative likelihood, in practice,
of our choosing one statement rather than another for revision in the event of
recalcitrant experience”.16
Secondly, there is the holistic approach of meaning and cognition, propagated
by Quine in particular,17 which has led many epistemologists to be inclined to
think that an epistemic state is an idealization of our ‘theory of the world’, where,
14For an already somewhat dated survey, see [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988, p. 21–46].
15See [Beth, 1959, p. 31–32] for a detailed discussion.
16[Quine, 1953, p. 43.]. In recent investigations into belief change we come across a similar idea
under the name ‘epistemic entrenchment’. See among others [Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson, 1988],
[Rott, 1991], and [Levi, 1991, § 4.7].
17In his famous ‘Two Dogma’s of Empiricism’, Quine discredited the assumption that each
meaningful sentence is equivalent to a logical-mathematical construct of observational terms,
an assumption that was shared by Peirce and most logical empiricists. Instead, Quine proposes
to consider theories instead of sentences as the primary carriers of meaning, and then to try
to establish the empirical meaning of theories on the basis of the relations between theories
and empirical data. Levi also stresses that “in the first instance it is not sentences or other
linguistic entities that carry truth value and informational value but potential states of full
belief.” [Levi, 1996, p. 53.]
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obviously, a theory consists of descriptive sentences. The logical empiricist ideal
of an Einheitswissenschaft has only reinforced that inclination. So, Quine speaks
of ‘[t]he totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs’, ‘our own particular world-
theory’, and ‘total science’.18
In the third place, there is an influential methodological reason for representing
epistemic states by structured sets of descriptive sentences. First, in epistemo-
logical inquiry, it is possible to limit oneself, for instance on the basis of Quinean
behaviourism, to the part of our knowledge that can be put into words, without
committing oneself to the point of view that all our knowledge can be thus articu-
lated. Likewise, it seems advisable in epistemology to start by investigating only
those beliefs which can be put into a descriptive sentence, so that recently booked
results in logic can be applied in epistemological analyses, without committing
oneself to the point of view that all knowledge that can be put into words can also
be straitjacketed into a descriptive sentence. This reculer pour mieux sauter – to
be able to tackle epistemological problems with contemporary logic we will limit
ourselves to the part of knowledge which can be expressed in descriptive sentences
– is a popular strategy among formally oriented philosophers of science, logicians
and researchers in the field of artificial intelligence.
So it is only natural that Levi proposes to represent the knowledge of a certain
agentX that can be expressed in some (formal) language L as a deductively closed
set K of sentences in L.19 Levi calls such a deductively closed set of sentences a
corpus.20 Within a corpus two classes of sentences can be distinguished.
In the first place, a corpus contains sentences that X will not give up under
any circumstance. For instance, those sentences that articulate the metaphysical,
ontological and (classical) logical presuppositions to which X is committed. Levi
labels the set of sentences which, at least for X, do not qualify for revision, as
X’s urcorpus. It forms the kernel of each corpus of X and includes at least the
criteria on the basis of which proposals for changing X’s corpus are judged. So
the urcorpus consists at least of “those assumptions which any corpus should have
if an account of the revision of knowledge [...] is to stand a chance of working.”
[Levi, 1980, p. 7.] In addition to (classical) logic, mathematics and set theory,
the urcorpus contains a ‘conception of error’ [Levi, 1980, p. 8] and, I assume, a
‘conception of informational value’.21
In the second place, X’s corpus contains sentences of which X does not rule
18[Quine, 1953, p. 42]; [Quine, 1960, p. 24]; and [Quine, 1953, p. 42].
19Levi assumes that L is rich enough to express arithmetic and set theory and that it complies
with (classical) first-order logic. L should not be understood as the language “that the agent
uses or would use to communicate his convictions or other attitudes.” [Levi, 1991, p. 33.]
20[Levi, 1980, p. 4.] The problem of logical omniscience, a consequence of the choice for
deductively closed sets of sentences, is discussed in [Levi, 1976, p. 22–23] and in [Levi, 1980, p. 9–
12]. See also [Levi, 1991, § 2.1], in which Levi, by putting forward a distinction between ‘doxastic
commitment’ and ‘doxastic performance’, distances himself from the naturalist program in
epistemology defended notably by Quine.
21In the formalizations of Levi’s theory of belief change, the urcorpus is represented by Cn(∅).
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out that they might one day qualify for revision, though they are, at present,
infallible.22 These sentences may be (negations of) singular statements, but also
laws, theories, and statistical claims. The fact that X considers a statement φ
in her corpus at time t to be susceptible to revision, does not alter the degree to
which φ is considered probable by X:
From X’s point of view at t, every theoretical assumption, statistical
claim, universal generalization and observation report in his corpus at
t is as certainly and necessarily true as any truth of logic – at least as
far as the conduct of practical deliberations and scientific inquiry are
concerned. [Levi, 1976, p. 24]
If we now follow Levi’s suggestion and represent the ‘credal probability’ that X
attributes to sentences by a function Q complying with the standard axioms of
probability theory, such that Q is defined for all sentences in the language L, the
above can be summed up as follows: for all sentences φ in X’s corpus K it holds
that Q(φ) = 1.
Our current corpus is, according to Levi, the only standard for what we, at
least for the time being, hold possible. Logical possibilities form much too large
a class for a workable concept of possibility:
It seems clear that in daily life and scientific inquiry, we discount
utterly all sorts of logical possibilities. We do not assign them small
probabilities of being true. [Levi, 1976, p. 12.]
Furthermore, it is for Levi a “prima facie obvious fact” that, in scientific inquiry
and practical deliberation, X must consider all the elements from its present
corpus to be certain and infallible. The tenets that our current corpus determines
what we hold possible and that we consider all the elements from our current
corpus to be certain and infallible are defended on the basis of Levi’s definition of
the concept ‘serious possibility’: a sentence φ is a serious possibility with respect
to a corpus K if and only if φ is consistent with K [Levi, 1980, p. 5].23 A corollary
of this interpretation of possibility is that each element φ in K is necessary and
therefore infallible, since ¬φ is not a serious possibility with respect to K. Levi
sums up both claims with his thesis of epistemological infallibilism.24 In short,
X is committed to treating all items in the corpus of knowledge he
adopts at t as infallibly true in the sense that the logical possibility
that one of the items is false is not, as far as he is concerned, a serious
one. [Levi, 1976, p. 7]
22See the quote of Peirce’s (CP 5.416) on page 32 of this chapter.
23In 1980, Levi defines a corpus K in terms of the set of serious possibilities. In 1996, Levi
defines the set of serious possibilities in terms of a corpus K. Logically speaking, these are two
sides of the same cookie – see [Levi, 1996, p. 45].
24See [Levi, 1980, p. 13].
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Epistemological infallibility, however, does not imply that our current corpus
K, our one and only standard for serious possibility is impervious to deliberate
change: “Certainty does not imply incorrigibility.” [Levi, 1991, p. 3.] With good
reason, our current corpus can be changed and improved in order to arrive at
another corpus K ′ which then will become our one and only standard for serious
possibility. In short, knowledge is corrigible, even though we consider it to be
infallible when we have no reason to change it.25
In his ‘Knowledge and Belief’ from 1952, in which he provides a reinterpreta-
tion of the traditional distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’, Norman Mal-
colm uses a concept of knowledge closely related to Levi’s. The omission of the
latter to breathe life into his rather formal conception of knowledge with a num-
ber of convincing illustrations is compensated by the five real-life examples which
Malcolm puts forward to make clear that the answer to the question “Can I dis-
cover in myself whether I know something or merely believe it?” [Malcolm, 1952,
p. 69] must be in the negative.26 Let us take a closer look at two of his examples:
Suppose, for example, that several of us intend to go for a walk and
that you propose that we walk in Cascadilla Gorge. I protest that I
should like to walk beside a flowing stream and that at this season
the gorge is probably dry. Consider the following cases: [...]
(4) You say ‘I know it won’t be dry’ and give a stronger reason, e.g., ‘I
saw a lot of water flowing in the gorge when I passed it this morning’.
If we went and found water, there would be no hesitation at all in
saying that you knew. [...]
(5) Everything happens as in (4), except that upon going to the gorge
we find it to be dry. We should not say that you knew, but that you
believed that there would be water. And this is true even though you
declared you knew, and even though your evidence was the same as
it was in case (4) in which you did know. [Malcolm, 1952, p. 69–70]
According to Malcolm, these examples show that “although you knew you
could have been mistaken” [Malcolm, 1952, p. 71]. Malcolm thinks that it is
surely possible for a statement that we consider to be an ‘absolute certainty’ at
present, for example “There is a heart in my body”, to turn out to be false on
closer examination and, hence, to be eligible for correction.27 So, absolute certain
knowledge and corrigibility are not mutually exclusive. That’s all very well, but
when can a change of our absolute certain knowledge be called an improvement?
25See [Levi, 1980, p. 18].
26Levi writes: “In my opinion, there is no relevant difference, from X’s point of view at t,
between what he knows and what he fully believes” [Levi, 1976, p. 5]. On the relation between
‘knowledge’ and ‘full belief’, see also [Levi, 1991, p. 45].
27See [Malcolm, 1952, p. 76].
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3.1.3 Revision of Corpora
Now that we have represented an epistemic state by a corpus – a deductively
closed set of sentences from a language L – we can start thinking of belief changes
or revisions of corpora in terms of “shifts from one deductively closed set to an-
other.” [Levi, 1976, p. 23.] Levi distinguishes two fundamental types of revision,
namely expansion and contraction. He claims that these types are fundamental
because all other kinds of revision of corpora can be understood as a series of ex-
pansions and contractions [Levi, 1980, p. 65].28 Subsequently, Levi concentrates
on articulating the conditions under which these two basic types of revision are
justified, starting from the following consideration:
The kind of cognitive aim that, in my opinion, does best in rational-
izing scientific practice is one that seeks, on the one hand, to avoid
error and, on the other, to obtain valuable information. [Levi, 1996,
p. 51]
Consequently, the starting-point of Levi’s ideas on belief change is formed by the
twin concepts of ‘informational value’ and ’credal probability’.
Expansion
In expansion, a sentence φ is added to a corpus K. For the sake of convenience
we will denote the result of such an operation by ‘K + φ’. Logically speaking, an
expansion doesn’t amount to much: just take the union of the sets K and {φ}
and close that union under deduction. In short,
K + φ = Cn(K ∪ {φ}).
It is plain that this definition does not answer the question under which conditions
an expansion is an improvement of our corpus. It only indicates how we should
change our current corpus once we have decided to expand it with the sentence φ.
It tells us nothing about the reasonableness of such a decision. Unlike the great
majority of researchers in the field of belief change, Levi formulates up a standard
on the basis of which the legitimacy of the decision to implement an expansion
can be judged.29 Most of Levi’s ideas on expansion stem from the monograph
28Consequently, in belief change literature, revision is usually defined in terms of a contraction
and an expansion: K ×φ = (K −¬φ)+φ. This definition of revision is called the Levi identity.
See [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988, p. 69].
29Friedman and Halpern rightly complain about the fact that in the bulk of belief change
literature no-one takes the trouble to investigate into the conditions under which the addition of
a sentence to an epistemic state is legitimate, though “deciding when a formula has come to be
accepted is nontrivial. [...] Acceptance has a complex interaction with what is already believed.”
[Friedman and Halpern, 1999, p. 404.] Levi notes the same shortcoming: “The absence of an
account of the conditions under which expansion is justified is a serious lacuna in a theory of
rational belief change.” [Levi, 1996, p. 6.] See also Levi’s remarks on Ga¨rdenfors’s work on
expansion [Levi, 1991, p. 44 and § 3.6].
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Gambling with Truth (1967).
Levi distinguishes two types of expansion, namely deliberate expansion and
routine expansion. Both types are necessary to acquire new information. In rou-
tine expansion, an external stimulus is converted into a sentence via a previously
adopted ‘program’. The resulting sentence is then indiscriminately added to the
corpus of the agent – what Levi has in mind here is making observations or con-
sulting a witness or an expert. Although we only accept a program for routine
expansion if we consider it to be reliable, a hundred percent reliability is an unrea-
sonable demand. Therefore, an accepted program can inject information into our
current corpus which is inconsistent with our current corpus, whereby the corpus
resulting from the expansion becomes inconsistent and, hence, trivial, since Levi
closes corpora under classical logic. In short, a routine expansion implemented
according to the rules can unintentionally lead to the inconsistent corpus.30 Fur-
ther on, we will see that a correctly implemented deliberate expansion does not
suffer from this deficiency.31
In deliberate expansion, an agent chooses one sentence from a series of al-
ternatives and then adds it to his corpus. Let us now take a look at what the
technical ins and outs of this type of expansion are. The need for a deliberate
expansion of our present corpus does not simply come out of the blue – we add
new information to our corpus only for a certain purpose. What is that purpose
and how do we serve it best? To clarify the issue, Levi notes down the following
considerations concerning ‘deliberate decision making’:
In deliberate decision making, the agent identifies the options available
to him, his goals, and the available relevant evidence concerning the
admissibility of the options for the purpose of realizing these goals and
values. The option chosen is determined relative to these beliefs and
values according to principles of rational choice. [Levi, 1980, p. 36]
Several aspects of our question about the conditions under which an expansion is
legitimate can now be specified:
The options are potential expansion strategies which qualify as po-
tential answers to the question under investigation, and the aim is to
gratify the demand for information occasioned by the question while
at the same time avoiding error. [Levi, 1980, p. 38–39]
So the aim of an expansion is answering a question with ‘new error-free informa-
tion’. However, in case φ as well as ¬φ are serious possibilities with respect to
30See for a more detailed discussion of routine expansion [Levi, 1991, § 3.4].
31“[I]f one is living up to one’s commitments, one cannot legitimately expand into inconsis-
tency via deliberate expansion. On the other hand, routine expansion can and sometimes does
lead to inconsistency even when all commitments are fully met.” [Levi, 1991, p. 76.]
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K, there is always the risk that if we expand our corpus K with φ, we allow a
false sentence into our corpus. According to Levi, such an expansion is justified
if and only if the information value of φ outweighs the risk that φ is false:
On the basis of inquiries [...] we sometimes reach a point where we
conclude that the trade offs between risk of error and informational
benefits are such as to warrant adding some hypothesis to the corpus
and so to convert its status from mere hypothesis to settled, estab-
lished and infallible truth (where being settled, and established is only
for the time being and not necessarily forever). [Levi, 1976, p. 15]
In order to fulfil the aim of getting relevant ‘new error-free information’ as best
as possible, we should ideally proceed as follows: if, given our current corpus K,
we have to deal with a problem, we first identify, in a phase which Levi calls
‘abduction’,32 all seriously possible problem-solving options; then we trade off
the informational value and the credal probability of all the available options; and
finally, we implement an expansion of our current corpus with those subset of
options which have come up as the best during this weighing procedure. How
does it all fit together formally?
Levi calls the set U of all available options that solve a given problem an
ultimate partition. Let U = {φ1, . . . , φn} be a finite set of available options.
33 U
is exhaustive and exclusive. All alternative options φi in U are serious possibilities
with respect to the current corpus K. No single option φi is an element of K.
Moreover, K implies the truth of exactly one element in U , though we do not
know which.34 Levi defines a potential answer as the rejection of a subset R of
U . A potential answer can be formulated with a sentence ρ, where ρ stands for
the disjunction of all alternative options in R. After choosing a potential answer,
agent X should expand his corpus K with ¬ρ, that is, with the statement that
the correct answer in U is not in the subset R of rejected elements from U .35
As noticed, we need to balance the risk we take of admitting a false sentence
into our corpus when choosing a potential answer ρ against what the choice of
32Levi stipulates: “Abductive logic [...] is a system of norms prescribing necessary conditions
which a system of potential answers to any legitimate question should satisfy.” [Levi, 1976,
p. 33] The assessment of the informational values of the potential answers is also the result of
abduction. See [Levi, 1980, p. 49] and [Levi, 1998, p. 4].
33Levi also discusses, although summarily, infinite sets of options. See [Levi, 1976, p. 41–42]
and [Levi, 1980, p. 49]. The technical problems raised by infinite sets of options are irrelevant
for the purpose of my argument.
34See [Levi, 1967a].
35There are two limiting cases. On the one hand, X can decide not to reject any option in U .
In that case, the expansion of K with the statement that the correct answer is not to be found
in the (now empty!) set of rejected alternatives in U leaves the corpus K as it was. On the
other hand, X may decide to reject all alternatives in U . Expansion of K with the statement
that the correct answer in U is not to be found in the set of rejected alternatives now produces
the inconsistent corpus.
3.1. Isaac Levi’s Epistemology 41
ρ brings us, namely new information: after expansion with ¬ρ, we indeed know
that ¬ρ. In order to represent this trade off between informational value and
credal probability numerically, Levi attaches to both informational value and
credal probability a separate probability measure. (Levi maintains that these two
measures should not be reducible to each other.) So, the informational value is
fixed with an ‘information-determining probability measure’ M , and the credal
probability with a second probability measure, the ‘expectation-determining prob-
ability measure’ Q. (We have already met the latter at our discussion of Levi’s
notion of a corpus.)
The probability measure M assigns to each sentence φi in U a probability
M(φi), such that 0 ≤M(φi) ≤ 1 and M(φ1)+ . . .+M(φn) = 1. This probability
measure means to represent X’s (context dependent) evaluation of the informa-
tional value of the available options, but says nothing about X’s assessment of the
credal probability of these options: M(φi) is the informational value of rejecting
φi [Levi, 1980, p. 48]. Hence, “1 − M(φi) is the informational utility or value
of adding φi to X’s corpus [...] when considerations of truth value are ignored.”
[Levi, 1976, p. 38 – adapted notation.]
In turn, the measure Q assigns a probability Q(ψ) to each sentence ψ in the
language L, such that 0 ≤ Q(ψ) ≤ 1. This probability measure is meant to
represent X’s assessment of the credal probability of the available options, but
tells us nothing about X’s evaluation of the informational value of these options.
It fixes X’s ‘credal state’, a supplement to X’s corpus of knowledge:
[R]elative to his corpus of knowledgeX has a ’credal state’ represented
by a probability function assigning to all sentences in L a numerical
probability consistent with the requirement that all items in his corpus
bear probability 1. [Levi, 1976, p. 37]
Lastly, the utilities M(φi) and Q(φi) of each option φi have to be traded off,
weighed by a ‘degree of boldness’ q. This degree of boldness, which, though
it always holds that 0 < q ≤ 1, is context-dependent (as we shall see later on),
represents the degree to which X is prepared to risk errors in order to acquire new
information. Levi’s assumptions and argumentations, based on an approach via
a maximization of expected epistemic value, finally lead to the following criterion
for the choice of an expansion strategy,36 a criterion that we will designate from
now on with ‘Rule A’:
Given a corpusKX,t, finite partition U , information-determining prob-
ability function M defined over the Boolean algebra of elements of U ,
an expectation-determining probability function Q defined over the
36For technical details, see especially [Levi, 1967b].
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same algebra, and an index of caution q, X should reject all and only
those elements of U satisfying Q(φi) < qM(φi). [Levi, 1980, p. 53]
37
If the potential answer R = {φi1, . . . , φim} is the set of options which is rejected on
the strength of the abovementioned criterion, then, if we subscribe to Levi’s pro-
posals, the expansion of X’s current corpus K with ¬(φi1∨ . . .∨φim) is legitimate.
The result of this expansion, X’s new corpus, is then given byK+¬(φi1∨. . .∨φim),
which will serve as X’s new standard for serious possibility:
To be sure, prior to expansion, there is a risk, from X’s point of view,
that the information to be added to his standard for serious possibility
is false. Yet, sometimes X is justified in taking the risk. Once X has
implemented the expansion strategy and taken the risk, he evaluates
serious possibility according to a new standard relative to which the
new information added is no longer possibly false. [Levi, 1980, p. 57]
Contraction
In contraction, a sentence φ is deleted from a corpus K, such that φ is not a
logical consequence of the remaining sentences in the corpus resulting from the
contraction of K with φ. For the sake of convenience, we will use ‘K − φ’ to
denote the resulting corpus.
Other criteria apply for contractions than for expansions. As opposed to what
is the case in expansions, avoiding error cannot be a reason for deleting a sentence
φ from a corpus K, as all the sentences in a corpus K, which after all acts as
X’s standard for serious possibility, cannot possibly be false: “In contraction,
the concern to avoid error is vacuous.”38 On the contrary, in a contraction X
gives up a sentence which is definitely true: “For X to contract his corpus is for
him to surrender error-free information.” [Levi, 1980, p. 58.] Hence, the credal
probability of the sentences in K can play no part in the formulation of a criterion
for legitimate contractions. Levi intends to formulate a theory of contraction that
“seeks to show how a consistent account of justified ceasing to believe is feasible
even when K is taken to be a standard for serious possibility and all members of
K are true in the sense in which avoidance of error is taken to be a desideratum
of efforts to improve K by revising it.” [Levi, 1991, p. 61.]
Levi’s epistemology only allows for two reasons for a contraction. First, as we
have indicated briefly above, it is possible to accidentally end up in the incon-
sistent corpus via a legitimate routine expansion of a consistent corpus K with
a sentence φ. Because the inconsistent corpus “fails as a standard for serious
possibility to be used in inquiry and deliberation” and therefore is of no value
37Strictly speaking, theQ-function is not only defined for all boolean combinations of elements
in U , but for all elements of the language L.
38[Levi, 1991, p. 79.] See [Levi, 1998, p. 50].
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whatsoever,39 an agent is obliged to once again arrive at a consistent corpus by
means of a coerced contraction:40
When routine expansion injects inconsistency into the inquirer’s doc-
trine, contraction from the inconsistent state is required. An incon-
sistent state of full belief or corpus fails as a standard for serious
possibility for the purpose of subsequent inquiry and for practical de-
liberation. [Levi, 1991, p. 76–77]
That we need to implement a contraction if we have landed in the inconsistent
corpus is beyond dispute. In a coerced contraction, we can restrict ourselves to
determining the strategies to extricate ourselves from the inconsistent corpus.
The inconsistent corpus was reached by expanding a consistent corpus K already
containing the sentence ¬φ with a sentence φ which was obtained via a program
held to be reliable. Hence, according to Levi, we can do either of three things:41
(1) we may call into question the reliability of the program which resulted in the
sentence φ which was inconsistent with our old corpus K. In this case, we go back
to the old corpus K, from which we delete with contraction the claim that the
program in question is reliable; (2) we may doubt the background information
present in the old corpus which is inconsistent with the sentence φ obtained by
means of the program. In this case, we remove background sentence ¬φ with
contraction from K and expand the result with φ; (3) we may refuse to believe
both the program and the relevant background information.42 In the last case, we
take the intersection of the corpora obtained by way of the first two strategies.43
39Elsewhere Levi writes: “To allow X to consider a contradictory corpus to be feasible does
not imply that if he should detect inconsistency in his corpus he should rest content. When
X’s corpus is inconsistent, it breaks down as a standard of serious possibility. It furnishes a
truth definition which is unsuitable for characterizing the aim of avoiding error. It is useless as
a resource for inquiry and deliberation.” [Levi, 1980, p. 27–28.] Hence, “it is always urgent to
contract from an inconsistent state of full belief.” [Levi, 1991, p. 68.]
40Situations in which one arrives at the inconsistent corpus via a routine expansion “furnish
one of the occasions that justify contraction through coming to doubt the information obtained
via routine expansion or some other item in the initial corpus or, as I think is normally sensible,
both.” [Levi, 1991, p. 76.]
41Since Levi bases his system on an underlying classical logic which he considers immune
to revision, he cannot account for a fourth possibility: an adjustment of the underlying logic.
Von Neumann and others argued that the reconciliation of the particle theory and the wave
theory of light via Bohr’s principle of complementarity did not imply a weakening of one of the
fundamental principles of the rival theories, but actually a weakening of the underlying logic.
See [Beth, 1964, p. 8–10].
42Although an inconsistent corpus contains all the sentences of L, it apparently does not
eat away at our memory and our powers of judgment. After all, one seems not to forget from
which corpus the inconsistency is reached, while the corresponding informational values which
will turn out to be necessary to implement the said contraction are left undisturbed. How
inconsistent is an inconsistent corpus?
43A more comprehensive account of coerced contractions can be found in [Levi, 1991, § 4.8].
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In the second place, an uncoerced contraction comes into consideration when
we decide to give ‘a hearing’ to a hypothesis T2, which is contradicted by an
element T1 from the current corpus K. Because it initially holds that T2 is not
a serious possibility with respect to K, elements from K have to be deleted,
so as “to shift to a position where judgment is suspended between these rival
hypotheses so that investigations can be undertaken to decide whether T1 should
be reinstated via inferential expansion or T2 should take T1’s place.” [Levi, 1980,
p. 60.] Not every hypothesis qualifies for such a procedure. “There must be some
inducement to incur the loss of information” [Levi, 1991, p. 118]:
To be justified in ceasing to believe what is initially settled, the in-
quirer must regard the benefits of giving the new proposal a non-
question-begging hearing to be great enough to outweigh the costs.
[Levi, 1991, p. 4]
For example, a hypothesis T2, which, though it be incompatible with our current
views, gives an explanation of anomalies – phenomena that cannot (yet) be ex-
plained by our current theories, whereas they should44 – is worth considering.45
The actual corpus K, which contains ¬T2, prohibits an unprejudiced evaluation
of T2. If we still wish to make a fair evaluation possible between T2 and ¬T2,
it is necessary to adapt our actual corpus in such a way that both T2 and ¬T2
are serious possibilities with respect to the adapted corpus. According to Levi,
K − ¬T2 is the best corpus for the intended evaluation, because it differs only
minimally from our current corpus. Now, on the basis of this adapted corpus
K −¬T2, using the criteria for expansion discussed above, we can check without
prejudice whether T2 or its negation should be added to the adapted corpus.
46
After this brief outline of the circumstances that justify the deletion of certain
sentences from our current corpus, we shall conclude our discussion of contraction
with the contraction method propagated by Levi, in which the central question
is: supposing that we wish to remove a sentence φ from a given corpus K, how
should we implement this contraction? Levi answers:
We need to identify the available options or strategies for contraction
by removing φ and then examine the goals and values that ought to
be promoted in order to decide among them. [Levi, 1991, p. 121]
We will not be able to avoid a modest logical apparatus in order to grasp the
technical details of Levi’s ideas on contraction.47 Given the aim of a contraction
44See [Levi, 1991, p. 152–153].
45Levi writes: “[A] good reason for implementing an uncoerced contraction would be that it
allows a promising theory incompatible with current doctrine to be examined without preju-
dice.” [Levi, 1991, p. 153.]
46For more information, see [Levi, 1991, § 4.9].
47[Hansson and Olsson, 1995] is an excellent study of Levi’s contraction operators.
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of a corpus K with a sentence φ, we can immediately impose three constraints
on K − φ, the result of this contraction: (1) K − φ is a corpus, a deductively
closed set of sentences; (2) K − φ is a subset of K, since a sentence is removed
from K; and (3), the sentence φ which needs to be removed is not an element of
K − φ. We shall use C(K,φ) to denote the set of corpora that meet these three
requirements:
C(K,φ) = {K ′ ⊆ K : K ′ = Cn(K ′) and φ 6∈ K ′}.
Since each element of C(K,φ) is the intersection of one or more elements of the
set S(K,φ) of ‘saturatable’ contractions which skip a sentence φ from a corpus
K,48 we can stick without loss of generality to the set S(K,φ):
S(K,φ)
=
{K ′ ⊆ K : K ′ = Cn(K ′) and Cn(K ′ ∪ {¬φ}) is maximally consistent in L}.
The set of saturatable contractions S(K,φ) is used by Levi as a starting-point for
his definition of the contraction of a corpus K with a sentence φ: after all, each
possible contraction of K with φ is the intersection of the elements of a subset of
S(K,φ). Hence, the problem of finding the right contraction can be reduced to
the question which elements of S(K,φ) we should choose for this subset. Since
each subset of S(K,φ) meets the logical contraints imposed on a contraction,
logical considerations alone will fall short if, like Levi, we require that “when all
relevant factors in a given context are taken into account, one change at most
should be legitimate or justified. Hence, given the initial corpus K and all other
relevant factors (whatever these may be), and given that adding or deleting φ
is legitimate or justified, the new belief state to which one shifts legitimately or
with justification is uniquely determined.”49
Since, at the present state of logical research, no purely logical definition of
a sensible contraction operator can be given within classical logic,50 Levi resorts
to an information-determining measure M which assigns an M -value M(K ′) to
all possible contractions K ′ in C(K,φ) and so solves the problem of making a
well-founded choice from the elements of S(K,φ) in order to define the required
unique subset of S(K,φ). In this way, the uniqueness of the contraction of K
with φ is warranted,51 as Levi defines this contraction as the intersection of all
48See [Levi, 1991, p. 122] and [Levi, 1996, p. 20]. The elements of S(K,φ) are saturatable,
because for each element K ′ in S(K,φ) it holds that Cn(K ′ ∪ {¬φ}) is maximally consistent in
L.
49[Levi, 1991, p. 67 – adapted notation.]
50These results have been summarized in Observation 2.1 of [Alchourro´n and Makinson, 1982]
and in Proposition 5.3 of [Hansson and Olsson, 1995].
51Levi starts from “the normative assumption that there should not be more than one ad-
missible change of belief state in a given context” [Levi, 1991, p. 180].
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the elements of the said subset of S(K,φ). Levi advises the agent who is planning
to contract a sentence φ from her corpus K to use this information-determining
measure M as follows:
[T]he inquiring agent should evaluate the various contraction strate-
gies available to her with respect to the informational value incurred
and should choose a contraction strategy that minimizes the loss of in-
formational value if a minimizing strategy exists. [Levi, 1991, p. 122]
In short, choose those saturatable contractions from S(K,φ) which have the high-
est informational value. If we now assume that an information-determining mea-
sure M assigns to all deductively closed subsets of K ′ an informational value
Cont(K ′) = 1−M(K ′), only requiring that A ⊂ B implies Cont(A) ≤ Cont(B),52
then the needed selection function γ, which chooses the elements from S(K,φ)
with the highest informational value, can be defined as follows: if S(K,φ) = ∅,
then γ(S(K,φ)) = {K}; if S(K,φ) 6= ∅, then
γ(S(K,φ))
=
{K ′ ∈ S(K,φ) : for all K ′′ ∈ S(K,φ) it holds that Cont(K ′′) ≤ Cont(K ′)}.
The formal apparatus developed in this subsection allows Levi to determine the
admissible contraction K − φ, given a corpus K, a sentence φ which has to be
deleted and an informativity measure M over C(K,φ), by means of the set of
saturatable contractions S(K,φ) and the selection function γ:53
(i) If φ ∈ K, then K − φ = ∩γ(S(K,φ)),
(ii) If φ 6∈ K, then K − φ = K.
Levi’s contraction operator does not have all the properties of Alchourro´n,
Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s contraction operator. The latter operator is charac-
terized by the following six postulates:54
52On the basis of the informational values of K and of the elements of S(K,φ), Levi also
defines the concept ‘damped informational value’ to rule out the possibility that for two elements
K ′ and K ′′ of S(K,φ) with Cont(K ′) = Cont(K ′′), it can hold that Cont(K ′∩K ′′) < Cont(K ′).
We leave this extra complication aside, because it does not affect the logical characteristics of
Levi’s contraction operator. See [Levi, 1991, § 4.4]. [Levi, 1998] also presents a variant of this
adapted informativity concept, which leads to a somewhat more strict contraction operator
‘mild contraction’, characterized in [Rott and Pagnucco, 1999]. A discussion of Levi’s recent
refinements of his ideas on contraction would lead to far afield in a study of an introductory
nature.
53[Levi, 1991, p. 130.] Hansson and Olsson showed that clause (ii), which is lacking in Levi’s
original definition, is indispensable [Hansson and Olsson, 1995, p. 108]. In [Levi, 1996, p. 23],
this minor flaw is corrected.
54See [Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson, 1985, p. 513].
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(K − 1) K − φ is deductively closed, Closure
(K − 2) K − φ ⊆ K, Inclusion
(K − 3) If φ 6∈ K, then K − φ = K, Vacuity
(K − 4) If φ 6∈ Cn(∅), then φ 6∈ K − φ, Success
(K − 5) K ⊆ (K − φ) + φ, Recovery
(K − 6) If Cn(φ) = Cn(ψ), then K − φ = K − ψ. Extensionality
Levi’s contraction operator meets all these postulates except (K − 5), which is
known in the literature as Recovery.55 This postulate has come under critical
fire, not in the least from Levi himself:
Consider, for example, a situation where it is believed that Jones was
HIV positive, received a drug treatment and subsequently showed HIV
negative. Contract the corpus by giving up “Jones received the drug
treatment.” The conviction that Jones initially showed HIV positive
would be retained. But the judgment that Jones showed HIV negative
later on would be abandoned. Moreover, restoring the judgment that
Jones received the drug treatment would not resurrect the conviction
that Jones subsequently showed HIV negative unless the inquirer had
the well entrenched conviction initially that the drug treatment always
eliminates the HIV virus. If this belief were not well entrenched or
if all that is believed is that the drug treatment is followed by cure
in some percentage of cases less than 100%, the Recovery Condition
would be violated. [Levi, 1998, p. 9]56
Levi’s contraction operator, on the other hand, is characterized by the following
five postulates:57
(K − 1) K − φ is deductively closed, Closure
(K − 2) K − φ ⊆ K, Inclusion
(K − 3a) If φ 6∈ K or φ ∈ Cn(∅), then K − φ = K, Vacuity
(K − 4) If φ 6∈ Cn(∅), then φ 6∈ K − φ, Success
(K − 5) If Cn(φ) = Cn(ψ), then K − φ = K − ψ. Extensionality
3.1.4 Two Applications
A short outline of Levi’s treatment of modal and conditional statements concludes
this brief expose´ of Levi’s epistemological and logical positions. As we have seen,
55Let L be the language that consists of all truth functional combinations of p and q, and let
K = Cn({p, q}). Then Cn({q → p}) ∈ S(K, p). Choose γ such that γ(S(K, p)) = {Cn({q →
p})}. Then K − p = Cn({q → p}) and (K − p) + p = Cn({p}). In this case, K is not a subset
of (K − p) + p, so Recovery does not hold. See [Hansson and Olsson, 1995, p. 112].
56See also [Levi, 1991, p. 134–135] and [Hansson, 1999a]. [Levi, 1998, p. 37] presents a second
counterexample to Recovery.
57See [Hansson and Olsson, 1995, p. 109] and [Rott and Pagnucco, 1999, p. 512].
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Levi imposes two requirements on a plausible theory for revising epistemic states:
(1) such a theory should articulate inference rules which, unlike classical inference,
allow us to draw those conclusions from an epistemic state which we would also
draw in practical deliberation and scientific inquiry; and (2), it should formally
justify transitions – expansions as well as contractions – from one epistemic state
to another epistemic state. Levi’s recent For the Sake of the Argument (1996)
develops one general, quasi-formal framework with which formal theories that
aim at meeting these two requirements can be compared on the basis of abstract
characteristics.
All types of sentences that have been in the spotlight of philosophical logic
for decades, can be handled within the system developed by Levi. Tautologies,
mathematical truths, indicative statements, laws, dispositional statements, modal
statements, conditionals, counterfactuals, inductive statements, defaults – they
all have their place in Levi’s framework. In this subsection we will briefly discuss
the way in which Levi accounts for modal and conditional statements within his
system. In Levi’s view, these types of statements have no truth values, unlike the
elements of a corpus, though they can be accepted or rejected on the basis of a
corpus.
Modal Statements
Levi is of the opinion that modal claims express a serious possibility. A sentence is
only held to be seriously possible with respect to an epistemic state represented
by a corpus K. However, it does not follow from this that if φ is consistent
with K, the sentence “φ is a serious possibility” is an element of K. Levi shows
that such a ‘realistic’ interpretation of modal statements is contrary to his ideas
on expansion and contraction.58 Modal statements cannot be part of a corpus.
As an alternative Levi proposes to interpret them as claims about a corpus, as
claims expressing a certain property of such a corpus. Levi sees it as an important
advantage of his interpretation of modal statements that it can do without the
Kripke semantics which abounds in philosophical logic:59
“φ is seriously possible” is acceptable with respect to K
⇐⇒
K ∪ {φ} is consistent.
58See [Levi, 1991, § 3.7] for a concise presentation of these arguments.
59Levi opposes modal extensions of the language in which our opinions are articulated. In
Levi’s view, modal logic and its applications to epistemological and metaphysical problems are
a “retrograde step in philosophy” [Levi, 1980, p. xvi]. Possible worlds semantics is, strictly
speaking, superfluous: “[M]any advocates of the usefulness of possible worlds semantics for
the purpose of explicating judgments of possibility and conditionals appeal to examples that
may be given a straightforward epistemic or, in the case of conditionals, belief-change treat-
ment.” [Levi, 1991, p. 114.] Indeed, “[c]onditionals understood in terms of imaging become
mere artifacts of the metaphysician’s fevered imagination.” [Levi, 1996, p. 76.]
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Conditionals
According to Levi, conditionals are a second class of statements which never
are an element of a corpus. They do, however, express properties of a corpus,
properties which tell us how a corpus will behave under certain revisions. Levi
interprets conditionals on the basis of Ramsey’s Test, which takes its name from
a cursory remark by Frank Ramsey on the interpretation of conditionals:
If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to
p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and
arguing on that basis about q; so that in a sense ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, ¬q’
are contradictories. [Ramsey, 1929, p. 143n]
Levi now proposes to interpret conditionals on the basis of Ramsey’s Test us-
ing the techniques for belief change outlined above, a choice which obliges him,
under penalty of triviality, to refuse to admit conditionals as elements of cor-
pora.60 Therefore, like modal statements, conditionals do not have truth, but
only acceptability conditions. Then Levi proposes a theory figuring three differ-
ent variations of Ramsey’s Test.61 According to Levi, this theory provides an
adequate solution to the well-known problems concerning conditional sentences:
“[A]ll ‘if’ sentences customarily classified by contemporary philosophers as indica-
tives and as subjunctives are explicated by various versions of the Ramsey test”
[Levi, 1996, p. 13].
In order to find out whether a conditional “If φ, then ψ” is acceptable with
respect to a consistent corpus K, we add the antecedent φ to our current ‘stock
of knowledge’, that is, to the actual corpus K. If this addition produces an
inconsistent set of sentences, we make minimal changes in the inconsistent set so
as to make it consistent while retaining the sentence φ. This procedure, carried
out along Levi’s criteria for revisions of corpora, produces a new consistent corpus
K ′ which contains φ and differs only minimally from the old corpus K. Then we
check whether the consequent ψ is an element of this new corpus K ′. If that
indeed is the case, then the conditional “If φ, then ψ” is acceptable with respect
to the original corpus K.62
All three variations of Ramsey’s Test discussed by Levi can be formulated in
terms of contraction and expansion. Levi argues that a conditional “If φ, then
ψ” should ideally be interpreted on the basis of a corpus that contains neither φ
nor ¬φ. Hence, the corpus K must be processed such that both φ and ¬φ are
serious possibilities with respect to the adapted corpus. In some cases, this may
60See [Rott, 1989] for an elegant proof of Ga¨rdenfors’s Triviality Theorem from 1986.
61See [Levi, 1996, p. 18–50] and [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988, p. 147–148].
62Similar epistemic interpretations of conditionals have been formalized previously in
[Rescher, 1964] and [Veltman, 1976]. From the beginning, the idea that counterfactuals
need an epistemic interpretation has been criticized. See [Kratzer, 1981], [Lewis 1973], and
[Stalnaker, 1968]. For a more recent discussion, see [Rott, 1999] and [Stalnaker, 1992].
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mean that φ has to be eliminated by contraction from K, in others, (think of
counterfactuals), ¬φ has to be eliminated. This variant – Levi’s favourite – can
be defined as follows [Levi, 1996, p. 31]:
“If φ, then ψ” is acceptable with respect to K
⇐⇒
ψ ∈ ((K − ¬φ)− φ) + φ.
3.2 A Critique
3.2.1 Corpora?
A corpus represents an epistemic state. As the epistemic states of an individual
agent are highly continuous, even when the agent is placed in a multitude of
situations, we cannot assume that epistemic states depend only on context. Let
us assume that we wish to articulate our actual epistemic state by a corpus in a
certain formal language L. Levi assumes corpora to be consistent and deductively
closed. Hence, if we wish to identify the corpus that represents our actual epis-
temic state, we only need to determine which sentences in L are elements of the
corpus and which are not. Is there a criterion for this? Are the contextual cer-
tainties we apply in the current context C1 – epistemic states are always located
within some context – perhaps precisely the elements sought after? (The contex-
tual certainties in C1 are exactly all sentences φ with Q1(φ) = 1, where Q1 is our
expectation-determining probability measure in context C1.) The certainties we
use in context C1 may, however, very well be incompatible with our certainties
in a context C2.
63 Since the corpus we are looking for must be consistent, we
cannot immediately admit contextual certainties into the corpus. This is due to
the circumstance that although an element of a corpus is in fact necessarily a
contextual certainty, the converse does not apply: imagine a situation where an
agent X with corpus K in context C1 accepts that Q1(φ) = 1, while the same
agent with the same corpus in context C2 accepts that Q2(¬φ) = 1. According to
Levi, it cannot be concluded from the fact that Q1(φ) = 1 that φ is an element
of K.64 Of course this holds for ¬φ as well. Consequently, X is free to apply mu-
tually inconsistent certainties within different contexts. Contextual certainties,
therefore, give us little to go on in determining our current corpus K.
But how do we determine whether a certain sentence is an element of the
corpus K which represents our current epistemic state? If we can imagine a
context C in which, given the current corpus K, a sentence φ is relevant, while
Q(φ) 6= 1, then φ is not part of our corpus, because in this case ¬φ is a serious
possibility with respect to K. Might that be a feasible criterion?
63Cf. [Batens, 1992, p. 202].
64Levi writes: “According to X’s credal state, all items in his corpus receive probability 1
(although the converse need not hold).” [Levi, 1976, p. 10.]
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We have already seen that the certainties in our current context C1 do not
give a definitive answer, but at best a clue as to whether those certainties are
an element of our corpus. The abovementioned criterion instructs us to verify
whether Qi(φ) = 1 holds in all imaginable contexts Ci when our corpus is the
corpus K. A tricky question presents itself, even supposing that it is feasible to
scour all imaginable contexts: how do we know if our epistemic state, represented
by corpus K, stays the same with a context shift? It is impossible to aim, on the
one hand, at finding the elements of K, and to make sure, on the other, that the
corpus applied in context Ci is identical to K, because after all we have to know
what K’s elements are before we can make that comparison. How do we know
for sure whether in such a context shift we have not inadvertently expanded or
contracted K?
Although it is a direct consequence of Levi’s epistemology, the criterion formu-
lated in this paragraph for the determination of the elements of a corpus K will
have to do without any application. For want of a better criterion with which to
decide whether a certain sentence is an element of a corpus we can only come to
the provisional conclusion that Levi’s notion of a corpus violates Quine’s maxim:
“No entity without identity” [Quine, 1969, p. 23].
3.2.2 Contextual Parameters?
The preceding discussion of Levi’s theories of expansion and contraction show that
Levi’s epistemology can only be applied if we have at our disposal (estimations of)
numerical values for the ‘system of contextual parameters’ he uses, consisting of,
among others, the ‘ultimate partition’ U , the information-determining measure
M , the expectation-determining measure Q and the degree of boldness q.65 This
system of contextual parameters is part of X’s epistemic state at time t. In
his inquiry into the mechanisms of belief change, Levi just presupposes that we
have found sufficiently specific values for these parameters and argues for his
criteria concerning legitimate expansions and contractions on the basis of this
presupposition. Levi defends his crucial presupposition with an ad consequentiam
argumentation:
Of course, investigation may reveal that no system of contextual pa-
rameters can be identified such that, given specific values for these
parameters, the legitimacy of X’s modification of bodies of knowl-
edge would be subjective or context dependent in a sense which put
them beyond critical control. However, we would be obstructing the
course of inquiry to assume that this is so at the outset. [Levi, 1976,
p. 2]
65After a brief discussion of deliberate expansion, Levi writes: “This sketch presupposes that
there is no indeterminacy in evaluations of informational value and that a definite value for the
index q has been fixed.” [Levi, 1991, p. 93.]
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Following this argument, the first question we could ask ourselves is which course
of inquiry is obstructed if we do not assume that sufficiently specific values can
be found for Levi’s system of contextual parameters? It would seem a bit far-
fetched that Levi is alluding here to research in the field of theoretical physics
or in the area of comparative literature. These (and other) disciplines do not
need Levi’s methodological considerations to get along anyway. More likely, Levi
is referring to epistemological investigations which aim at grasping ’the logic of
inquiry’, investigations that also include Levi’s own epistemology.
Second, we can check, on the basis of clues from Levi’s own works, if and
to what extent the presupposition that Levi’s contextual parameters have been
specified accurately enough is plausible. We will limit ourselves to the assessments
of the probability measure M and the degree of boldness q.
Informational Value
Assessing an information-determiningM -function is a context dependent matter.
Among others, it depends on the cognitive aims pursued by an agent X in a
given context. As a consequence, there are hardly any gains to be expected
from the search for a universal, context independent M -function.66 Since Levi’s
criteria for both expansion and contraction can only be applied once we have,
among others, assessed the M -function, this function should be assessed before
the intended evaluation of the proposed expansion or contraction can take place.
Such assessments
are part of the abductive task. To some extent, these assessments
may be regulated by criteria which are applicable to a large class of
problems. It may, perhaps, be possible to identify certain desiderata
which determine explanatory power and simplicity relevant to the as-
sessment of informational value in inquiries where the aim is to obtain
explanations of some kind. It is doubtful, however, that such desider-
ata can be converted into criteria for the evaluation of informational
value which render it irrelevant to consider the peculiarities of the par-
ticular demands for information motivating specific inquiries. Indeed,
such restrictions on the assessment of informational value are likely
to be very weak. Such assessment is, in my opinion, heavily context
dependent. [Levi, 1980, p. 47]
In the end, in the adoption of a certain (class of) M -function(s), an ‘abductive
logic’ is the deciding factor:
66Levi writes: “The considerations that enter into an evaluation of informational value are
diverse, often competing, and heavily context dependent. Different kinds of inquiries impose
different demands for new information, so that it is not to be expected that evaluations of
informational value will meet the same requirements in all contexts. And inquiries addressing
the same issues may be committed to different research programs generating different demands
for information.” [Levi, 1991, p. 83.]
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Arguments concerning the adoption of one M -function rather than
another are to be evaluated (insofar as there is a right and a wrong
to the matter) according to principles of abductive logic [Levi, 1976,
p. 40–41].
We can, however, hardly see this reference to an ‘abductive logic’ as anything else
but a shortcut, as long as Levi keeps us guessing about the peculiarities of such
an abductive logic. Hence, the appeal to an ‘abductive logic’ does not contribute
anything to the assessment of an M -function. Luckily, Levi gives us some rather
more tangible clues for the determination of an M -function, even though the as-
sumption of anM -function is considered by him to be “excessively unrealistic”:67
different kinds of values, for example precision, simplicity and explanatory power,
“constitute different dimensions that contribute to the assessment of what I call
informational value.”68 Moreover, Levi writes:
[T]he demands for informational value that animate the inquirer’s
deliberations [...] may reflect commitments to research programs and
ideals of explanatory adequacy, simplicity, systematicity, precision,
and the like, including commitments to certain types of theoretical
frameworks [Levi, 1991, p. 150–151].
This does not help us make any headway either: the original problem of finding a
numerical specification for one parameter is now ‘reduced’ to a messy multitude
of problems. Is Levi’s list complete? And how do we assess the different values
on the list? How can the relative importance of these values be assessed? Many
questions, but no answers.
Are we perhaps just splitting hairs by demanding excessive preciseness in the
estimation of Levi’s M -values? Isn’t it enough if, off the top of our head, we
make an ordering of the informational values of those sentences or corpora that
require anM -value in a given context, so that the correct expansion or contraction
can then be assessed?69 Still, in order to apply Levi’s contraction operator, a
67[Levi, 1976, p. 37.]. Nevertheless, Levi thinks that “some light can be shed on the more real-
istic situations of daily life and scientific inquiry by considering these idealisations.” [Levi, 1976,
p. 37.]
68[Levi, 1991, p. 145] See also [Levi, 1998, p. 16].
69Levi writes: “[A]ny two evaluations that yield the same weak ordering of the potential
contraction strategies will yield the same recommendations. One might argue that quantitative
differences in the assessment of informational value [...] are irrelevant to the assessment of
contraction strategies.” [Levi, 1998, p. 50.] Therefore, “in contraction quantitative dimensions
of informational value do not seem relevant” [Levi, 1998, p. 51], since “only ordinal considera-
tions are needed in contraction” [Levi, 1998, p. 52]. In expansion, however, such quantitative
considerations do play a prominent role, because after all, an evaluation of a potential expan-
sion strategy amounts to the trading off of the informational value and credal probability of
the available options weighed by a degree of boldness: “The task of aggregating informational
value and risk of error in a single assessment [...] calls for the quantitative characterization of
informational value.” [Levi, 1998, p. 21.]
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certain precision is needed: if we want to apply Levi’s selection function γ without
difficulties, we should be able to establish whether there is a negligible or in fact
a considerable difference between the informativities Cont(K ′) and Cont(K ′′) of
two saturatable contractions K ′ and K ′′ in S(K,φ). Numerical identity is, after
all, too much to ask, since Levi’s clues for finding the right numerical values for
his M -function cannot warrant the preciseness required in the case of numerical
identity. It would be in Levi’s line of argument to sidestep the problem discussed
here by conjuring up yet another parameter, ², which represents the doubtlessly
context dependent degree of precision of an agent X, so that by referring to ²,
it is possible to assess whether the informativities Cont(K ′) and Cont(K ′′) are
negligibly different from each other or not:
Cont(K ′) ∼ Cont(K ′′) ⇐⇒ |Cont(K ′)− Cont(K ′′)| ≤ ².
It is up to the reader to determine whether this strategy gives a satisfactory
solution for our problem.
The assessment of an information-determining M -function takes more doing
than Levi wishes us to believe by simply assuming that it has already been as-
sessed. In spite of all Levi’s clues it is altogether implausible that theM -function
could ever be determined with sufficient preciseness in a given context. Since Levi,
given a corpus K and a sentence φ, eventually reduces the problem of finding the
admissible contraction K − φ to the problem of determining an M -function over
the saturatable contractions in S(K,φ), we can at least come to the conclusion
that something is lacking in Levi’s epistemology, considering the difficulties in
assessing the M -function. Unfortunately it is not entirely clear to me how this
lacuna in Levi’s epistemology could be filled appropriately.
A second problem with the assessment of informational values arises when we
wish to test the acceptability of counterfactuals via Levi’s criteria for conditionals.
At first glance, Levi’s approach seems to be preferable to David Lewis’s and
Robert Stalnaker’s treatment of counterfactuals with possible worlds semantics,
in which a relation of similarity between worlds plays a crucial role. After all, it
is possible, within Levi’s system, to sidestep counterexamples to David Lewis’s
and Robert Stalnaker’s analysis. In 1976, Pavel Tichy´ described a situation in
which Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s analysis of counterfactuals produces a result that
is completely at odds with our pretheoretical intuitions:
[C]onsider a man – call him Jones – who is possessed of the follow-
ing dispositions as regards wearing his hat. Bad weather invariably
induces him to wear his hat. Fine weather, on the other hand, af-
fects him neither way: on fine days he puts his hat on or leaves it on
the peg, completely at random. Suppose, moreover, that actually the
weather is bad, so Jones is wearing his hat. [Tichy´, 1976, p. 271]
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The statement “If the weather were fine, Jones would be wearing his hat”, which,
on the strength of our pretheoretical intuitions, is unacceptable, would be accept-
able according to Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s analysis.
If we write K for the, obviously consistent, corpus that contains at least the
abovementioned information, φ for “The weather is fine” and ψ for “Jones is
wearing his hat”, then it is clear that both ¬φ ∈ K and ψ ∈ K. To check with
Levi’s method whether the conditional in question is acceptable with respect to
K, we first have to contract the corpus K by ¬φ. (A contraction of the resulting
corpus with φ will not be necessary, as φ 6∈ K.) At this point it is important
to arrive at a corpus that leaves open whether ψ is the case or not, because if
ψ were to remain in K − ¬φ, the statement “If φ, then ψ” would be acceptable
with respect to K.
At first sight, it seems that the corpus K − ¬φ must contain ψ. As ψ is
obviously relevant to the problem at hand, it seems likely that each corpusK∗ such
that K∗ ⊆ K and ψ 6∈ K∗ must have a lower informational value than K − ¬φ.
It seems an unavoidable conclusion that ψ ∈ K − ¬φ, because Levi demands of
an admissible contraction K − ¬φ minimal loss of informational value. There is,
however, an emergency exit: according to Levi’s Weak Monotonicity postulate, it
holds that K−¬φ has at least as much informational value as all its subsets, but,
on the other hand, real subsets K∗ of K − ¬φ can have the same informational
value as K − ¬φ itself. Hence, I propose to leave these sceptical considerations
aside and to try to find, in line with Levi’s proposals, an admissible corpusK−¬φ
such that both ψ and ¬ψ are serious possibilities with respect to that corpus.
This we can do by finding out which element of C(K,¬φ) is most suited to
serve as a starting-point for a further expansion with φ. This element must be
a deductively closed subset of K which contains neither ¬φ nor ψ nor ¬ψ nor
φ → ψ nor φ → ¬ψ. Let K∗ be this subset. Then there is a subset S∗ of
S(K,¬φ), such that K∗ = ∩S∗. If we now choose the informational values of
the elements of S(K,¬φ) in such a way that exactly all elements in S∗ have
the highest informational value, then it holds that γ(S(K,¬φ) = S∗ and, hence,
that K − ¬φ = K∗. It is now plain that, in accordance with our pretheoretical
intuitions, the following sentences are both unacceptable with respect to K:
(1) “If the weather were fine, Jones would be wearing his hat.”
(2) “If the weather were fine, Jones wouldn’t be wearing his hat.”
However, something still does not feel right. It turns out that Tichy´’s example
is, indeed, not a counterexample to Levi’s account of conditionals as long as we
are absolutely free to choose the informational values of the elements of S(K,¬φ)
in such a way that we reach the result that was prescribed by our pretheoretical
intuitions. Therefore, the desired result holds sway over the assessment of the
informational values of the elements of S(K,¬φ). It is even possible to generalize
this observation to a theorem: Let ¬φ ∈ K, such that ¬φ 6∈ Cn(∅) and K is
56 Chapter 3. Isaac Levi’s Epistemology: A Critique
consistent. Then, for each ψ in L such that ¬φ 6∈ Cn(¬φ ∨ ψ) there is a choice
of informational values over S(K,¬φ) such that “If φ, then ψ” is acceptable with
respect to K.70 In short, we can always construct the required contractions in
such a way that each and every counterfactual turns out to be acceptable. What
would be the explanatory power of a theory of conditionals which can validate
every counterfactual? 100%? (If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, Jack Ruby
would have been the first man on the moon.)
Degree of Boldness
In Rule A, which gives the conditions under which a deliberate expansion is
legitimate, the degree of boldness q weighs the informational value M(φi) of
rejecting an option φi against φi’s credal probability Q(φi). Hence, the higher
q, the more options in U escape rejection, the bolder X is in accepting new
information. With the introduction of the degree of boldness, which Levi also
calls the ‘index of caution’, it was stipulated that 0 < q ≤ 1. Obviously, we
cannot apply Rule A unless we have determined the parameter q, even if we have
already found the appropriate numerical values for the probability measures M
and Q. Levi pays a relatively large amount of attention to a method with which
q can be determined with greater accuracy. This method for finding the ‘true
value’ [Levi, 1976, p. 46] of q (or an appropriate interval for values of q) is based
on Rule A and on a process which Levi calls ‘bookkeeping’. He describes this
bookkeeping process as follows:
Suppose that X has a corpus K1 and a question under consideration.
Rule A (or one of its variations) recommends a given conclusion at an
appropriately high level of caution andX’s problem situation does not
contain any other questions for which rule A recommends conflicting
conclusions. X is in a position to accept as evidence the conclusion
which K1 and rule A warrant his merely accepting. In that case, X
shifts to the corpus K2 which is the result of such expansion. He can
then proceed to consider whether relative to K2 rule A licenses adding
still more information pertinent to the question X is considering. X
can ask the same question over and over again until he has exhausted
the resources of using rule A in this reiterated way. [Levi, 1976, p. 42–
43]
70Suppose that ¬φ ∈ K and that K is consistent. Since K is deductively closed, it holds
that ¬φ ∨ ψ ∈ K for all ψ in L. Suppose that ¬φ 6∈ Cn(¬φ ∨ ψ). Then there is a deductively
closed subset K∗ of K such that ¬φ 6∈ K∗ and ¬φ∨ψ ∈ K∗. There is a subset S∗ of S(K,¬φ),
such that K∗ = ∩S∗. Choose the informational values of the elements of S(K,¬φ) in such a
way that exacly all elements in S∗ have the highest informational value. Then, by definition,
K−¬φ = K∗. As K is consistent, it holds that φ 6∈ K. By Inclusion, it holds that φ 6∈ K−¬φ.
By Vacuity, it holds that (K−¬φ)−φ = K−¬φ = K∗. Hence, ¬φ∨ψ ∈ (K−¬φ)−φ. Hence,
ψ ∈ ((K − ¬φ)− φ) + φ. Therefore, “If φ, then ψ” is acceptable with respect to K.
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Levi throws light on his positive evaluation of “the usefulness of the bookkeeping
device in imposing constraints on degrees of caution” [Levi, 1976, p. 43] by means
of the following considerations. Let U be a finite ultimate partition, and let
q = 1.71 If we write Z(φ) for the quotient Q(φ)/M(φ), it can be proven that
within a finite number of reiterations of the bookkeeping process all elements
from U that do not have maximum Z-value are rejected. As a rule, a lesser
degree of boldness brings it about that a number of elements from U that do not
have maximum Z-value escape rejection [Levi, 1976, p. 44]. One example then
shows that in some cases it must be that q < 1: given that q = 1, if we apply
Rule A and the bookkeeping process to determine which options from U have to
be rejected, where all options from U are understood to be equally informative,
then precisely all the options with the greatest plausibility escape rejection. In
this case, a situation can be imagined which clearly contradicts our pretheoretical
intuitions:
If I toss a coin known to be unbiased ten times, I am not prepared
to predict that it will land heads exactly 5 times. If I toss it 100
times, I am not prepared to predict that it will land heads exactly
50 times. My reluctance is not based on any doubts as to the truth
of the claim that the chance of heads is 0.5. I would not make the
predictions even if I was certain that 0.5 is, indeed the chance of heads.
The point is that I would refuse to rule out hypotheses asserting that
the relative frequency of heads will differ from heads by some small
amount. [Levi, 1976, p. 44]
On the other hand, in other cases the desired result can only be reached if q = 1.
Here are two of Levi’s examples:
In estimating the value p of the chance of obtaining heads on a toss
of a coin, imagine that X observes a large number of tosses and they
all land heads. [...] It will become clear that under suitably specified
conditions, X will be able to conclude that p falls in an interval from
1 − ² to 1 when the value of q is less than 1 but will not be able to
conclude that p equals 1. Yet, on some occasions, it may be appro-
priate to conclude that the coin will always land heads on tosses and
p = 1.
[...]
71In the formulation of the conditions for the theorem discussed here, the degree of boldness q
is fixed for the entire bookkeeping process. This, however, is not mandatory. According to Levi,
the degree of boldness may also be changed during the process: “[O]ccasions can arise where
an investigator has reached a stage of inquiry where his demands for information may very well
induce him to modify his ultimate partition and change his degree of caution.” [Levi, 1976,
p. 48.] During the bookkeeping process the probability measures M and Q are adjusted via
conditionalization. See [Levi, 1980, p. 54n].
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Suppose that a population of organisms which are all hybrid with
respect to some pair of alleles are randomly mated and data as to
the percentage of offspring which are purebred dominant, purebred
recessive and hybrid collected. On the basis of the data, one might
conclude that the chance of obtaining a purebred dominant offspring
from hybrid parents is approx[i]mately 1
4
, of obtaining purebred reces-
sive offspring is also approximately 1
4
and of obtaining hybrid offspring
is approximately 1
2
. However, there is considerable pressure to con-
clude that the values for these chances are exactly 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
2
respectively.
[Levi, 1976, p. 45–46]
Finally, after discussing the views of critics and rivals on the assessment of a
numerical value for q, Levi comes to a modest conclusion:
I suggest that the q-value ought to be substantially less than 1 unless
there is some excusing circumstance along the lines described above.
I have no firm conviction as to what an appropriate numerical value
for q ought to be which will satisfy “all but the virtually sceptical”
but I suspect that many sceptics will remain dissatisfied unless it is
substantially less than 0.5. [Levi, 1976, p. 51–52]72
Although Levi does not state it in so many words, he cannot do without reference
to a “presystematic judgment”73 on which expansions are justified in which cases,
if his suggestion to make a more accurate approximation of the value of q by way
of the bookkeeping process is to wash. After all, as long as we do not assume
a presystematic judgment on which expansions are legitimate at what time, we
have, applying Levi’s bookkeeping technique for an approximation of q, no reason
whatsoever to prefer one specific value (or interval of values) for q over another.
In short, the desired result plays a decisive role in the choice of a specific value
for the degree of boldness q.
3.3 Conclusion
We noted that even the assessment of the elements of a corpus K results in
problems which are as yet unsolved. Moreover, even if we know which elements
are part of a corpusK, the values of Levi’sM -function, Q-function and parameter
q can always be chosen in such a way that each expansion or contraction can
be legitimized within Levi’s epistemological framework with hindsight, if that
expansion or contraction meets at least a number of minimal constraints. No
72Four years later, Levi writes: “[N]ormally q should be less than 1 (and indeed, less than
.5)” [Levi, 1980, p. 55].
73See also Levi’s refutation of a proposal by Keith Lehrer [Levi, 1976, p. 44].
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credence can be attached to the normative status of his theory, to which Levi
sticks through thick and thin,74 as long as Levi fails to formulate convincing
criteria – criteria that are independent of the desired result – with which (1)
the identity of a corpus K can be found out, and (2) the system of contextual
parameters (the parameter q and the probability measures M and Q) can be
assessed adequately.75 It is a misleading strategy to nonchalantly assume that
“appropriate inputs are present (such as the demand for information, ultimate
partition, degree of caution, credal state, and so on)” [Levi, 1991, p. 107] and then
to formulate criteria for legitimate expansions and contractions on the basis of
these values, since not much is gained with a ‘solution’ in which a given problem is
reduced to the values of a number of parameters of which it is absolutely unclear
how they should be assessed. Would we really be explaining much less if we
limited ourselves to one parameter, l, which stipulates the legitimacy of belief
changes: a ‘measure of legitimacy’?76
May Levi’s dynamic epistemology have a second life, this time in the form
of a descriptive theory? Descriptivity implies the obligation of testability, which
Levi’s theory, at least until now, fails to meet: as long as the numerical values
of the parameters of our epistemic state before and after a controlled change
cannot be measured with sufficient accuracy, a test (as opposed to the usual
reference in belief change literature to the ‘intuitiveness’ of basic assumptions and
postulates77) of Levi’s theory, supposing it is testable, remains a futuristic idea.
Though Levi antagonizes Lewis and Stalnaker by proclaiming that their treatment
of conditionals and conditional logic, based on possible worlds semantics, are
74“I am concerned with conditions under which changes in doxastic commitments are legiti-
mate. The concern is prescriptive, not explanatory” [Levi, 1991, p. 107] and “[m]y preoccupa-
tion is in the final analysis with identifying standards of rational health in reasoning. Logicians,
mathematicians, and computer scientists make an important contribution to identifying what
those standards might be and to the design of technologies that can contribute to enhancing
our limited abilities to realize these standards. I am interested in defending a view not of what
these standards might be but what they should be.” [Levi, 1996, p. xiii.]
75Levi tries to justify his refusal to have anything to do with inquiries into criteria for finding
adequate values for his parameters with an argument by analogy: “Thermodynamics and some
branches of economic theory illustrate comparative statical theories which investigate changes in
equilibrium states of systems suitably specified without scrutinizing the details of the paths such
systems follow in moving from one equilibrium state to another. The normative analogue of such
theories of the sort I am aiming to construct here prescribes shifts from one state of cognitive
equilibrium to another without prescribing details of the psychological or social changes which
are made in implementing the revision.” [Levi, 1980, p. 11.] This does not wash, because the
assessing of the values of the required parameters in ‘thermodynamics and some branches of
economic theory’ is done relatively unproblematically, while it is a major obstacle for Levi’s
logico-epistemological system. Accordingly, thermodynamic theories are usually testable, while
theories in the field of belief change are not.
76Note that this mock proposal does not differ in principle, but only in degree from Levi’s
approach.
77Levi writes: “[T]he appeal to postulates that seem intuitively compelling at first blush is a
risky business.” [Levi, 1998, p. 9.]
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“formalisms in search for an as yet undiscovered application” [Levi, 1996, p. 82],
they should actually be seeing eye to eye with one another
While Levi’s proposals for expansion, once it has been decided to expand a
corpus K with a sentence φ, are unproblematic from a logical point of view, the
forementioned difficulties of determining an appropriate information-determining
M -function prevent us from applying Levi’s contraction operator, even if the de-
cision has already been taken to contract a corpus K with a sentence φ. Levi’s
proposal to concretize the ubiquitous reference to a selection function γ in be-
lief change literature with an information-determining probability measure M
does not yield much, since Levi’s contraction operator cannot be applied without
the required informational values. This problem cannot be avoided by simply
assigning the same informational value to all the elements from a not-empty
S(K,φ), in which case γ(S(K,φ)) = S(K,φ), because then, as Hansson and
Olsson demonstrated, it holds that K − φ = Cn(∅). The standard approach of
[Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson, 1985], in which the selection function γ
is not explained in any further detail, suffers from the same deficiency.
Therefore, it is important to strive for an approach of belief change in which
the usual reference to an extra-logical element, such as a selection function or an
ordering of sentences in a corpus on the basis of their corrigibility, is avoided, so
that a contraction, as well as an expansion, can be implemented directly, that
is, without appealing to an extra-logical element. This is even more important
in cases where we have no indication of the relative corrigibility of the elements
of the corpus to be contracted. Only when we have construced such theories,
can we verify on the basis of empirical tests whether the proposed contraction
operator holds good. Within a classical logical framework this wish (until now)
can only be fulfilled under penalty of totally unacceptable results. An underlying
logic which is weaker than classical logic might open up new perspectives.
Chapter 4
Finite State Belief Dynamics
Suppose that we get the information that “Cervantes lost his left hand in battle”
(p), “Cervantes did not lose both hands in battle” (¬(p ∧ q)), and “Go´ngora was
born in 1561” (r). Suppose, furthermore, that all information is on equal footing,
that is, the sources from which the information stems are equally reliable. Which
beliefs can we plausibly extract from these sentences? Obviously, the information
offered is consistent, so, if we have to rely solely on the given sentences, there is
no objection to believing all of them (and their logical consequences) at the same
time.
But suppose, furthermore, that we get the additional information that “Cer-
vantes lost his right hand in battle” (q). First, now all sentences cannot be true at
the same time, although it is possible, of course, to get these pieces of information.
Assuming our beliefs to be based on the information we have, it makes sense to
say that in the information base consisting of our four sentences it is plausible to
believe that Go´ngora was born in 1561 and that Cervantes lost a hand in battle,
although we do not have plausible beliefs as to whether it was his right or his left
one (or even both!). New information can, therefore, put a strain on old beliefs:
this course of reasoning is nonmonotonic.
Suppose now, that, for some reason or other, the information that “Cervantes
lost his left hand in battle” turns out to be unreliable. We eliminate the informa-
tion that “Cervantes lost his left hand in battle” from the information we have,
which is thus contracted. This means that, ceteris paribus, we are entitled to
believe that “Cervantes lost his right hand in battle”, although our previous set
of sentences did not enable us to do so.
If we apply classical logic to the inconsistent information base just described,
we fail to save these appearances, because of classical logic’s property of ex falso
quodlibet. Obtaining all formulas from a contradiction is inappropriate for the
information base described above, for then we would lose all structure and infor-
mation we had: if we have everything, we have nothing at all. Therefore, if we
want to construct a formal theory that describes the phenomena sketched above,
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classical logic will not do. We do need a logic which can handle inconsistencies,
so some relevance logic or paraconsistent logic seems convenient. This logic has
to have another important characteristic as well: it must be able to cope with
incomplete information, as our information base will never be complete. Here,
we shall deal with the matter using a partial, paraconsistent logic.
4.1 Paraconsistent Belief Revision?
The literature on paraconsistent logics is focused on taming the inconsistent. A
range of systems has been built in which a contradiction does not necessarily lead
to triviality. Dynamics usually does not play a role in these systems. On the
other hand, customarily, the consistency of theories is assumed in the belief revi-
sion tradition initiated by [Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson, 1985].1 Little
work has been done to integrate paraconsistent logics with qualitative logics for
theory change. To the best of my knowledge, only [Restall and Slaney, 1995]
presents belief revision using a paraconsistent underlying logic. Let us take a
closer look at Restall and Slaney’s reasons for such an approach.
Restall and Slaney use arguments taken from the field of relevant logic to
motivate their paraconsistent approach to belief revision. In almost all systems
for belief revision, Restall and Slaney note, the underlying logic is superclassical.
This is a theoretical simplification. No-one believes that belief is
closed under that sort of consequence. If it were, we would believe all
tautologies, and furthermore, we would only have inconsistent beliefs
when believing everything. [Restall and Slaney, 1995, p. 1]
Though Restall and Slaney reject the view that two contradictory statements can
both be true, and hence grant that ‘knowledge brooks no contradiction’, they
accept inconsistent beliefs, but retain the idealization that beliefs be closed under
logical consequence. Thus, they make way for a straightforward substitution for
the underlying logic in systems for belief revision: instead of using (supra)classical
logic they opt for the paraconsistent logic first degree entailment as the underlying
logic and show that all standard representation theorems (epistemic entrench-
ment, transitively relational partial meet contraction, and spheres) are preserved
under the proposed substitution. Restall and Slaney admit inconsistent beliefs,
but also provide a method to extract consistent subsets from an inconsistent
theory.
We share Restall and Slaney’s misgivings about using (at least) classical logic
as underlying logic in systems for belief revision, and we favor their proposal to
use first degree entailment instead. Nevertheless, we refuse to allow for inconsistent
beliefs in a logical system, yet we cannot but agree with an aphorism of Charles
1There are some attempts to deal with inconsistent belief sets within this AGM tradition.
See, for instance, [Fuhrmann, 1991], [Hansson, 1993], and [Wasserman, 2000].
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Caleb Colton’s: ‘Man is an embodied paradox, a bundle of contradictions.’ Just
as a theorist of correct reasoning does not aim to validate fallacies, regardless of
how often people commit them, we favor a theory of belief revision that shuns
inconsistent beliefs, even in cases where the information on which these beliefs
are grounded is inconsistent.
This asymmetry mirrors the fact that it is in our power to aspire to con-
sistent beliefs (and perhaps even to attain them), though the inconsistency of
information offered is beyond our control. The system to be expounded in the
present chapter is a normative system, since it exemplifies the norm that beliefs
ought to be consistent. A similar maxim cannot be maintained for information:
it is pointless to precribe that information be consistent. Of course, Restall and
Slaney subscribe to the norm that beliefs ought to be consistent, but their paper
‘Realistic Belief Revision’ has a different object: it aims at a description of ac-
tual reasoning practices.2 Hence, they allow for inconsistent beliefs, not only in
practice, but in logical theory as well.
4.1.1 A Novel Approach
Paraconsistent logic can, indeed, handle inconsistent sets of formulas satisfacto-
rily. Nevertheless, its commitment to inconsistent beliefs or even contradictory
beliefs, notwithstanding philosophical defences of dialethism,3 gives it an exotic
flavour, which is a serious hindrance for its introduction in epistemic contexts.
Secondly, our introductory considerations showed that we need a nonmonotonic
logic to appreciate the fact that additional information that contradicts previous
information may lead to giving up some of our beliefs. Paraconsistent logic is far
too liberal as regards the admission of beliefs. In my view, the admission of in-
consistent beliefs is a major flaw in all the more or less paraconsistent treatments
of inconsistent information.
Here, we argue for a distinction between information and belief. On the one
hand, we shall set forth interrelated techniques for representing, expanding, con-
tracting and revising information. Information may, of course, be inconsistent.
Henceforth, the devices representing our information can contain contradictory
and even inconsistent sentences. On this level, nonmonotonicity does not play
a role. Hence, we may use the paraconsistent monotonic logic first degree entail-
ment as the logic governing expansion, contraction, and revision of information.
On the other hand, operations are offered to extract beliefs from the represented
information. These beliefs will always be consistent and are closed under logical
consequence. Here, nonmonotonicity seems imperative.
2Note that the phenomena discussed in the introduction to this chapter cannot be described
within Restall and Slaney’s framework, because their underlying logic (first degree entailment)
is monotonic. In the present chapter, the underlying logic is a nonmonotonic logic based on first
degree entailment.
3Dialethism is the view that there are true contradictions.
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Hansson, in his editorial in the thematic issue on belief revision of the Journal
of Logic, Language, and Information, makes a case for such a two-fold approach:
[T]he dynamics of belief states involves two major types of operations.
One is operations of change, transformations from one belief state
to another. [...] The other major type can be called operations of
retrieval. The task of such an operation is to find, for a given belief
state, the set of sentences to which the agent has a certain epistemic
attitude. [...]
In the presence of conflicting information, selections are necessary. We
have a choice between making these selections as part of the operations
of change when new information is received and making them as part
of the operations of retrieval when information is recovered from the
system [...]. [Hansson, 1998, p. 125]
The aim of the present study is to develop a suitable system for belief dy-
namics with the following characteristics. First, the system must be capable
of representing inconsistent information. Second, the set of beliefs licensed by
possibly inconsistent information must always be consistent.
Section 4.2 sets forth the method for representing static information. The
dynamics of information change are studied in Section 4.3. To model information
and information change, a simple inconsistency-tolerant four-valued logic, known
as first degree entailment, is used. This logic is a generalization of classical propo-
sitional logic in the sense that it admits, next to classical propositional logic’s
total and consistent valuations, partial and inconsistent valuations as well.
In Section 4.4, operations to extract consistent beliefs from a representation of
static information are explored. Several methods for processing sets of four-valued
valuations to obtain a set of consistent three-valued valuations are investigated.
The resulting three-valued valuations are valuations in the sense of Kleene’s strong
three-valued logic and, hence, guarantee that the set of formulas they all validate
is consistent. The logics governing these extraction operators are nonmonotonic
three-valued logics based on the four-valued logic first degree entailment.
4.2 Preliminaries
The basic logic, underlying all concepts and systems in the present chapter, will
be first degree entailment (henceforth fde), which pertains to implications of the
form φ→ ψ, where φ and ψ are truth functional, not containing any implications
themselves. In [Anderson and Belnap, 1962], this logic has been defined proof-
theoretically. Later, systems of formal semantics for this system were provided in
[Routley and Routley, 1972], which propounded a two-valued semantics for fde,
and in [Dunn, 1976], which propounded a four-valued semantics for fde. Here,
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Dunn’s semantics will be used. For a system of natural deduction for fde, the
reader may have recourse to the Appendix of this thesis.
Throughout the chapter, we use a language for propositional logic, built from
an infinite set of propositional variables PV = {p, q, r, . . .}.
4.2.1. Definition. [Language] The set of all formulas of fde, denoted by F , is
the least set satisfying the following conditions:
(i) PV ⊆ F
(ii) If φ ∈ F and ψ ∈ F , then (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ F and (φ ∨ ψ) ∈ F
(iii) If φ ∈ F , then ¬φ ∈ F .
Note that > and ⊥ do not occur among the formulas of the object language.
4.2.2. Definition. [Valuations] Let w be a set of propositional literals. Then
w is a valuation.
In the following, we shall use v and w to denote valuations. A valuation w is
inconsistent if and only if for some propositional variable p both p ∈ w and
¬p ∈ w. In Section 4.4, to define an extractor, we need the concept of the
co-valuation of a valuation, where such contradictory propositional variables are
eliminated from the valuation. So, if w = {p,¬p, q}, then its co-valuation should
be {q}:
4.2.3. Definition. [Co-Valuations] Let w be a valuation. Then its co-valuation
w is defined to be:
w = {p ∈ w : ¬p 6∈ w} ∪ {¬p ∈ w : p 6∈ w}.
Obviously, a valuation is consistent if and only if it is identical with its co-
valuation.
Our basic semantics is just a rewriting of Dunn’s semantics for fde. In Dunn’s
sense, a valuation is a map ν : PV 7→ ℘({true, false}) from the set of proposi-
tional variables to subsets of the set of truth-values true and false. Hence, a
propositional variable p can have both truth-values, only one truth-value, and no
truth-value.
Here, a valuation w defines such a map as follows: p ∈ w if and only if
true ∈ ν(p), and ¬p ∈ w if and only if false ∈ ν(p). As a consequence, given
the valuation {p,¬p, q}, it holds that ν(p) = {true, false}, ν(q) = {true}, and
ν(x) = ∅ for all other propositional variables x.
The assignment of truth-values to literals is extended to all formulas of the
language as follows:4
4Definite restrictions on the set of valuations give rise to other, familiar logics: if we consider
only consistent valuations, the resulting logic is Kleene’s strong three-valued logic [Kleene, 1952];
if we consider only total valuations, we have Priest’s logic of paradox LP [Priest, 1979]; if we
consider only consistent and total valuations, we end up with classical propositional logic.
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4.2.4. Definition. [Semantical Rules] Let w be a valuation. Then
(i) w |= p iff p ∈ w, if p ∈ PV
(ii) w =| p iff ¬p ∈ w, if p ∈ PV
(iii) w |= φ∧ψ iff w |= φ and w |= ψ
(iv) w =| φ∧ψ iff w =| φ or w =| ψ
(v) w |= φ∨ψ iff w |= φ or w |= ψ
(vi) w =| φ∨ψ iff w =| φ and w =| ψ
(vii) w |= ¬φ iff w =| φ
(viii) w =| ¬φ iff w |= φ.
For instance, {p,¬p, q} |= p ∧ ¬p, but {p,¬p, q} 6|= q ∧ ¬q. Hence, fde semantics
keeps inconsistencies local. An inconsistency does not lead to triviality, in the
sense that from an inconsistency everything follows.
Validity is defined in the obvious way:
4.2.5. Definition. [Validity] Let φ and ψ be formulas. Then φ implies ψ, de-
noted by φ |= ψ, is defined as follows:
φ |= ψ iff ∀w(w |= φ→ w |= ψ).
In the following, we shall frequently use a partial ordering on the set of val-
uations. The ordering is given by set-theoretical inclusion. This simple ordering
enables us to define least valuations satisfying a formula.
4.2.6. Definition. [Minimality] Let φ be a formula. A valuation w is φ-minimal
if both
(i) w |= φ
(ii) ∀v(v ⊂ w → v 6|= φ).
Of course, several valuations can be φ-minimal (the valuations {p} and {¬q}
both are p ∨ ¬q-minimal), but every formula defines a non-empty unique set of
smallest finite valuations satisfying that formula. This set contains exactly all
different fde-valuations that are minimally sufficient for validating the formula
under consideration. A subset – empty, if the formula is inconsistent – of this
set is the set of consistent φ-minimal valuations. These notions are defined as
follows:
4.2.7. Definition. [Minimal Valuations] Let φ be a formula. Then
[[φ]] = {w : w is φ-minimal}.
We shall use [[φ]]> to denote the set of consistent valuations in [[φ]], and likewise,
[[φ]]⊥ to denote the the set of inconsistent valuations in [[φ]].
Of course, [[φ]] = [[φ]]> ∪ [[φ]]⊥ and [[φ]]> ∩ [[φ]]⊥ = ∅.
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So, [[(p ∨ q) ∧ ¬p]]> = {{q,¬p}} and [[(p ∨ q) ∧ ¬p]]⊥ = {{p,¬p}}.
These definitions entail that if the set of φ-minimal valuations is identical
with the set of ψ-minimal valuations, then φ and ψ are equivalent under fde. The
converse holds as well:
4.2.8. Lemma (Extensionality). Let φ and ψ be formulas. Then
[[φ]] = [[ψ]] iff φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ.
Proof. Assume that [[φ]] = [[ψ]]. Suppose that w |= φ. Sift this w to obtain v such
that v ⊆ w and v ∈ [[φ]]. By our assumption, it must be that v ∈ [[ψ]]. Then v |= ψ.
Hence, as v ⊆ w, we have w |= ψ. Therefore, φ |= ψ. As the other case is proved
similarly, it must be that φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ.
Assume that φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ. Suppose that w ∈ [[φ]]. Then w |= φ and, hence,
w |= ψ. Suppose that w 6∈ [[ψ]]. Then there must be a v such that v ⊂ w and v |= ψ.
Then, as we assumed that ψ |= φ, we have v |= φ, contradicting the φ-minimality of w.
Hence w ∈ [[ψ]]. The other inclusion is proved similarly. Therefore, [[φ]] = [[ψ]]. 2
4.2.1 An Algorithm for Finding φ’s Minimal Valuations
Finding φ’s minimal valuations can be cumbersome. How does one know that
no single minimal valuation has been overlooked? An algorithm that lists them
all gives the necessary assurance. Before formulating such an algorithm, we need
some operations on valuations and sets of valuations.
4.2.9. Definition. [Set Minimalization] LetW be a set of valuations. Then the
minimalization of W , denoted by min(W), is defined to be
min(W) = {w ∈ W : ∀v(v ∈ W → v 6⊂ w)}.
4.2.10. Definition. [Minimal Union and Minimal Product] Let φ and ψ be
formulas. Then the minimal union of [[φ]] and [[ψ]], denoted by [[φ]]⊗ [[ψ]], and the
minimal product of [[φ]] and [[ψ]], denoted by [[φ]]⊕ [[ψ]], are defined to be
(i) [[φ]]⊗ [[ψ]] = min([[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]])
(ii) [[φ]]⊕ [[ψ]] = min({v ∪ w : v ∈ [[φ]] and w ∈ [[ψ]]}).
The algorithm is based on the following Deconstruction Rules. We prove the
correctness of these rules immediately. We avoid a direct definition of [[¬φ]] in
terms of some set-theoretical operation on [[φ]] by splitting cases according to the
main connective of the negated formula.
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4.2.11. Lemma (Deconstruction Rules). Let φ and ψ be formulas. Then
(i) [[p]] = {{p}}, if p ∈ PV
(ii) [[¬p]] = {{¬p}}, if p ∈ PV
(iii) [[φ ∧ ψ]] = [[φ]]⊕ [[ψ]]
(iv) [[φ ∨ ψ]] = [[φ]]⊗ [[ψ]]
(v) [[¬(φ ∧ ψ)]] = [[¬φ]]⊗ [[¬ψ]]
(vi) [[¬(φ ∨ ψ)]] = [[¬φ]]⊕ [[¬ψ]]
(vii) [[¬¬φ]] = [[φ]].
Proof. (i) and (ii) are obvious.
(iii) Suppose that w ∈ [[φ∧ψ]]. Then w |= φ and w |= ψ. Sift w to obtain a w1 ∈ [[φ]]
and a w2 ∈ [[ψ]]. Obviously, w1∪w2 ⊆ w. Moreover, the strong inclusion does not hold:
suppose that w1∪w2 ⊂ w. Then, because of the φ∧ψ-minimality of w, it must be that
w1 ∪ w2 6|= φ ∧ ψ. Hence, w1 6|= φ or w2 6|= ψ, contradicting the fact that w1 ∈ [[φ]] and
w2 ∈ [[ψ]]. Therefore, there are w1 ∈ [[φ]] and w2 ∈ [[ψ]], such that w = w1 ∪ w2.
It remains to be shown that w is an element of the minimal product of [[φ]] and [[ψ]].
Suppose it is not. Then there are v1 ∈ [[φ]] and v2 ∈ [[ψ]], such that v1 ∪ v2 ⊂ w. But
then, because of the φ ∧ ψ-minimality of w, it must be that v1 ∪ v2 6|= φ ∧ ψ. Hence,
v1 6|= φ or v2 6|= ψ, contradicting the fact that v1 ∈ [[φ]] and v2 ∈ [[ψ]]. Therefore, w is
an element of the minimal product of [[φ]] and [[ψ]] – that is, w ∈ [[φ]]⊕ [[ψ]].
Suppose that w ∈ [[φ]] ⊕ [[ψ]]. Then there are w1 ∈ [[φ]] and w2 ∈ [[ψ]], such that
w = w1 ∪w2. Obviously, w |= φ∧ψ. Suppose that w is not φ∧ψ-minimal. Then there
is a v, such that v ⊂ w and v |= φ ∧ ψ. Hence v |= φ and v |= ψ. Sift this v to obtain
v1 ∈ [[φ]] and v2 ∈ [[ψ]]. Of course, v1 ∪ v2 ⊆ v ⊂ w. Hence, v1 ∪ v2 ⊂ w. But then
w 6∈ [[φ]] ⊕ [[ψ]] and we have a contradiction. Therefore, w is φ ∧ ψ-minimal – that is,
w ∈ [[φ ∧ ψ]].
(iv) Suppose that w ∈ [[φ ∨ ψ]]. Then w |= φ ∨ ψ and ∀v(v ⊂ w → v 6|= φ ∨ ψ), that
is, ∀v(v ⊂ w → v 6|= φ) and ∀v(v ⊂ w → v 6|= ψ). Hence w ∈ [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]]. It remains to
be shown that w is in the minimalization of [[φ]]∪ [[ψ]]. Suppose it is not. Then there is
a v ∈ [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]] with v ⊂ w. Then, as v ∈ [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]], it must be that v |= φ or v |= ψ.
But, as v ⊂ w, by the φ ∨ ψ-minimality of w, it must be that v 6|= φ and v 6|= ψ: a
contradiction. Therefore, w ∈ min([[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]]), that is, w ∈ [[φ]]⊗ [[ψ]].
Suppose that w ∈ [[φ]] ⊗ [[ψ]]. Then w ∈ min([[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]]). Then w ∈ [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]] and
∀v(v ∈ [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]]→ v 6⊂ w). Hence, w ∈ [[φ]] or w ∈ [[ψ]].
Case 1: Suppose that w ∈ [[φ]]. Then w |= φ and ∀v(v ⊂ w → v 6|= φ). Hence,
w |= φ ∨ ψ. Suppose that there is a v with v ⊂ w and v |= φ ∨ ψ. As w is φ-minimal,
it must be that v 6|= φ. Hence, v |= ψ. Sift v to obtain a v1 with v1 ⊆ v and v1 ∈ [[ψ]].
Then v1 ⊂ w and v1 ∈ [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]]: a contradiction. Therefore, w ∈ [[φ ∨ ψ]].
Case 2: Suppose that w ∈ [[ψ]]. Then w |= ψ and ∀v(v ⊂ w → v 6|= ψ). Hence,
w |= φ ∨ ψ. Suppose that there is a v with v ⊂ w and v |= φ ∨ ψ. As w is ψ-minimal,
it must be that v 6|= ψ. Hence, v |= φ. Sift v to obtain a v1 with v1 ⊆ v and v1 ∈ [[φ]].
Then v1 ⊂ w and v1 ∈ [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]]: a contradiction. Therefore, w ∈ [[φ ∨ ψ]].
Therefore, w ∈ [[φ ∨ ψ]].
(v), (vi) and (vii) follow from the fact that the De Morgan rules and the Law of
Double Negation hold for fde, from Lemma 4.2.8 and from (iii) and (iv). 2
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4.2.12. Definition. [Minimal Valuations Algorithm] Let φ be a formula. Then,
the Minimal Valuations Algorithm applied to φ is defined as follows:
1. Put φ between double brackets. Then apply Deconstruction Rules (iii), (iv),
(v), (vi) and (vii), until no further application of one of these Deconstruction
Rules is possible. Use brackets, in order to avoid confusion.
2. Apply Deconstruction Rules (i) and (ii), and solve, bottom up, the opera-
tions ⊕ and ⊗ according to their definitions, until all occurences of ⊕ and
⊗ have been treated.
4.2.13. Theorem. Let φ be a formula. Then the Minimal Valuations Algorithm
applied to φ generates exactly all φ-minimal valuations.
Proof. By structural induction on φ. Use Lemma 4.2.11. 2
4.2.2 Finite States and Their Determiners
In possible worlds semantics, the meaning of a formula φ is identified with the
set [φ] of all possible worlds that validate φ, where a possible world is a total and
consistent valuation. Partial information is represented by a multitude of possible
worlds. In the present context, the meaning of a formula φ is identified with the
set [[φ]] of minimal valuations required to validate φ. Restricting our discussion to
the consistent case, these consistent minimal valuations, which then are partial
valuations of Kleene’s strong three-valued logic, state the minimal requirements
possible worlds must fulfill in order to be included in [φ]. Hence, a possible world
w is an element of [φ] if and only if there is a consistent v in [[φ]] such that
v ⊆ w. Thus, it seems that the same information is conveyed by [φ] and by [[φ]].
However, the accounts differ in their notion of relevance, which has an important
repercussion for the concept of ‘information span’, which is discussed below.
Relevance is definitely not a characteristic of the usual possible worlds ap-
proach. Each possible world that validates “Go´ngora was portrayed by Vela´zquez”
is opinioned on every other formula of the language, regardless of its relevance
to the subject matter of the represented information. This huge amount of addi-
tional ‘information’ is the price paid for using a set of total valuations to represent
partial information. In this chapter, we avoid this situation by concentrating on
the set of minimal valuations required to validate the information to be repre-
sented. Thus, a notion of relevance (albeit a crude one) is central to our way of
information representation.
In the inconsistent case, possible worlds semantics could be construed using,
instead of classical logic, Priest’s LP as underlying logic. LP employs total, but
possibly inconsistent valuations. Thus, we would stay as close as possible to the
standard possible worlds semantics. (See for instance [Mares, 1998] on ‘counter-
possible conditionals’). Here, we pursue the same strategy as in the consistent
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case sketched above. We shall use minimal fde-valuations to describe the minimal
requirements an ‘inconsistent world’ must fulfill in order to be included in [φ].
In a possible worlds framework, an epistemic state σ is identified with a set
of possible worlds. A formula φ is supported by σ if and only if every world w in
σ validates φ. Here, following our intentions to discuss epistemic changes using
minimal valuations, we shall define analogues of these notions. A finite state K
is a set of valuations that satisfies four conditions:
4.2.14. Definition. [Finite State] Let K be a set of valuations. Then K is a
finite state, if
(i) K 6= ∅,
(ii) K is finite,
(iii) every w in K is finite,
(iv) ∀v∀w((v ∈ K and w ∈ K)→ v 6⊂ w).
If K = {∅}, then K is trivial.
Since every formula of the language is satisfiable in fde, a finite state, which is
a representation of all the information we recieved thus far, can not be empty. In
case we do not have any information at all, the finite state is trivial and should not
impose any constraint on the choice of minimal valuations validating the incoming
information. This situation is represented adequately by the finite state {∅}. As
∅ is a subset of all total valuations w, the possible worlds analogue of {∅} would
be the set of all possible worlds, which indeed represents the epistemic state of
total ignorance.
Every formula φ has a finite number of propositional variables, so we need only
consider finitely many valuations under which that formula is true. Moreover,
each valuation itself will be finite as well, as the number of its truth-assigments
to propositional variables is bounded by φ’s number of propositional variables.
Therefore,
4.2.15. Lemma. Let φ be a formula. Then [[φ]] is a finite state.
Each non-trivial finite state K has a formula ∂(K), that characterizes it. In
[Ga¨rdenfors, 1988, p. 26], this formula is called the determiner of K. Contrary
to Ga¨rdenfors’s notion of a determiner, we do not need to extend the language
to incorporate infinite conjunctions. The determiner of a non-empty, finite set of
valuations W such that every wi ∈ W is finite is just a formula of the language
F :
4.2.16. Definition. [Determiner] LetW = {w1, . . . , wn} a non-empty, finite set
of valuations such that each wi ∈ W is finite. Then the determiner ofW , denoted
by ∂(W), is defined to be
∂(W) =
n∨
i=1
(
∧
wi)
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As all the wi’s in W are finite, ∂(W) is a formula.
For example, let W be {{p,¬q}, {p,¬p}, {q}}. ThenW is a non-empty, finite set
and each wi ∈ W is finite. Hence, ∂(W) = (p ∧ ¬q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬p) ∨ q.
The next lemma shows that the determiner ∂(K) characterizes a non-trivial
finite state K. Note that the trivial finite state does not have a determiner.5
4.2.17. Lemma (Characterization). Let K = {w1, . . . , wn} be a non-trivial
finite state. Then
[[∂(K)]] = K.
Proof. Suppose that w ∈ [[∂(K)]]. Then, (i) w |=
∨n
i=1(
∧
wi), and (ii) ∀v(v ⊂
w → v 6|= ∂(K)). From (i) it follows by the Semantical Rules of fde that there is an i
with 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that w |=
∧
wi. Hence, there is an i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
wi ⊆ w. Suppose that wi ⊂ w. Obviously, wi |=
∧
wi and, therefore, wi |= ∂(K). By
(ii), however, it must be that wi 6|= ∂(K), contradicting the previous statement. Hence,
wi 6⊂ w and thus wi = w. Therefore, w ∈ K.
Suppose that w ∈ K, that is, there is an i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that w = wi.
Obviously, wi |=
∧
wi and, hence, wi |= ∂(K). Therefore, w |= ∂(K). Suppose ∃v(v ⊂
w and v |= ∂(K)). Sift this v to obtain a v′ such that v′ ∈ [[∂(K)]] and v′ ⊆ v. Then
v′ ⊂ w, and, by the reasoning in the first part of this proof, from v′ ∈ [[∂(K)]] we obtain
v′ ∈ K. Hence, there are w ∈ K and v′ ∈ K such that v′ ⊂ w, contradicting the fact
that K is a finite state. Hence, ∀v(v ⊂ w → v 6|= ∂(K)). Therefore, w ∈ [[∂(K)]]. 2
4.2.18. Lemma. Let K1 and K2 be finite states. Suppose that both
(i) ∀v(v ∈ K1 → ∃w(w ∈ K2 and v ⊆ w))
(ii) ∀w(w ∈ K2 → ∃v(v ∈ K1 and w ⊆ v)).
Then K1 = K2.
Proof. Suppose v in K1. Then there is a w in K2 such that v ⊆ w. Suppose that
v 6= w. Then v ⊂ w and there is a v′ ∈ K1 such that w ⊆ v
′. Hence, there are v and v′
in K1 such that v ⊂ v
′, contradicting the fact that K1 is a finite state. Therefore, v = w.
Hence, it must be that ∀v(v ∈ K1 → ∃w(w ∈ K2 and v = w)). By the same reasoning,
starting with a w in K2, it must be that ∀w(w ∈ K2 → ∃v(v ∈ K1 and w = v)). Hence,
K1 ⊆ K2 and K2 ⊆ K1. Therefore, K1 = K2. 2
A finite state K supports a formula φ, if φ is validated by all valuations in
K. This notion of support must be distinguished from the notion of ‘information
span’ which will be discussed more thoroughly in the next subsection. A formula
5One might consider to introduce a formula > in the language, which is true under all
valuations, and stipulate that ∂({∅}) = >. This addition proves to be unnecessary for the
results in this chapter and poses additional technical complications, which are the main reasons
for not following this policy.
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φ is within the information span of a finite state K, if φ is validated by at least
one valuation in K. It should be noted that the latter concept does not function
in a standard possible worlds setting: every formula that is consistent with an
epistemic state σ would be, regardless of the state’s content, within that state’s
information span, for each world in σ is fully opinioned.
To conclude this subsection, we note the fact that K supports φ if and only if
K’s determiner implies φ:
4.2.19. Lemma. Let K be a non-trivial finite state and let φ be a formula. Then
∂(K) |= φ iff ∀w(w ∈ K → w |= φ).
Proof. Let K be {w1, . . . , wn}. Assume that ∂(K) |= φ. Suppose that w ∈ K.
Then there is an i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that w = wi. Obviously, w |=
∧
wi. Hence,
w |=
∨n
i=1(
∧
wi). Then w |= ∂(K). Therefore, by assumption, w |= φ.
Assume that ∀w(w ∈ K → w |= φ). Suppose that v |= ∂(K). Then v |=
∨n
i=1(
∧
wi).
Hence, there is an i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that v |=
∧
wi. Obviously, wi ⊆ v. As wi ∈ K,
by assumption, wi |= φ. Therefore, v |= φ. 2
4.2.3 Finite States: Information Span
Before we are in a position to study the properties of the information dynamics
of finite states, we must be able to say something about the information that is
within the information span of a finite state. In the present section, this notion
of ‘information span’ shall be explored. The definition below enables us to define
a relation on pairs of finite states (‘The information span of K1 is contained
in the information span of K2’). Information spans play a crucial role in our
representation theorem for contraction later on.
4.2.20. Definition. [Information Span] Let K be a finite state and let φ be a
formula. Then φ is in the information span of K, notation: φ <− K, if the following
holds:
φ <− K iff ∃w(w ∈ K and w |= φ).
‘The information span of K1 is contained in the information span of K2’ can now
be expressed as follows:
4.2.21. Definition. Let K1 and K2 be finite states. Then
K1 £K2 iff ∀φ(φ <− K1 → φ <− K2).
From these definitions it follows that if two states have the same information
span, they are identical:
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4.2.22. Lemma. Let K1 and K2 be finite states. Then
K1 £K2 and K2 £K1 iff K1 = K2.
Proof. Suppose that K1 £ K2 and K2 £ K1. As K1 is a finite state, it has a finite
number of elements. Let K1 = {v1, . . . , vn}. For all v in K1 it holds that v |=
∧
v.
Hence, for all v in K1 it holds that
∧
v <− K1. Hence, by supposition, for all v in K1 it
holds that
∧
v <− K2. Hence, by definition, for all v in K1 there is a w in K2, such that
w |=
∧
v. Hence, by the Semantical Rules of fde, for all v in K1 there is a w in K2 such
that v ⊆ w, that is, ∀v(v ∈ K1 → ∃w(w ∈ K2 and v ⊆ w)). By the same reasoning, it
must be that ∀w(w ∈ K2 → ∃v(v ∈ K1 and w ⊆ v)). By Lemma 4.2.18, K1 = K2.
The converse is obvious. 2
Hence the relation £ has some properties analogous to set-theoretical inclusion.
Let us introduce union and intersection for finite states as well:
4.2.23. Definition. [Set Maximalization] Let W be a set of valuations. Then
the maximalization of W , denoted by max(W), is defined to be
max(W) = {w ∈ W : ∀v(v ∈ W → w 6⊂ v)}.
4.2.24. Definition. [Maximal Union and Intersection] Let K1 and K2 be finite
states. Then the maximal union of K1 and K2, denoted by K1 t K2, and the
maximal intersection of K1 and K2, denoted by K1 u K2, are defined to be
(i) K1 t K2 = max(K1 ∪ K2)
(ii) K1 u K2 = max({v ∩ w : v ∈ K1 and w ∈ K2}).
Union and intersection for finite states behave as they should:
4.2.25. Lemma. Let K be a finite state. Then
(i) K t K = K
(ii) K u K = K.
The following two lemmas extend the analogy between the relation £ and set-
theoretical inclusion. Since it is easy to check that the first lemma holds, only
the second is proved.
4.2.26. Lemma. Let K1 and K2 be finite states. Then
(i) K1 u K2 £K1
(ii) K1 u K2 £K2
(iii) K1 £K1 t K2
(iv) K2 £K1 t K2.
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4.2.27. Lemma. Let K1, K2, K3, and K4 be finite states. Suppose that K1 £K3
and K2 £K4. Then
(i) K1 t K2 £K3 t K4
(ii) K1 u K2 £K3 u K4.
Proof. (i) Suppose that φ <− K1 t K2. Then φ <− max(K1 ∪ K2). Hence, there is a
v in max(K1 ∪ K2) such that v |= φ. It holds that v ∈ K1 or v ∈ K2. Hence, φ <− K1 or
φ <− K2. Hence, by the supposition that K1 £K3 and K2 £K4, it must be that φ <− K3
or φ <− K4. Therefore, by Lemma 4.2.26(iii) and (iv), φ <− K3 t K4.
(ii) Suppose that φ <− K1 u K2. Then φ <− max({v ∩ w : v ∈ K1 and w ∈ K2}).
Hence, there are vi in K1 and vj in K2 such that vi ∩ vj |= φ. Consider vi. Obviously,
it holds that vi |=
∧
vi. Hence, it holds that
∧
vi <− K1. Hence, by the assumption that
K1 £ K3, it must be that
∧
vi <− K3. Hence, there is a wk ∈ K3 such that vi ⊆ wk. By
the same reasoning, there is a wl ∈ K4 such that vj ⊆ wl. Obviously, vi ∩ vj ⊆ wk ∩wl.
Hence, wk ∩wl |= φ. As the maximalization of {v ∩w : v ∈ K3 and w ∈ K4} only skips
wk ∩wl in case there is a w
′ in {v ∩w : v ∈ K3 and w ∈ K4} such that wk ∩wl ⊂ w
′, it
must be that φ <− max({v ∩ w : v ∈ K3 and w ∈ K4}). Therefore, φ <− K3 u K4. 2
The quasi-set-theoretical notions developed in this section serve as tools for
analysing the properties of contraction. The notion of a determiner of a finite
state will be instrumental in probing expansion.
4.3 Operations of Information Change
4.3.1 Expansion
In classical systems of belief revision, expansion of a belief set K with a formula
φ is the least problematic operation. So it is here. There is, nevertheless, a
difference in interpretation of the operation. In the system to be propounded
here, an expansion of the finite state K with a formula φ amounts to changing
our finite state K, which is a systematic representation of all the information
we received thus far, to incorporate the information that φ. The result of the
adaptation of our finite state is a new finite state K + φ.
4.3.1. Definition. [Expansion] Let K be a finite state and let φ be a formula.
Then the expansion of K with φ, denoted by K + φ, is defined as follows:
K + φ = min({v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}).
In order to facilitate the proofs to come, we need the following lemma:
4.3.2. Lemma. Let K be a finite state and let φ be a formula. Then
K + φ = K ⊕ [[φ]].
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Proof. Suppose that v ∈ min({v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}). Then v |= φ and
there is a wi ∈ K such that wi ⊆ v. Take vj in [[φ]] with vj ⊆ v. It holds that wi ∈ K
and vj |= φ, and vj ∪ wi ⊇ wi. Hence, wi ∪ vj ∈ {v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}.
Obviously, wi ∪ vj ⊆ v. Hence, it must be that wi ∪ vj = v, since otherwise v would
have been skipped by the minimalization of {v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}, which
would contradict our initial supposition. Therefore, v ∈ {v ∪ w : w ∈ K and v ∈ [[φ]]}.
Suppose that v 6∈ min({v ∪ w : w ∈ K and v ∈ [[φ]]}). Then there must be a v′ in
{v ∪ w : w ∈ K and v ∈ [[φ]]} such that v′ ⊂ v. Then there must be a w′k in K and a v
′
l
in [[φ]] such that v′ = w′k∪v
′
l. It holds that w
′
k ∈ K and v
′
l |= φ and w
′
k∪v
′
l ⊇ w
′
k. Hence,
w′k ∪ v
′
l ∈ {v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}. Therefore, v
′ ∈ {v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}.
But then v is skipped by the minimalization of {v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}. Hence,
v 6∈ {v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}: a contradiction. Therefore, v ∈ min({v ∪ w : w ∈
K and v ∈ [[φ]]}), that is, v ∈ K ⊕ [[φ]].
To prove the other inclusion, suppose that v ∈ min({v ∪ w : w ∈ K and v ∈ [[φ]]}).
Then there is a wi in K and a vj in [[φ]] such that v = wi ∪ vj . It holds that wi ∈ K and
wi ∪ vj |= φ and wi ∪ vj ⊇ wi. Hence, wi ∪ vj ∈ {v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}. Therefore,
v ∈ {v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}. Suppose that v 6∈ min({v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}).
Then there must be a v′ in {v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ} such that v′ ⊂ v. Then v′ |= φ
and there is a w′k ∈ K such that w
′
k ⊆ v
′. Take v′l in [[φ]] with v
′
l ⊆ v
′. Consider w′k ∪ v
′
l.
It holds that w′k ∪ v
′
l ⊆ v
′. Hence, w′k ∪ v
′
l ⊂ v. Moreover, since w
′
k ∈ K and v
′
l ∈ [[φ]],
it must be that w′k ∪ v
′
l ∈ {v ∪ w : w ∈ K and v ∈ [[φ]]}. But then v is skipped by
the minimalization of {v ∪ w : w ∈ K and v ∈ [[φ]]}. Hence, v 6∈ min({v ∪ w : w ∈
K and v ∈ [[φ]]}): a contradiction. Therefore, v ∈ min({v ⊇ w : w ∈ K and v |= φ}),
that is, v ∈ K + φ. 2
The next lemma will be put to use in our representation theorem for expansion.
Note that if K is trivial, then, by definition, K + φ = [[φ]].
4.3.3. Lemma. Let K be a non-trivial finite state and let φ be a formula. Then
K + φ = [[∂(K) ∧ φ]].
Proof. By Lemma 4.3.2, Lemma 4.2.17 and Lemma 4.2.11(iii). 2
Properties of the Expansion Function
The following five postulates are similar to the first five (out of six) postulates in
[Ga¨rdenfors, 1988, p. 48–51]:6
6Update semantics, as set forth in [Veltman, 1996], can be mimicked with this expansion
function, on the condition that the starting set σ of possible worlds always only contains worlds
that differ finitely. σ must be describable by a finite formula.
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4.3.4. Definition. [Postulates for Expansion] Let K and K′ be non-trivial finite
states and let φ be a formula. An expansion operator, †, is any operator satisfying
the following postulates:
(K † 1) K † φ is a non-trivial finite state
(K † 2) ∂(K † φ) |= φ
(K † 3) ∂(K † φ) |= ∂(K)
(K † 4) If ∂(K) |= φ, then ∂(K) |= ∂(K † φ)
(K † 5) If ∂(K) |= ∂(K′), then ∂(K † φ) |= ∂(K′ † φ).
Our next theorem shows that, using finite states rather than belief sets, we do
not, unlike Ga¨rdenfors, need an additional postulate to secure uniqueness.
4.3.5. Theorem (Uniqueness). Let † and ‡ be expansion operators, satisfying
(K † 1) through (K † 5). Then for all formulas φ it holds that K † φ = K ‡ φ.
Proof. It will suffice to show that both (a) ∂(K † φ) |= ∂(K ‡ φ) and (b) ∂(K ‡ φ) |=
∂(K † φ), for, by Lemma 4.2.8 and Lemma 4.2.17, it follows from (a) and (b) that
K†φ = K‡φ. First, because of (K†1), both ∂(K†φ) and ∂(K‡φ) are formulas. By (K†2),
it must be that ∂(K†φ) |= φ. Hence, by (K† 4), we obtain (i) ∂(K†φ) |= ∂((K†φ) ‡φ).
By (K † 3), it must be that ∂(K † φ) |= ∂(K). Hence, by (K † 5), we obtain (ii)
∂((K † φ) ‡ φ) |= ∂(K ‡ φ). From (i) and (ii), it follows that (a). Of course, (b) can be
proved analogously. Therefore, K † φ = K ‡ φ. 2
4.3.6. Theorem (Representation Theorem for Expansion). Let K be a
non-trivial finite state and let φ be a formula. Then K†φ satisfies (K†1) through
(K † 5) iff K † φ = K + φ.
Proof. Because of Theorem 4.3.5, it will suffice to show that K+ φ satisfies (K † 1)
through (K † 5). The first three follow from Lemma 4.3.3.
(K † 4) Suppose that ∂(K) |= φ. Since fde is reflexive, it holds that ∂(K) |= ∂(K).
Hence, ∂(K) |= ∂(K) ∧ φ. From Lemma 4.3.3, we get ∂(K) ∧ φ |= ∂(K+ φ). Therefore,
∂(K) |= ∂(K + φ), since fde is transitive.
(K†5) Suppose that ∂(K) |= ∂(K′). From Lemma 4.3.3 we obtain both ∂(K+φ) |= φ
and ∂(K + φ) |= ∂(K). Combining the latter with our supposition, it must be that
∂(K + φ) |= ∂(K′), since fde is transitive. Hence, ∂(K + φ) |= ∂(K′) ∧ φ. From
Lemma 4.3.3 we get ∂(K′) ∧ φ |= ∂(K′ + φ). Therefore, ∂(K + φ) |= ∂(K′ + φ). 2
The following theorem relates iterated expansion to conjunction.
4.3.7. Theorem (Iterated Expansion). Let K be a finite state and let φ and
ψ be formulas. Then
(K + φ) + ψ = K + (φ ∧ ψ).
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Proof. If K = {∅}, then for all χ it holds that K + χ = [[χ]], by definition.
Lemma 4.2.11(iii) does the job. Otherwise, by Lemma 4.3.2, it holds that (K+φ)+ψ =
(K ⊕ [[φ]]) ⊕ [[ψ]]. By Lemma 4.2.17, K has a determiner such that K = [[∂(K)]]. The
proof can be completed, using Lemma 4.2.8, Lemma 4.2.11(iii), and Lemma 4.3.2. 2
Since conjunction is commutative, the order of the formulas with which a finite
state is expanded is irrelevant to the result:
4.3.8. Corollary. Let K be a finite state and let φ and ψ be formulas. Then
(K + φ) + ψ = (K + ψ) + φ.
4.3.2 Contraction
Intuitively, if we contract a finite state K with a formula φ, we skip all sufficient
evidence for φ from the elements of our finite state, so that φ can not be among
the formulas which are within the information span of the resulting finite state,
as there will be no residual evidence for φ left in it. Hence, φ is not within the
information span of K − φ. Moreover, all logical consequences which were in the
information span of K ‘just because’ φ was within the information span of K will
be removed as well.
First, we provide two definitions of contraction, one of which is, to the best
of my knowledge, the first recursive definition of contraction in the literature,
and secondly, we shall show that these definitions are equivalent. The recursive
definition offers more insight into the handling of complex formulas than the
direct definition. Moreover, we can use the results of earlier contractions of K
to compute the contraction of K with a more complex formula. On the other
hand, the direct definition is more convenient in case we study the metalogical
properties of the system.
4.3.9. Definition. [Contraction] Let K be a finite state and let φ be a formula.
Then the contraction of K with φ, denoted by K − φ, is defined as follows:
K − φ = max({v ⊆ w : w ∈ K and v 6|= φ}).
4.3.10. Definition. [Recursive Contraction] Let K be a finite state and let φ
be a formula. Then the recursive contraction of K with φ, denoted by K ∼ φ, is
defined recursively as follows:
(i) K ∼ p = max({w\{p} : w ∈ K})
(ii) K ∼ ¬p = max({w\{¬p} : w ∈ K})
(iii) K ∼ (ψ1 ∧ ψ2) = (K ∼ ψ1) t (K ∼ ψ2)
(iv) K ∼ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2) = (K ∼ ψ1) u (K ∼ ψ2).
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These rules suffice to define the contraction of any formula φ from K, since the
De Morgan rules and the Law of Double Negation hold for fde. For instance,
K ∼ ¬(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) equals K ∼ (¬ψ1 ∨ ¬ψ2), which, according to (iv), amounts to
(K ∼ ¬ψ1) u (K ∼ ¬ψ2).
By structural induction on φ, we can show that Contraction and Recursive
Contraction are equivalent:
4.3.11. Theorem. Let K be a finite state and let φ be a formula. Then
K − φ = K ∼ φ.
Properties of the Contraction Function
In the present context, Ga¨rdenfors’s postulates for contraction cannot be straight-
forwardly applied, as the standard postulates have been devised for belief sets.
We propose to translate them into the language of finite states, using previous
definitions. We only need four of Ga¨rdenfors’s eight postulates plus an additional
postulate for our representation theorem. The reader can easily check, however,
that all translations of Ga¨rdenfors’s eight postulates hold, except for the hotly
debated Recovery postulate.7
4.3.12. Definition. [Postulates for Contraction] Let K and K′ be finite states
and let φ be a formula. A contraction operator,
.
−, is any operator satisfying the
following postulates:
(K .−1) K .−φ is a finite state (Closure)
(K .−2) K .−φ£K (Inclusion)
(K .−3) If φ 6<− K, then K .−φ = K (Vacuity)
(K .−4) φ 6<− K .−φ (Success)
(K .−M) If K £K′, then K .−φ£K′ .−φ (Monotonicity).
The last property of this list is not among the AGM-postulates.8 Ga¨rdenfors
discusses the property under the same name (K
.
−M) and argues against it, be-
cause it is, in the context of belief sets, equivalent to its counterpart (K ×M),
which he previously showed to be unsound [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988, p. 59–60]. In the
present setting, (K
.
−M) is satisfied, but (K ×M) not. [Pais and Jackson, 1992]
introduces a similar but weaker postulate Partial Monotonicity.
7In the present setting, Recovery would amount to the following: K £ (K
.
−φ) + φ. For a
counterexample: let K be [[p∧q]], and let φ be p∨q. As is well-known, Recovery is, in case belief
revision is studied for epistemological reasons, the least plausible of Ga¨rdenfors’s postulates for
contraction. [Hansson, 1999a] presents the central counter-examples which hinge on the justifi-
catory structure of the beliefs involved. As the other translations of Ga¨rdenfors’s postulates are
satisfied by our contraction function, our contraction function is, following [Makinson, 1987], a
finite state based withdrawal function.
8[Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson, 1985].
4.3. Operations of Information Change 79
All traditional contraction functions, such as partial meet contraction9, safe
contraction10, and contraction based on epistemic entrenchment11, depend on an
extra-logical element. The chief argument for adopting an extra-logical element,
such as a selection function or an ordering of the formulas, is the fact that the only
contraction function defined by logical means alone, that is, full meet contraction
[Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson, 1985, p. 512], gives rise to a trivial op-
eration.12 As we have seen, in the present context, contraction has been defined
with logical means alone. Since our contraction function does not lead to the
undesirable results that full meet contraction had within the usual classical set-
ting of belief change, AGM’s arguments against defining contraction without an
extra-logical element are out of place in our approach.
Standard AGM-contractions allow for different non-equivalent contraction
functions satisfying the postulates (K
.
−1) through (K
.
−8). (K
.
−M), however,
guarantees uniqueness of the function, if (K
.
−1) through (K
.
−4) are present:
4.3.13. Theorem (Uniqueness). Let
.
− and
..
− be contraction functions, sat-
isfying (K
.
−1) through (K
.
−4) and (K
.
−M). Then for all formulas φ it holds that
K
.
−φ = K
..
−φ.
Proof. On the basis of (K .−4), it holds that φ 6<− K .−φ and φ 6<− K ..−φ. By (K .−1),
both K
.
−φ and K
..
−φ are finite states. Hence, by (K
.
−3), we obtain (K
.
−φ)
..
−φ = K
.
−φ
and (K
..
−φ)
.
−φ = K
..
−φ. Moreover, by (K
.
−2), we have K
.
−φ £ K and K
..
−φ £ K. From
this, using (K
.
−M), it follows that (K
.
−φ)
..
−φ£K
..
−φ and (K
..
−φ)
.
−φ£K
.
−φ. Using the
equalities established previously, it must be that K
.
−φ£K
..
−φ and K
..
−φ£K
.
−φ. From
Lemma 4.2.22 it follows that K
.
−φ = K
..
−φ. 2
4.3.14. Theorem (Representation Theorem for Contraction). Let K
be a finite state and let φ be a formula. Then K
.
−φ satisfies (K
.
−1) through (K
.
−4)
and (K
.
−M) iff K
.
−φ = K − φ.
Proof. Because of Theorem 4.3.13, it will suffice to show that K−φ satisfies (K .−1)
through (K
.
−4) and (K
.
−M). The first four postulates follow directly from the definition
of K−φ. To prove (K
.
−M), assume that K£K′. Suppose that ψ <− K−φ. Then there
is a v in K−φ with v |= ψ. Hence, there is a w in K with v ⊆ w and v |= ψ and v 6|= φ.
9[Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson, 1985].
10[Alchourro´n and Makinson, 1985].
11[Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson, 1988].
12If K is a theory such that φ ∈ K, then the full meet contraction of φ from K, denoted by
K∼φ, is defined to be ∩(K⊥φ), where K⊥φ is the set of all maximal subsets K ′ of K such that
K ′ 6` φ. Observation 2.1 of [Alchourro´n and Makinson, 1982] shows what goes wrong: if φ ∈ K,
then K∼φ = K ∩Cn (¬φ), which is far too small, since the contraction skips all sentences from
K that are not consequences of ¬φ. For instance, let K be Cn (p ∧ q) and let φ be q. Then
p 6∈ K∼q. (Using the machinery of the present chapter, let K be [[p ∧ q]] and let φ be q. Then
K® [[q]] = [[p]].) The situation for full meet Levi contractions is even worse. See Theorem 5.3 of
[Hansson and Olsson, 1995].
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Hence,
∧
w <− K. Therefore, by assumption,
∧
w <− K′. Hence, there is a w′ in K′ with
w ⊆ w′. Summarizing, there is a w′ in K′ with v ⊆ w′ and v 6|= φ and v |= ψ. Hence,
v ∈ {v ⊆ w′ : w′ ∈ K′ and v 6|= φ}. As the maximalization of this set only skips v in
favour of a superset of v, there will be an element in K′ − φ that validates ψ. Hence,
ψ <− K′ − φ. Therefore, if K £K′, then K − φ£K′ − φ. 2
Iterated contraction is related to disjunction:
4.3.15. Theorem (Iterated Contraction). Let K be a finite state and let
φ and ψ be formulas. Then
(K − φ)− ψ = K − (φ ∨ ψ).
Proof. Since, by Definition 4.3.10 and Theorem 4.3.11, it holds that K− (φ∨ψ) =
(K − φ) u (K − ψ), it suffices to prove (a) (K − φ) u (K − ψ) £ (K − φ) − ψ and (b)
(K − φ)− ψ £ (K − φ) u (K − ψ). The identity is then established by Lemma 4.2.22.
(a) By Lemma 4.2.26, it must be that both (i) (K − φ) u (K − ψ)£K − φ and (ii)
(K−φ)u (K−ψ)£K−ψ. Because of the Representation Theorem and (K
.
−4) it holds
that ψ 6<− K − ψ, it follows from (ii) that ψ 6<− (K − φ) u (K − ψ). Hence, by (K
.
−3), it
holds that (iii) ((K − φ) u (K − ψ)) − ψ = (K − φ) u (K − ψ). By (i) and (K
.
−M), it
must be that ((K − φ) u (K − ψ)) − ψ £ (K − φ)− ψ, which, together with (iii), gives
us (a).
(b) By the Representation Theorem and (K
.
−2) it must be that (K−φ)−ψ£K−φ
and K − φ £ K. Applying (K −M) to the latter gives us (K − φ) − ψ £ K − ψ. By
Lemma 4.2.27 and Lemma 4.2.25, it must be that (K − φ)− ψ £ (K − φ) u (K − ψ).2
Due to the commutativity of disjunction, it immediately follows that the order in
which formulas are contracted from a finite state has no influence on the result:
4.3.16. Corollary. Let K be a finite state and let φ and ψ be formulas. Then
(K − φ)− ψ = (K − ψ)− φ.
4.3.3 Revision
Finally, revision of a finite state K with a formula φ can be thought of as changing
a finite state K with the claim that there is only evidence for (and not against)
φ. This can be modelled in two ways, the second of which is an adaption of a
proposal in [Hansson, 1993] to the present context.
4.3.17. Definition. [Levi Identity] Let K be a finite state and let φ be a for-
mula. Then the revision of K with φ, denoted by K × φ, is defined to be
K × φ = (K − ¬φ) + φ.
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4.3.18. Definition. [Reversed Levi Identity] Let K be a finite state and let φ
be a formula. Then the reversed revision of K with φ, denoted by K ×r φ, is
defined to be
K ×r φ = (K + φ)− ¬φ.
Using the Levi Identity always leads to a finite state K × φ that supports φ.
Hence, ∂(K × φ) |= φ. Note that ¬φ might be within the information span of
K×φ. (Consider, for instance, K× (p∧¬p).) Conversely, applying the Reversed
Levi Identity always results in a finite state K×rφ that does not have ¬φ within its
information span. Hence, it holds that ¬φ 6<− K×rφ. It is possible, though, that φ
is not supported by K×r φ either. (Consider, once again, K×r (p∧¬p).) Special
representation theorems for these revision functions have not been thoroughly
studied yet.
4.4 Extractors: Operations of Belief Retrieval
The formal apparatus developed so far enables us to attach to each formula,
consistent or inconsistent it may be, a finite state. Which set of beliefs can we
plausiby extract from this state, under the constraint that this set of extracted be-
liefs has to be consistent? Several alternative consequence relations, constructed
along different lines, will be adequate to this task.13 Hence, our investigations
into these consequence relations will be of a tentative sort, since there are no
prima facie reasons in favor of one of the four alternatives which we shall discuss.
Here, we shall first distinguish two functions on finite states that make in-
consistent valuations consistent and define extractors in terms of these functions.
The first function, the consistency forcer f , just ignores literals which appear con-
tradictorily in a contradictory valuation. The second one, the consistency forcer
g, takes maximal consistent subvaluations of a contradictory valuation, thereby
retaining literals which appear contradictorily in it.
Next, we consider a selection function that serves as a criterion on the ba-
sis of which we may neglect some valuations. Before applying one of our two
consistency-forcing functions, we may, but must not, use this selection function.
Hence, four different consequence relations are generated. Given the present re-
sults, a principled choice between these consequence relations can not be made.
Instead, we shall list some arguments in favor of each of them.
13A systematic overview of consequence relations devised for reasoning from inconsistent un-
prioritized knowledge bases is presented in [Benferhat, Dubois, and Prade, 1997]. Semantics for
their consequence relations have been provided recently (See [Batens, manuscript]). Benferhat,
Dubois and Prade also investigate into the ‘syntax-sensitivity’ of their consequence relations,
distinguishing four types of syntax-sensitivity. Contrary to the consequence relations discussed
by them, the consequence relations to be defined in the present chapter are insensitive to all
four types.
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4.4.1 Making K⊥ Consistent
Informally, a simple preference relation on partial valuations motivates the defini-
tion of these consequence relations. The minimal and consistent partial valuations
satisfying a certain formula are preferred over the minimal and inconsistent valu-
ations satisfying the same formula, if any. If there are such consistent valuations
in the finite state under discussion, we do not want any surprising logic. (Here,
the logic ruling the consistent case amounts to Kleene’s strong three-valued logic.)
Therefore, if the finite state which serves as the starting-point has a consistent
valuation among its elements, all four extractors coincide.
On the other hand, if there are no minimal and consistent valuations satisfying
the formula in question, then our reasoning has to be carried out on the basis of the
minimal and inconsistent valuations satisfying that formula. These inconsistent
valuations must be processed in some way or other, since all of them satisfy some
contradiction. We shall describe two related ways of processing the inconsistent
valuations guaranteeing that the beliefs that are based on them are consistent.
[Restall and Slaney, 1995] uses a vocabulary to extract consistent subsets from
a set of formulas K closed under fde. A vocabulary V is a set of propositional
variables, and the restriction of K with V equals the set of formulas in K built
from the propositional variables in V . If one chooses only propositional variables
p in V which are consistent in K (that is, p∧¬p 6∈ K), then the restriction of K
with V is consistent.
In the present setting, Restall and Slaney’s proposal amounts to skipping all
contradictory literals from all valuations in K⊥.14 Restricting all valuations w in
K⊥ to its consistent literals is just taking the co-valuations w of all w in K. So,
if K> = ∅, in order to guarantee that the reliable conclusions based on the given
inconsistent information are classically consistent, their proposal tells us to work
with the co-valuations w of valuations w in K⊥. In this way, the joint consistency
of the ‘beliefs’ licensed by a finite state is secured, also in case when that state
only contains inconsistent valuations.
A similar (as a matter of fact slightly stronger) extractor is defined thus: in
case K> = ∅, we might consider the maximal consistent subvaluations of the
inconsistent valuations in K⊥. For instance, consider p ∧ ¬p ∧ q. Then its min-
imal valuations are given by the finite state {{p,¬p, q}}, whose single valua-
tion is inconsistent. Taking its maximal consistent subvaluations would give us
{{p, q}, {¬p, q}}. Then ∂({{p, q}, {¬p, q}}) |= p ∨ ¬p, although the first conse-
quence relation does not give us p∨¬p as a conclusion, since ∂({{q}}) 6|= p∨¬p.
Let us make these ideas precise with a couple of definitions:
14For K> and K⊥, see Definition 4.2.7.
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4.4.1. Definition. [Consistency Forcers] Let K be a finite state. Then the co-
valuations of K, denoted by f(K), and the maximally consistent subvaluations of
K, denoted by g(K), are defined to be
f(K) = {w : w ∈ K}
g(K) = max({v : v ⊆ w and w ∈ K and v is consistent }).
4.4.2. Definition. Let K be a finite state and let x ∈ {f, g}. Then
Kx =


x(K⊥), if K> = ∅
K>, otherwise.
4.4.3. Definition. [Belief Extractors] Let K be a finite state, let φ be a formula,
and let x ∈ {f, g}. If Kx = {∅}, then K |6≈x φ for all φ ∈ F . Otherwise,
K |≈x φ iff ∂(Kx) |= φ.
As an example, let K be [[p∧¬(p∧ q)∧ r]], the first information base discussed in
the introductory Cervantes-example. Obviously, K |≈f p∧¬(p∧q)∧r. Expanding
K with q, we obtain K + q |≈f (p ∨ q) ∧ r, but K + q |6≈f p and K + q |6≈f q. If we
now contract this last state with p, then (K + q) − p |≈f q ∧ ¬(p ∧ q) ∧ r. The
reader can easily check that all these statements hold for g-based extraction as
well. Unlike f -based extraction, it holds that K+q |≈g p∨¬p and K+q |≈g q∨¬q.
There are two arguments in favor of f -based extraction. First, it is the weakest
extractor of the four alternative extractors we shall discuss (Theorem 4.4.10).
Secondly, it conforms to six out of seven conditions for Preferential Reasoning
as described by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (Theorem 4.4.4). It is far from
obvious, however, that these conditions have normative force within the present
context.
Likewise, there are two arguments in favor of g-based extraction. First, unlike
the f -based extraction, g-based contraction gives literals appearing inconsistently
in the relevant valuations and literals that do not appear in the relevant valuations
a different treatment. Secondly, the consistency forcer g is a special case of
contraction (Theorem 4.4.6).
Some Properties of f-Based and g-Based Extraction
Let us check some properties of our extractors, using the categorization of non-
monotonous systems in [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor, 1990]. As noted, it is
not clear whether Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor’s conditions have normative
force within the present context. Theorem 4.4.4 does enable a comparison of
some properties of f -based extraction with familiar conditions on nonmonotonic
reasoning. Representation theorems for f -based extraction or g-based extraction
have not been found yet.
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We shall show that the f -based extractor satisfies four out of five of Kraus,
Lehmann and Magidor’s conditions for Cumulative Reasoning,15 whereas the con-
dition that does not hold, that is, Reflexivity, can be modified into Conditional
Reflexivity. Since our extractors do not satisfy Reflexivity, And loses its status
as a derived rule and becomes an independent one. Additionally, the rule Or
holds for f -based extraction.16 Hence, the properties of f -based extraction are,
except for the change of Reflexivity into Conditional Reflexivity, similar to Kraus,
Lehmann and Magidor’s Preferential Reasoning.
4.4.4. Theorem. Let φ, ψ, and χ be formulas and let x ∈ {f, g}. Then
(i)
[[φ]] |≈x ψ
(Conditional Reflexivity)
[[ψ]] |≈x ψ
(ii)
φ |= ψ ψ |= φ [[φ]] |≈x χ
(Left Logical Equivalence)
[[ψ]] |≈x χ
(iii)
[[φ]] |≈x ψ ψ |= χ
(Right Weakening)
[[φ]] |≈x χ
(iv)
[[φ ∧ ψ]] |≈f χ [[φ]] |≈f ψ
(Cut)
[[φ]] |≈f χ
(v)
[[φ]] |≈f ψ [[φ]] |≈f χ
(Cautious Monotonicity)
[[φ ∧ ψ]] |≈f χ
(vi)
[[φ]] |≈x ψ [[φ]] |≈x χ
(And)
[[φ]] |≈x ψ ∧ χ
(vii)
[[φ]] |≈f χ [[ψ]] |≈f χ
(Or)
[[φ ∨ ψ]] |≈f χ
15Cumulative Reasoning consists of the inference rules Reflexivity, Left Logical Equivalence,
Right Weakening, Cut, and Cautious Monotonicity. Preferential Reasoning consists of the
inference rules for Cumulative Reasoning and the inference rule Or.
16Within g-based extraction, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity and Or are not valid. (Since the
three counterexamples hinge on formulas which are tautologies in classical logic, it might be that
these nonmonotonic inference relations do hold for the classical version of g-based extraction.)
To refute Cut, take φ = (p∧¬p)∨(q∧¬q)∨(p∧r∧¬r)∨(¬p∧r∧¬r)∨(q∧s∧¬s)∨(¬q∧s∧¬s),
ψ = ((p∨¬p)∧ (r∨¬r))∨ ((q ∨¬q)∧ (s∨¬s)), and χ = (p∨¬p)∧ (q ∨¬q). Then [[φ∧ψ]] |≈g χ
and [[φ]] |≈g ψ and [[φ]] |6≈g χ.
To refute Cautious Monotonicity, take φ = (p∧¬p)∨(p∧q∧¬q)∨(¬p∧q∧¬q), ψ = q∨¬q∨r,
and χ = q ∨ ¬q. Then [[φ]] |≈g ψ and [[φ]] |≈g χ and [[φ ∧ ψ]] |6≈g χ.
To refute Or, take φ = (p∧¬p)∨ (p∧q∧¬q), ψ = q∧¬q, and χ = ¬p∨q∨¬q. Then [[φ]] |≈g χ
and [[ψ]] |≈g χ and [[φ ∨ ψ]] |6≈g χ.
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Proof. (i) Suppose that [[φ]] |≈x ψ. Then ψ is consistent. Hence, [[ψ]]> 6= ∅. Then,
[[ψ]]x = [[ψ]]
>. Hence, ∂([[ψ]]x) = ∂([[ψ]]
>). Since w |= ψ for all w in [[ψ]]>, it follows, by
Lemma 4.2.19, that ∂([[ψ]]x) |= ψ. Therefore, [[ψ]] |≈x ψ.
(ii) Immediately from Lemma 4.2.8.
(iii) Suppose that [[φ]] |≈x ψ and ψ |= χ. Then, by definition, ∂([[φ]]x) |= ψ. Since
‘|=’ is transitive, it follows that ∂([[φ]]x) |= χ. Therefore, [[φ]] |≈x χ.
(iv) Suppose that [[φ ∧ ψ]] |≈f χ and [[φ]] |≈f ψ.
Suppose that [[φ ∧ ψ]]> 6= ∅. Then [[φ]]> 6= ∅. Take a w in [[φ]]>. Then w |= φ and,
by the global supposition, w |= ψ, as ∂([[φ]]>) |= ψ. Hence, w |= φ∧ψ. Then, there is a
v in [[φ ∧ ψ]]> with v ⊆ w. Since by the global assumption it holds that v |= χ, it must
be that w |= χ. Hence, ∂([[φ]]>) |= χ. Therefore, [[φ]] |≈f χ.
Suppose that [[φ ∧ ψ]]> = ∅. Suppose that [[φ]]> 6= ∅. Take a w in [[φ]]>. Then w is
consistent, w |= φ, and, by the same argument as in the previous case, w |= ψ. Hence,
φ ∧ ψ is consistent. Therefore, [[φ ∧ ψ]]> 6= ∅: a contradiction. Hence, [[φ]]> = ∅. It is
proved that under the given circumstances [[φ]] = [[φ∧ψ]]: Suppose that w ∈ [[φ]]. Then
w |= φ and, by the global assumption, w |= ψ. Hence, w |= φ∧ψ. Suppose that v ⊂ w.
Then v 6|= φ. Hence, v 6|= φ ∧ ψ. Therefore, w ∈ [[φ ∧ ψ]]. Suppose, to prove the other
inclusion, w ∈ [[φ ∧ ψ]]. Then w |= φ. Suppose that v ⊂ w. Then v 6|= φ ∧ ψ. Suppose
that v |= φ. Then it must be that v 6|= ψ. From v |= φ, it follows that there is a v ′ with
v′ ⊆ v and v′ ∈ [[φ]]. By the global assumption, it must be that v′ |= ψ. Hence, v′ |= ψ
and v |= ψ: a contradiction. Therefore, v 6|= φ. Therefore, w ∈ [[φ]]. Finally, [[φ]] |≈f χ.
(v) Suppose that [[φ]] |≈f ψ and [[φ]] |≈f χ.
Suppose that [[φ ∧ ψ]]> 6= ∅. Then [[φ]]> 6= ∅. Take a w in [[φ ∧ ψ]]>. Then w |= φ.
Then there is a v in [[φ]]> with v ⊆ w. By the global assumption, it must be that v |= χ.
Then, w |= χ. Hence, ∂([[φ ∧ ψ]]>) |= χ. Therefore, [[φ ∧ ψ]] |≈f χ.
Suppose that [[φ∧ψ]]> = ∅. By the same train of arguments as in the proof of (iv),
it must be that [[φ ∧ ψ]] = [[φ]]. Therefore, [[φ ∧ ψ]] |≈f χ.
(vi) Suppose that [[φ]] |≈x ψ and [[φ]] |≈x χ. Then, by definition, ∂([[φ]]x) |= ψ and
∂([[φ]]x) |= χ. Hence, ∂([[φ]]x) |= ψ ∧ χ. Therefore, [[φ]] |≈x ψ ∧ χ.
(vii) Suppose that [[φ]] |≈f χ and [[ψ]] |≈f χ.
Suppose that [[φ ∨ ψ]]> 6= ∅. Take a w in [[φ ∨ ψ]]>. Then, by Lemma 4.2.11(iv), it
must be that w ∈ [[φ]]> or w ∈ [[ψ]]>. In both cases, by the global supposition, it must
be that w |= χ. Hence, ∂([[φ ∨ ψ]]>) |= χ. Therefore, [[φ ∨ ψ]] |≈f χ.
Suppose that [[φ ∨ ψ]]> = ∅. Then [[φ]]> = ∅ and [[ψ]]> = ∅. Take a w in [[φ ∨ ψ]]⊥.
Then, by Lemma 4.2.11(iv), it must be that w ∈ [[φ]]⊥ or w ∈ [[ψ]]⊥. In both cases, by
the global supposition, it must be that w |= χ. Hence, ∂(f([[φ∨ ψ]]⊥)) |= χ. Therefore,
[[φ ∨ ψ]] |≈f χ. 2
To establish a connection between the consistency forcer g and the contrac-
tion function of the previous section, we introduce the notion of a finite state’s
inconsistency determiner, a formula indicating which propositional variables oc-
cur inconsistently in one of the valuations of the finite state. Note that different
finite states can have identical inconsistency determiners.
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4.4.5. Definition. [Inconsistency Determiner] Let K be a finite state, such that
K⊥ 6= ∅. Then the inconsistency determiner of K, denoted by ∂⊥(K), is defined
to be
∂⊥(K) =
∨
{p ∧ ¬p : p ∈ PV and p ∧ ¬p <− K}.
The inconsistency determiner of a finite state K can be used to define a spe-
cial contraction operation that makes K consistent. This operation resembles
Hansson’s operator of consolidation [Hansson, 1999b, p. 420].
Contracting a finite state K that contains at least one contradictory valuation
with its inconsistency determiner ∂⊥(K) amounts to taking its maximal consistent
valuations g(K). In this way, a strong connection has been established between
information contraction and g-based extraction.
4.4.6. Theorem. Let K be a finite state, such that K⊥ 6= ∅. Then
K − ∂⊥(K) = g(K).
Proof. Let {p1, . . . , pn} be the set of all atoms p for which there is a valuation w
in K with {p,¬p} ⊆ w. This set is non-empty by hypothesis, and it is finite because K
is a finite state. Hence, K − ∂⊥(K)
= K − ((p1 ∧ ¬p1) ∨ · · · ∨ (pn ∧ ¬pn))
= max({v ⊆ w : w ∈ K and v 6|= (p1 ∧ ¬p1) ∨ · · · ∨ (pn ∧ ¬pn)})
= max({v ⊆ w : w ∈ K and v 6|= p1 ∧ ¬p1 and . . . and v 6|= pn ∧ ¬pn})
= max({v ⊆ w : w ∈ K and v is consistent})
= g(K).
2
4.4.2 Selecting K⊥’s Most Consistent Valuations
Consider the set of formulas {p,¬p,¬q, p ∨ r, q ∨ s}.17 The finite state K =
{{p,¬p, q,¬q}, {p,¬p,¬q, s}} contains the minimal valuations of the conjunction
of all formulas in this set. It is clear from the start that p must behave incon-
sistently. With regard to q, on the other hand, there are two possibilities: q
can behave inconsistently as well as consistently. The extractors f and g treat
these possibilities on equal terms, that is, no preference is given to ‘only p is
inconsistent’ above ‘both p and q are inconsistent’. Hence, K |6≈f s and K |6≈g s.
17The example has been taken from [Batens, forthcoming]. The choice function to be defined
in the present section leads to an inconsistency-adaptive logic in Batens’s sense. These are
logics between a monotonic upper limit logic and a paraconsistent monotonic lower limit logic
interpreting formulas as consistently as possible. In the terminology of the present chapter, we
may choose as an upper limit logic Kleene’s strong three-valued logic and as a lower limit logic
fde. An introduction into inconsistency-adaptive logics can be found in the series of papers
[Batens, 1980], [Batens, 1989], and [Batens, 1986].
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In defining f -based and g-based extraction, a choice function, albeit a crude
one, was already put in use: if K contains consistent valuations, stick to K>,
otherwise use K⊥. There are no pressing reasons to demand that all of K⊥’s
inconsistent valuations must be given equal consideration. We could ignore those
valuations which require more literals to behave inconsistently than other incon-
sistent valuations, thereby choosing the most consistent valuations in K. In the
example above, this amounts to restricting K to {{p,¬p,¬q, s}}, since all of its
inconsistent literals are contained in the valuation {p,¬p, q,¬q}, which contains
an extra inconsistently behaving literal as well. Denoting the intended restriction
of K by K?, it now holds that K? |≈f s and K
? |≈g s.
To make this idea precise, we need to define a choice function selecting the
most consistent valuations from a set of valuations. This can be done as follows:
4.4.7. Definition. Let K be a finite state. The set of K’s most consistent
valuations, denoted by K?, is defined to be:
K? = {w ∈ K : w − w ∈ min({w − w : w ∈ K})}.
Let us first show that this definition is well behaved:
4.4.8. Lemma. Let K be a finite state. Then
(i) If K> = ∅, then K? ⊆ K⊥.
(ii) If K> 6= ∅, then K? = K>.
Proof. (i) Suppose that K> = ∅. Then K = K⊥, since K contains only inconsistent
valuations. Hence, K? ⊆ K⊥.
(ii) Suppose that K> 6= ∅. Take a u in K>. Then u ∈ K and u − u = ∅. Hence,
∅ ∈ {w − w : w ∈ K}. Suppose that v ∈ K?. Then it must be that v − v = ∅, since
otherwise ∅ ⊂ v − v and v would be skipped because of the presence of u. Therefore,
v ∈ K>. To prove the other inclusion, suppose that v ∈ K>. Then v ∈ K and v−v = ∅.
Hence, since there can be no w in K with w − w ⊂ v − v, it must be that v ∈ K?. 2
Now, we can combine the f -based and g-based extractors with our function se-
lecting the most consistent valuations.
4.4.9. Definition. [Selective Belief Extractors] Let K be a finite state, let φ be
a formula, and let x ∈ {f, g}. Then
K |≈?x φ iff ∂((K
?)x) |= φ.
Which relations hold between our four extractors? Let us start with noting
that K |≈g φ does not imply K |≈
?
g φ.
18 The following relations hold:
18Consider the finite state K = {{p,¬p, q}, {q,¬q}, {p,¬p,¬q, r,¬r, s}}. Then ∂(g(K?)) 6|=
∂(g(K)), even if ‘|=’ in Definitions 4.4.3 and 4.4.9 is taken to denote classical validity. It is
easy to see, though, that Theorem 4.4.10 still holds under this modification. As an immediate
corollary, it is established that K |≈f φ and K |≈g φ are non-equivalent even under classical
propositional logic.
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4.4.10. Theorem (Relative Strength). Let K be a finite state and let φ be
a formula. Then
(i) If K |≈f φ, then K |≈g φ
(ii) If K |≈f φ, then K |≈
?
f φ
(iii) If K |≈?f φ, then K |≈
?
g φ.
Proof. (i) Assume that K |≈f φ. If K> 6= ∅, the implication follows trivially. Hence,
suppose that K> = ∅. Take a valuation u such that u |= ∂(Kg). Then u |= ∂(g(K
⊥)).
Then there is a v in g(K⊥), such that u |=
∧
v. Hence, v ⊆ u and v ∈ max({v ⊆
w : w ∈ K and v is consistent}). Take a w in K⊥ with v ⊆ w. First, we show that
w ⊆ v. Suppose l ∈ w, where l denotes a literal and (¬)l its literal negation. Then
l ∈ w and (¬)l 6∈ w. Hence, for all consistent subvaluations x of w it holds that x∪ {l}
is consistent. Hence l ∈ v, since v is a maximally consistent subvaluation of w. Since
w ⊆ v and v ⊆ u, it must be that w ⊆ u. Hence, u |=
∧
w. Hence, u |= ∂(f(K⊥)).
Hence, u |= ∂(Kf ). Hence, by our initial assumption, u |= φ. Then it must be that
∂(Kg) |= φ. Therefore, K |≈g φ.
(ii) Assume that K |≈f φ. Then it holds that ∂(Kf ) |= φ. Split cases as to whether
K> is empty or non-empty. Suppose, in the first case, that K> 6= ∅. Then K? = K>,
by Lemma 4.4.8. Hence, (K?)> 6= ∅. Therefore, Kf = K
> = K? = (K?)> = (K?)f .
Therefore, by the intitial assumption, ∂((K?)f ) |= φ. Therefore, K |≈
?
f φ. Suppose now,
in the second case, that K> = ∅. Then, by Lemma 4.4.8, K? ⊆ K⊥. Hence, (K?)> = ∅
and (K?)⊥ = K?. Suppose that u |= ∂((K?)f ). Then u |= ∂(f((K
?)⊥)). Hence, there is
a v in f((K?)⊥) with u |=
∧
v. Then there is a w in (K?)⊥ with v = w. Then there is a
w in K⊥ with v = w. Then there is a v in f(K⊥) with u |=
∧
v. Hence, u |= ∂(f(K⊥)).
Therefore, u |= ∂(Kf ). By the assumption, it follows that u |= φ. Therefore, K |≈
?
f φ.
(iii) The proof is similar to that in (i). 2
4.5 Future Work
4.5.1 Finite State Belief Revision
The four extractors discussed in the preceding section can be amended to obtain
their classical counterparts. We take K ||≈◦x φ as a notation for the general form
of the classical extractors, which are obtained by interpreting the ‘|=’ in Defini-
tions 4.4.3 and 4.4.9 to denote classical validity. Following this amendment, it is
feasible to describe four systems of belief revision, as follows:
4.5.1. Definition. Let K be a finite state, let x ∈ {f, g}, and let ◦ denote either
selected or unselected extraction. The classical belief set based on K, denoted by
K, is defined to be
K = {φ : K ||≈◦x φ}.
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Expansion and contraction for belief sets can now be defined in terms of expansion
and contraction for finite states. Revision and reversed revision can, of course,
be defined similarly.
4.5.2. Definition. Let K be a classical belief set based on a finite state K and
let φ be a formula. Then the expansion of K with φ, denoted by K+φ , and the
contraction of K with φ, denoted by K−φ , are defined to be
K+φ = {ψ : K + φ ||≈
◦
x ψ}
K−φ = {ψ : K
.−φ ||≈◦x ψ}.
Obviously, this definition gives rise to four different systems of belief revision,
depending on the classical extractor that has been used to obtain the classical
belief set. (A detailed study of the merits and drawbacks of our extractors may
reduce this number.) The four systems share some remarkable general properties:
(i) expansion and contraction are functions from classically closed belief sets to
classically closed belief sets, as in almost all existing systems of belief revision;
(ii) belief sets always are consistent, hence the systems are all non-prioritized
systems of belief revision,19 since the Succes Postulate for Revision (φ ∈ K×φ )
does not hold in case the belief set is revised by a contradiction; and (iii) iterated
revision presents no problems, as the belief set resulting from the application of an
operation of change is uniquely determined. No ordering of (sets of) propositions,
that needs to be reassessed after each contraction or revision, is used, contrary
to most systems presented in the literature.
A study into the sets of postulates characterizing these systems of belief
revision would facilitate a comparison between them and the systems of non-
prioritized belief revision studied in the literature.
4.5.2 Relative Trustworthiness of the Sources
In a sense, our study is complementary to [Cantwell, 1998]. Cantwell studies
methods governing the acceptance of information stemming from sources which
are at least partially ordered according to their relative trustworthiness, treating
all the information provided by a source en bloc. At first sight, it might seem
that the present study considers just a special case of Cantwell’s theory, since
we assumed all information to be equally trustworthy and equality is a partial
ordering. The next quote from Cantwell’s paper suffices to dispel this idea:
[T]here are two quite different ways of treating information from a
source. Each source provides a scenario for what has happened or
what the world is like. Either one can treat the scenario as a whole,
dismissing it in its entirety if it turns out wrong, or one can treat
each piece of information separately, allowing a source to be wrong
19For an overview of non-prioritized belief revision, see [Hansson, 1999b].
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in certain respects and right in others. [...] I shall treat the sce-
nario presented by a source as a whole and not sentence by sentence.
[Cantwell, 1998, p. 193]
Of course, this does not mean that Cantwell’s approach is wrong-headed. Con-
siderations having to do with the trustworthiness of the sources that provide
information do play a role in the fixation of beliefs based on this information. On
the other hand, people (except for attorneys in American lawsuit television series)
usually do not treat the information provided by a source ‘as a whole’, but rather
sort out this information, weighed by the relative trustworthiness of the source.
In the rare cases where we are able to assess such a trustworthiness-ordering, a
combination of Cantwell’s approach and mine might be fruitful.
4.5.3 Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics
Inconsistency-adaptive logics provide a semantical framework for traditional ap-
proaches to reasoning from inconsistent information [Batens, manuscript]. Our
belief extractors, especially the selective ones, share some characteristics with the
inconsistency-adaptive logics which have been developed by Batens and his as-
sociates. Precise relations between their logics and the logics set forth in the
present chapter have yet to be established. It would be interesting to study these
relations, since, at first sight at least, the semantics of our respective approaches
differ wildly.
Next to the mentioned semantical investigations into inconsistency-adaptive
logics, proof-theories or tableau-methods have been developed for most of these
logics as well. Exploiting the analogy between inconsistency-adaptive logics and
our belief extractors, insights gained from the proof-theoretical investigations into
inconsistency-adaptive logics may also prove useful for the construction of proof-
theories for our belief extractors.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary of the Results
The introductory chapter served to present the belief-doubt-belief model that was
first conceived within 19th century American pragmatism, in an attempt to recon-
cile the theory of knowledge with the insights from Darwin’s evolutionary biology.
Thus, an alternative for Aristotle’s ideal of knowledge was developed, an alterna-
tive that can do without the assumption that science needs a secure foundation
in the form of a set of evident axioms from which all truths can be deduced. It
was shown that attempts, still inspired by the demands of traditional philoso-
phy, to define the concepts of truth and reality in terms of the newly conceived
belief-doubt-belief model are, to say the least, somewhat premature. Instead, it
was proposed to focus our attention on more precise formulations of the model.
Consequently, the logical epistemology of the most prominent contemporary
advocate of the belief-doubt-beliefmodel, Isaac Levi, has been expounded at length
in the third chapter. In the course of this exposition, serious drawbacks of the
approach favoured by Levi came to the fore. Levi’s claims to construct a nor-
mative theory about belief change could not be substantiated, let alone that his
theory admits an empirical test. These characteristics are unacceptable. In the
face of recent pleas, among others from naturalistic philosophers, for empirical
evaluations of philosophical theories, it was argued that the field of belief change
urgently needs a reformulation in order to make possible empirical assessments of
the merits of the proposed theories. A fruitful way to address this reformulation
problem would be an approach that concentrates on eliminating parameters in
theories about belief change which have withstood practical assessment so far.
In the fourth chapter, this new program for the field of belief change was
carried out in detail. First, by representing the information offered as a finite
state, we avoided the computational problems that are posed by representations
of information by deductively closed sets of sentences. Second, rather than rely on
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extra-logical considerations in the definition of contraction, the newly proposed
system had a purely logical contraction operator. Third, unlike the host of the
systems for belief change that have been presented in the literature, the system
could cope with inconsistencies, which, if necessary, could be removed one by one.
We have not only developed techniques to change a finite state via expansion
or contraction, but have indicated methods to extract consistent ‘beliefs’ from
inconsistent finite states as well.1
Is this all there is? Obviously, there is much more to belief change than
avoiding bewilderment in the presence of contradictions:
Die Anpassung der Gedanken aneinander erscho¨pft sich nicht in der
Abschleifung der Widerspru¨che. [...] Das O¨konomisieren, Harmon-
isieren, Organisieren der Gedanken, welches wir als ein biologisches
Bedu¨rfnis fu¨hlen, geht weit u¨ber die Forderung der logischen Wider-
spruchslosigkeit hinaus. [Mach, 1905, p. 176]
5.2 Future Work
Since the publication of Quine’s programmatic ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ (1969),
in which Quine prompts to undertake empirical investigations into the connec-
tions between our ‘theory of the world’ and our sensory stimuli,2 epistemologists
have become more and more interested in something which could be called aptly
metanaturalism. Rather than concentrate on the construction and evaluation
of theories about cognition, the contemporary philosophical discussion has been
limited largely to the Kant-style question as to how, in the face of the demise of
rationalistic approaches to epistemology, a naturalistic epistemology might still
be possible. (In the meantime, cognitive psychologists, neurologists, logicians and
researchers within AI do the jobs epistemologists used to do.)
The recent collection of essays Naturalismus (2000), edited by the German
philosophers Keil and Schna¨delbach, is a case in point. In an introductory essay,
the editors address the problem of defining the term ‘naturalism’, discussing sev-
enteen proposals for a definition. Koppelberg, in his contribution, makes clear
that naturalism must not be equated to empiricism, fysicalism, scientism, or an-
timentalism. Moreover, the editors claim “daß sich mit der Opposition gegen
den Supranaturalismus heute keine interessante Position mehr markieren la¨ßt”
1The extractors, which have been defined in the last section of the fourth chapter, fulfill
at least one of Nuel Belnap’s wishes: “The complete reasoner should, presumably, have some
strategy for giving up part of what it believes when it finds its beliefs inconsistent. [...] I
have never heard of a practical, reasonable, mechanizable strategy for revision of belief in the
presence of contradiction” [Belnap, 1977, p. 9].
2“The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on,
ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really
proceeds?” [Quine, 1969, p. 75.]
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[Keil and Schna¨delbach, 2000, p. 31]. The present thesis has shown that, although
antirationalism might not be worth the trouble of yet another philosophical de-
fense, traces of rationalistic theorizing abound in contemporary epistemology and
philosophical logic.
By and large, the discussion in the belief change literature has been focussed
largely on technicalities and on a priori argumentations in favor of a specific
choice of a set of postulates. Lots of different systems have been proposed, lots
of different formal desiderata have been formulated and defended, usual on the
basis of concise, a priori argumentations, that ultimately rely on pre-theoretical
intuitions. As a starting phase, this is how it should be. It would be a mistake,
however, never to leave the formal considerations for what they are and go on
to try to put the proposed systems to an empirical test. Only by testing formal
belief change theories empirically, can convincing arguments for or against a spe-
cific approach be found, since it would not be the first time in philosophical or
mathematical research that exclusive reliance on intuitions led us astray. After
all, unlike research in, for example, modal logic, investigations into belief change
do purport to explain some phenomena in an empirical domain. It would be a
grave mistake to conceive of belief change research as a wholly rationalistic (in
the philosophical sense of the word) matter.
The investigations that have been conducted in the present thesis have, of
course, not been empirical. Nevertheless, they have made an empirical test pos-
sible, because of the elimination of extra-logical considerations in the definition
of contraction. Hence, the system presented in the fourth chapter ought to be
seen as an attempt to ‘pragmatize’ the field of belief revision,3 that is, to make
the field of belief revision more conducive to empirical considerations than sys-
tems advocated by Levi, by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson, and by their
sympathizers.
Thus, instead of indulging in purely academic debates concerning the proper
definition of naturalism, in my opinion, the spirit of the naturalized epistemology
programme is better served by a close examination of contemporary theories
about cognition. We should detect those elements in these theories that obstruct
empirical ways of assessing their merits. We should reformulate theories which
possess such elements in order to make empirical evaluations of them possible.
But most of all, we should actually carry out these empirical tests and revise
our theories according to their outcomes. In the present thesis, the first and
second points have been put into practice. The third point, applied to the subject
matter of the present thesis, could be implemented, for instance, by the following
3“Such a pragmatization brings an already existing theory – a system – into closer contact
with the empirical world and with practical life, and this, in turn, can inspire empirical research
of different kinds, which may seem irrelevant as long as the theory (for instance, the logical
system) is presented in its original objectivistic or solipsist-subjectivistic garb. Perhaps, prag-
matizing can not be called empirical research, but we may characterize it as a proto-empirical
activity.” [Barth, 1987, p. 11 – my translation; amt.]
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program:
First and foremost, an empirical test of the fourth chapter’s system for be-
lief change has to be carried out. In collaboration with cognitive psychologists,
test conditions must be specified in detail. Great care must be taken that the
information offered is really considered equally trustworthy by the test subjects.
This can be partly realized, for instance, by making sure that the test subjects
acknowledge that the order in which the information is offered to them is wholly
arbitrary. Moreover, the information must be selected in such a way, that the
test subjects have as few preconceived opinions as possible about the relative
plausibility of the information offered. Then, prompted by logical theory, strate-
gic questions should be asked relating to the plausibility of selected propositions.
The test subjects should answer these questions solely on the basis of logic and
the controlled information they received previously. Next, of course, it should be
checked whether their answers are more or less in line with the answers provided
by our system for belief change.
Furthermore, it would certainly be of interest to generalize the theory of belief
change that was presented in the fourth chapter to include not only equable
reliable sources, but sources that differ in trustworthiness as well. Though such a
generalization would hardly affect the logic of the system, it would, first, facilitate
a comparison with belief change systems in the tradition initiated by Levi and
by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson, since in such a generalized system as
well as in traditional belief change systems, extra-logical considerations do play
a role. Second, as attributions of trustworthiness do play a role in the real-life
evaluation of received information, the generalized theory purports to cover more
phenomena than the original theory.
The reintroduction of extra-logical elements would, however, fall short of be-
ing an advance, unless well-argued methods are set forth according to which
the relative trustworthiness of the sources can be assessed. Here, philosophical,
psychological and economical literature on trust will prove relevant. Moreover,
a multi-agent perspective seems to be incumbent, since the assessment of the
trustworthiness of a source does not amount to the discovery of a timeless and
objective property, but will rather be the assessment of a function, that might
change over time, of experiences the assessing agent has had with this source and
with other sources as well.
Appendix A
A Natural Deduction System for First
Degree Entailment
A.1 Introduction
A.1.1 First Degree Entailment
After being inspired by the work of Ackermann [Ackermann, 1956], Anderson
and Belnap started their investigation into a theory of implication: if . . . then
[Anderson and Belnap, 1975]. They developed a number of formal calculi of
entailment, which later came to be known as Relevant Logics.1 In developing
their systems, Anderson and Belnap encountered the difficulty of dealing with
nested entailments. Consequently, they considered first degree entailment (fde),
in which the antecedent φ and consequent ψ in an implicational sentence of the
form φ → ψ are truth functional, that is, φ and ψ themselves do not contain
implications. The purpose of the investigation into fde is, then, to study the
truth functional relationship between antecedent and consequent of implicational
sentences.
Anderson and Belnap provide a Hilbert-style system and a Gentzen-style sys-
tem for fde. However, although they give characteristic matrices, Anderson and
Belnap do not provide any formal semantics for fde. For this, we had to wait for
[Routley and Routley, 1972] and [Dunn, 1976].2 Routley and Routley provide a
two-valued semantics for fde. Although their semantics may be philosophically
contentious, it serves as a basis for the semantics for various relevant logics.3
However, in this Appendix, we are concerned only with Dunn’s semantics, which
1Or Relevance Logics. ‘Relevant logics’ is often preferred by Australian relevant logicians.
‘Relevance logics’, on the other hand, is preferred by American relevance logicians.
2The paper is included in [Anderson, Belnap, and Dunn, 1992], which is the second volume
of [Anderson and Belnap, 1975].
3See [Priest and Sylvan, 1992].
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is somewhat more intuitive. Together with a tableau system, Dunn presents an
‘intuitive’ formal semantics for fde. Classically, semantic evaluations of sentences
are defined to be functions that assign to a formula exactly one truth value. For
Dunn, however, evaluations are relations between a truth value and a formula.
A formula may, then, take (relate to) no truth value, or may take (relate to)
multiple truth values.4
One feature of Dunn’s semantics for fde that we should take notice of is that
truth and falsity are not mutually complementary. Truth and falsity are consid-
ered separately and are independent notions in Dunn’s semantics. This feature
plays an important role in developing a natural deduction system for fde later in
this Appendix.
A.1.2 Combined Systems
The idea of considering true and false formulas separately can also be found in the
study of formal logics for ‘assertion’ and ‘rejection’. ÃLukasiewicz was, to the best
of our knowledge, the first to introduce both a sign for ‘assertion’ and a sign for
‘rejection’ into formal logic. Tracing back the history of the philosophy of logic,
ÃLukasiewicz followed Brentano (1838–1917), who propounded a nonpropositional
theory of judgment. Brentano argued that
As every judgement is based on an idea, the statement expressing a
judgement necessarily contains a name [of the idea]. To this, another
sign must come, a sign corresponding to the inner state which we
call judging, that is, a sign completing the bare name to a sentence.
And because this judging can be twofold, viz., asserting or rejecting,
the sign indicating it must be twofold too, one for affirmation and
one for denial. These signs themselves do not mean anything, but
in conjunction with a name, they are the expression of a judgement.
Therefore, the most general scheme of a statement is ‘A is’ and ‘A is
not’ [translation by the authors].5
In the 1921 paper ‘Logika dwuwartos´ciowa’, which was later translated as ‘Two-
valued Logic’, ÃLukasiewicz followed Brentano in adding to Frege’s idea of assertion
4Some paraconsistent logics are on this idea. Unsurprisingly, fde is often considered to be a
paraconsistent logic, as well as a relevant logic.
5Brentano writes: “Da jedem Urteil eine Vorstellung zugrunde liegt, so wird die Aussage
als Ausdruck des Urteils notwendig einen Namen enthalten. Dazu wird aber noch ein anderes
Zeichen kommen mu¨ssen, das demjenigen inneren Zustand entspricht, den wir eben Urteilen
nennen, d.h. ein Zeichen, das den bloßen Namen zum Satz erga¨nzt. Und da dieses Urteilen
von doppelter Art sein kann, na¨mlich ein Anerkennen oder Verwerfen, so wird auch das Zeichen
dafu¨r ein doppeltes sein mu¨ssen, eines fu¨r die Bejahung und eines fu¨r die Verneinung. Fu¨r
sich allein bedeuten diese Zeichen nichts [...], aber in Verbindung mit einem Namen sind sie
Ausdruck eines Urteils. Das allgemeinste Schema der Aussage lautet daher: A ist (A +) und
A ist nicht (A −).” [Brentano, c.1887, p. 97–98.]
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Brentano’s idea of rejection. In his early works, ÃLukasiewicz argued that a propo-
sition must be rejected if and only if it is false, parallel with Frege’s condition for
the assertion of a proposition.6 Later, starting with Aristotle’s Syllogistic from
the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic (1951), ÃLukasiewicz redefined the concept
of rejection to cover not only false propositions, but propositions which are false
under at least one interpretation as well. Furthermore, he introduced syntactical
techniques to derive all rejected, that is, nontautological, statements. By using
the symbol ‘`’ for assertion (indicating tautologyhood) and ‘a’ for rejection (indi-
cating nontautologyhood), what ÃLukasiewicz added to classical propositional logic
(cpl) is the following:
Axiom a p, where p is a fixed propositional variable.
Detachment If ` φ→ ψ and a ψ, then a φ.
Substitution If a ψ and ψ can be obtained from φ by substitution, then a φ.
The system is first presented in [ÃLukasiewicz, 1951], where ÃLukasiewicz also pro-
pounded a system of rejection for Aristotle’s syllogistic, after some technical prob-
lems had been solved by SÃlupecki. ÃLukasiewicz also tried to construe systems of
rejection for the intuitionistic propositional logic (ipl) and for his own version of
modal logic. All these systems share one characteristic: they are all ‘combined
systems’, that is, they all include both a sign for ‘assertion’ and a sign for ‘rejec-
tion’.7
One of the advantages of combined systems over traditional ones that is worth
mentioning in this Appendix is that metatheoretical results can be incorporated
in the object language of the system under consideration. For instance, the
disjunction property of ipl can be formulated in the object language of a proof
system as follows:
a φ a ψ .
a φ ∨ ψ
Now, since in many of the combined systems, the systems of ÃLukasiewicz in par-
ticular, a φ is complemented by the failure of ` φ,8 the concept of rejection
contained in these systems is classical. Nonetheless, combined systems, prima fa-
cie, take the idea seriously that (possibly) false formulas be considered separately
from true formulas. This idea is congenial to Dunn’s semantics.
6 ÃLukasiewicz writes: “I wish to assert truth and only truth, and to reject falsehood and only
falsehood.” [ÃLukasiewicz, 1921, p. 91.]
7For a synopsis of the history of theories of rejection for cpl, the reader may have recourse
to [Tamminga, 1994].
8For a discussion of this feature of combined systems, see [Tamminga, 1994].
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A.2 Language and Semantics
A.2.1. Definition. The alphabet of fde consists of the following.
(i) Propositional variables p1, p2, p3, . . .
(ii) Logical symbols ¬,∧,∨
(iii) Auxiliary symbols ), (
2 denotes an empty sequence. A denotes the set of propositional variables.
A.2.2. Definition. The set of all formulas of fde, denoted by F , is the least set
satisfying the following conditions:
(i) A ⊂ F ,
(ii) φ, ψ ∈ F =⇒ (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ) ∈ F ,
(iii) φ ∈ F =⇒ ¬φ ∈ F .
A.2.3. Definition. LetM = 〈F , ν〉 be an interpretation for the language where
ν is an evaluation such that ν is a function fromA to ℘({0, 1}). Then ν is extended
to an evaluation νM for all formulas φ and ψ by the following conditions:
(i) ν ⊆ νM
(ii) 1 ∈ νM(φ ∧ ψ) ⇐⇒ 1 ∈ νM(φ) and 1 ∈ νM(ψ),
(iii) 0 ∈ νM(φ ∧ ψ) ⇐⇒ 0 ∈ νM(φ) or 0 ∈ νM(ψ),
(iv) 1 ∈ νM(φ ∨ ψ) ⇐⇒ 1 ∈ νM(φ) or 1 ∈ νM(ψ),
(v) 0 ∈ νM(φ ∨ ψ) ⇐⇒ 0 ∈ νM(φ) and 0 ∈ νM(ψ),
(vi) 1 ∈ νM(¬φ) ⇐⇒ 0 ∈ νM(φ),
(vii) 0 ∈ νM(¬φ) ⇐⇒ 1 ∈ νM(φ).
A.2.4. Definition. Let Π ⊆ F and M be an interpretation. Then
(i) 1 ∈ νM(Π) := 1 ∈ νM(φ) for every φ ∈ Π,
(ii) 0 ∈ νM(Π) := 0 ∈ νM(φ) for every φ ∈ Π.
We are now in a position to define validity. Validity defined below incorporates
the concept of Dunn’s semantics for fde. It concerns not only truth but also falsity
as in Dunn’s semantics.9
A.2.5. Definition. [fde Validity] Let Π,Γ ⊆ F and φ ∈ F . Then
(i) Π; Γ |= φ;2 ⇐⇒ For allM : if 1 ∈ νM(Π) and 0 ∈ νM(Γ),
then 1 ∈ νM(φ),
(ii) Π; Γ |= 2;φ ⇐⇒ For allM : if 1 ∈ νM(Π) and 0 ∈ νM(Γ),
then 0 ∈ νM(φ).
9Standardly, validity for fde is defined as in classical logic as follows:
Π |= φ ⇐⇒ For all M : if 1 ∈ νM(Π), then 1 ∈ νM(φ).
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A.3 A Natural Deduction System
While providing a Hilbert-style system and a Gentzen-style system and natural
deduction systems for other relevant logics, Anderson and Belnap do not give any
natural deduction system for fde. The first natural deduction system for fde to
be formally introduced, other than the system developed in this Appendix, will
be included in [Priest, 2001].10
In this section, we introduce a natural deduction system ND for fde. The
system is developed by amalgamating the concept of Dunn’s semantics and that
of the combined systems. Instead of taking ` φ to be an assertion of φ (a usual
policy in combined systems), will it here be semantically interpreted as: φ takes
‘truth’ as a truth value. Similarly, a φ is interpreted as: φ takes ‘falsity’ as a
truth value.
The system ND is defined as follows.11
A.3.1. Definition. Derivations in the system ND are inductively generated as
follows.
Basis: The proof tree with a single occurrence of an assumption ` φ or a φ is
a derivation.
Induction Step: Let D, D1, D2, D3 be derivations. Then they can be extended
by the following rules:
D
` φ
¬I`
a ¬φ
D
` ¬φ
¬E`
a φ
D
a φ
¬Ia
` ¬φ
D
a ¬φ
¬Ea
` φ
D1
` φ
D2
` ψ
∧I`
` φ ∧ ψ
D
` φ0 ∧ φ1 ∧E`, i ∈ {0, 1}
` φi
D1
a φ ∧ ψ
[a φ]u
D2
X
[a ψ]v
D3
X
∧E u,va , where X = ` χ or X = a χ
X
D
a φi ∧Ia, i ∈ {0, 1}
a φ0 ∧ φ1
D
` φi ∨I`, i ∈ {0, 1}
` φ0 ∨ φ1
10After the development of Dunn’s semantics, the history of fde is largely anecdotal. For this
reason, it is uncertain whether the system provided by Priest will be the first. However, there
do not seem to be any published papers that introduce natural deduction systems for fde. This
claim was suggested in conversations with Dunn and Priest.
11The notational conventions used in the definition of ND are only a slight modification of
those of [Troelstra and Schwichtenberg, 1996].
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D1
a φ
D2
a ψ
∨Ia
a φ ∨ ψ
D
a φ0 ∨ φ1 ∨Ea, i ∈ {0, 1}
a φi
D1
` φ ∨ ψ
[` φ]u
D2
X
[` ψ]v
D3
X
∨E u,v` , where X = ` χ or X = a χ
X
where [` φ] and [a φ] are assumptions which are discharged by the application of
the rules.
A.3.2. Lemma. De Morgan rules of the following forms are available in ND (dou-
ble lines indicate that the rules work both ways):
D
` φ ∧ ψ
DeM`
a ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ
D
a φ ∧ ψ
DeMa
` ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ
Proof. DeM `:
` φ ∧ ψ
` φ
a ¬φ
` φ ∧ ψ
∧E`
` ψ
¬I`
a ¬ψ
∨Ia
a ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ
a ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ
a ¬φ
` φ
a ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ
∨Ea
a ¬ψ
¬Ea
` ψ
∧I`
` φ ∧ ψ
DeM a:
a φ ∧ ψ
[a φ]u
` ¬φ
` ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ
[a ψ]v
¬Ia
` ¬ψ
∨I`
` ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ
∧E u,va
` ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ
` ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ
[` ¬φ]u
a φ
a φ ∧ ψ
[` ¬ψ]v
¬E`
a ψ
∧Ia
a φ ∧ ψ
∨E u,v`
a φ ∧ ψ
2
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A.3.3. Definition. Let Π ⊆ F . Then
(i) ` Π := {` φ : φ ∈ Π},
(ii) a Π := {a φ : φ ∈ Π}.
A.3.4. Definition. [fde Derivability] Let Π,Γ ⊆ F and φ ∈ F . Then
(i) Π; Γ 7→ φ;2 ⇐⇒ There is a derivation in ND of ` φ from ` Π∪ a Γ,
(ii) Π; Γ 7→ 2;φ ⇐⇒ There is a derivation in ND of a φ from ` Π∪ a Γ.
A.4 Soundness
A.4.1. Lemma. Let Πi,Γi ⊆ F for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and φ, ψ, χ ∈ F . Then
(i) Π; Γ |= φ;2, if φ ∈ Π
(ii) Π; Γ |= 2;φ, if φ ∈ Γ
(iii) Π; Γ |= φ;2 =⇒ Π;Γ |= 2;¬φ
(iv) Π; Γ |= 2;φ =⇒ Π;Γ |= ¬φ;2
(v) Π; Γ |= ¬φ;2 =⇒ Π;Γ |= 2;φ
(vi) Π; Γ |= 2;¬φ =⇒ Π;Γ |= φ;2
(vii)
Π1; Γ1 |= φ;2
Π2; Γ2 |= ψ;2
}
=⇒ Π1,Π2; Γ1,Γ2 |= φ ∧ ψ;2
(viii) Π; Γ |= 2;φ =⇒ Π;Γ |= 2;φ ∧ ψ
(ix) Π; Γ |= 2;ψ =⇒ Π;Γ |= 2;φ ∧ ψ
(x) Π; Γ |= φ ∧ ψ;2 =⇒ Π;Γ |= φ;2
(xi) Π; Γ |= φ ∧ ψ;2 =⇒ Π;Γ |= ψ;2
(xii)
Π1; Γ1 |= 2;φ ∧ ψ
Π2; Γ2, φ |= χ;2
Π3; Γ3, ψ |= χ;2

 =⇒ Π1,Π2,Π3; Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 |= χ;2
(xiii)
Π1; Γ1 |= 2;φ ∧ ψ
Π2; Γ2, φ |= 2;χ
Π3; Γ3, ψ |= 2;χ

 =⇒ Π1,Π2,Π3; Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 |= 2;χ
(xiv) Π; Γ |= φ;2 =⇒ Π;Γ |= φ ∨ ψ;2
(xv) Π; Γ |= ψ;2 =⇒ Π;Γ |= φ ∨ ψ;2
(xvi)
Π1; Γ1 |= 2;φ
Π2; Γ2 |= 2;ψ
}
=⇒ Π1,Π2; Γ1,Γ2 |= 2;φ ∨ ψ
(xvii) Π; Γ |= 2;φ ∨ ψ =⇒ Π;Γ |= 2;φ
(xviii) Π; Γ |= 2;φ ∨ ψ =⇒ Π;Γ |= 2;ψ
(xix)
Π1; Γ1 |= φ ∨ ψ;2
Π2, φ; Γ2 |= χ;2
Π3, ψ; Γ3 |= χ;2

 =⇒ Π1,Π2,Π3; Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 |= χ;2
(xx)
Π1; Γ1 |= φ ∨ ψ;2
Π2, φ; Γ2 |= 2;χ
Π3, ψ; Γ3 |= 2;χ

 =⇒ Π1,Π2,Π3; Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 |= 2;χ.
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Proof. (xii) Let M be an interpretation, such that 1 ∈ νM(Π1,Π2,Π3) and 0 ∈
νM(Γ1,Γ2,Γ3). Then, as Π1; Γ1 |= 2;φ ∧ ψ, we have 0 ∈ νM(φ ∧ ψ). Therefore,
0 ∈ νM(φ) or 0 ∈ νM(ψ). Suppose 0 ∈ νM(φ). Then, as Π2; Γ2, φ |= χ;2, we have
1 ∈ νM(χ). Suppose 0 ∈ νM(ψ). Then, as Π3; Γ3, ψ |= χ;2, we have 1 ∈ νM(χ). Hence
1 ∈ νM(χ). Therefore, Π1,Π2,Π3; Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 |= χ;2.
The other cases can be proved analogously. 2
A.4.2. Theorem (Soundness of ND). Let Π,Γ ⊆ F and φ ∈ F . Then
(i) Π; Γ 7→ φ;2 =⇒ Π;Γ |= φ;2,
(ii) Π; Γ 7→ 2;φ =⇒ Π;Γ |= 2;φ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the depth of derivation. All that needs to be
checked is that the rules preserve truth and falsity in the appropriate way. This can be
shown using Lemma A.4.1. 2
A.5 Completeness
We now prove the completeness theorem for ND. [Priest, 2001] demonstrates tech-
niques to prove completeness theorems for natural deduction systems for various
relevant and paraconsistent logics. Although Priest defines validity and derivabil-
ity in a standard way, his techniques provide some insights into the structure of
the proof for the theorem. Here we adapt his techniques in our proof.
A.5.1. Definition. Let Π,Γ ⊆ F . Then 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, if 〈Π;Γ〉 is closed
under deducibility, that is, if both
(i) Π; Γ 7→ φ;2 =⇒ φ ∈ Π,
(ii) Π; Γ 7→ 2;φ =⇒ φ ∈ Γ.
A.5.2. Definition. Let 〈Π;Γ〉 be a theory. Then 〈Π;Γ〉 is dual prime, if 〈Π;Γ〉
has both the disjunction property and the conjunction property, that is, if both
(i) φ ∨ ψ ∈ Π =⇒ φ ∈ Π or ψ ∈ Π,
(ii) φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ =⇒ φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ.
A.5.3. Lemma. Let Π,Γ ⊆ F and φ, ψ ∈ F . Let 〈Π;Γ〉 be a dual prime theory.
Then
(i) φ ∧ ψ ∈ Π ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Π and ψ ∈ Π,
(ii) φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ,
(iii) φ ∨ ψ ∈ Π ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Π or ψ ∈ Π,
(iv) φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ,
(v) φ ∈ Π ⇐⇒ ¬φ ∈ Γ,
(vi) ¬φ ∈ Π ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Γ.
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Proof.
(i) Suppose φ ∧ ψ ∈ Π. Then Π; Γ 7→ φ ∧ ψ;2. So Π; Γ 7→ φ;2 and Π; Γ 7→ ψ;2 by
∧E`. Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, φ ∈ Π and ψ ∈ Π. Suppose φ ∈ Π and ψ ∈ Π. By
∧I`, Π; Γ 7→ φ ∧ ψ;2. Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, φ ∧ ψ ∈ Π.
(ii) Suppose φ∧ψ ∈ Γ. By dual primeness, φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ. Suppose φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ.
By ∧Ia, Π; Γ 7→ 2;φ ∧ ψ. Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ.
(iii) Suppose φ ∨ ψ ∈ Π. By dual primeness, φ ∈ Π or ψ ∈ Π. Suppose φ ∈ Π or
ψ ∈ Π. By ∨I`, Π; Γ 7→ φ ∨ ψ;2. Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, φ ∨ ψ ∈ Π.
(iv) Suppose φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ. By ∨Ea, Π; Γ 7→ 2;φ and Π; Γ 7→ 2;ψ. Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a
theory, φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ. Suppose φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ. By ∨Ia, Π; Γ 7→ 2;φ ∨ ψ.
Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ.
(v) Suppose φ ∈ Π. By ¬I`, Π; Γ 7→ 2;¬φ. Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, ¬φ ∈ Γ. Suppose
¬φ ∈ Γ. By ¬Ea, Π; Γ 7→ φ;2. Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, φ ∈ Π.
(vi) Suppose ¬φ ∈ Π. By ¬E`, Π; Γ 7→ 2;φ. Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, φ ∈ Γ. Suppose
φ ∈ Γ. By ¬Ia, Π; Γ 7→ ¬φ;2. Since 〈Π;Γ〉 is a theory, ¬φ ∈ Π.
2
A.5.4. Definition. Let Π,Γ,∆,Σ ⊆ F . Then
(i) Π; Γ 7→ ∆;2 ⇐⇒ There are δ1, . . . , δn ∈ ∆ such that
Π; Γ 7→ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn;2,
(ii) Π; Γ 7→ 2; Σ ⇐⇒ There are σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ such that
Π; Γ 7→ 2;σ1 ∧ · · · ∧ σn.
A.5.5. Lemma. Let Π,Γ,∆ ⊆ F such that Π;Γ 67→ ∆;2. Then there are sets
Π∗ ⊇ Π, Γ∗ ⊇ Γ and ∆∗ ⊇ ∆ such that
(i) Π∗; Γ∗ 67→ ∆∗;2,
(ii) 〈Π∗; Γ∗〉 is a theory,
(iii) 〈Π∗; Γ∗〉 is dual prime.
Proof. Assume that Π; Γ 67→ ∆;2 for Π,Γ,∆ ⊆ F . Let χ0, χ2, χ4, . . . be an enu-
meration of F . Let m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}. We define by recursion the sequence 〈Πn; Γn; ∆n〉
(n ∈ ω) as follows:
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〈Π0; Γ0;∆0〉 := 〈Π;Γ;∆〉
〈Πm+1; Γm+1;∆m+1〉 :=


〈Πm, χm; Γm;∆m〉, if
Πm, χm; Γm 67→ ∆m;2
〈Πm; Γm;∆m, χm〉, if
Πm, χm; Γm 7→ ∆m;2.
〈Πm+2; Γm+2;∆m+2〉 :=


〈Πm+1; Γm+1, χm;∆m+1〉, if
Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 67→ ∆m+1;2
〈Πm+1; Γm+1;∆m+1,¬χm〉, if
Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 7→ ∆m+1;2.
We define the following by means of the sequence defined above thus:
〈Π∗; Γ∗;∆∗〉 := 〈
⋃
n∈ω Πn;
⋃
n∈ω Γn;
⋃
n∈ω∆n〉.
(i) We show that Π∗; Γ∗ 67→ ∆∗;2 by induction on the construction of 〈Π∗; Γ∗; ∆∗〉.
Basis: n = 0. Then Π0; Γ0 67→ ∆0;2 by assumption.
Induction Hypothesis: Πn; Γn 67→ ∆n;2.
Induction Step: We must show that Πn+1; Γn+1 67→ ∆n+1;2. There are two cases:
(a) n + 1 = m + 1 for some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}, and (b) n + 1 = m + 2 for some
m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}.
(a) Suppose that n+ 1 = m+ 1 for some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}. Then there are two
cases based on the construction of 〈Πm+1; Γm+1;∆m+1〉 from 〈Πm; Γm; ∆m〉.
(a′) Πm, χm; Γm 67→ ∆m;2. Then, by construction, 〈Πm+1; Γm+1;∆m+1〉 =
〈Πm, χm; Γm;∆m〉. Hence, Πm+1; Γm+1 67→ ∆m+1;2. Therefore, it must
be that Πn+1; Γn+1 67→ ∆n+1;2.
(a′′) Πm, χm; Γm 7→ ∆m;2. Then, by construction, 〈Πm+1; Γm+1;∆m+1〉 =
〈Πm; Γm;∆m, χm〉. Suppose Πm+1; Γm+1 7→ ∆m+1;2. Then Πm; Γm 7→
∆m, χm;2. By an application of ∨E` and, if necessary, applications of ∨I`
we have that Πm; Γm 7→ ∆m;2, that is, Πn; Γn 7→ ∆n;2, contrary to the
Induction Hypothesis.
(b) Suppose that n + 1 = m + 2 for some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}. Then, obviously,
there are two cases based on the construction of 〈Πm+2; Γm+2;∆m+2〉 from
〈Πm+1; Γm+1;∆m+1〉.
(b′) Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 67→ ∆m+1;2. By construction, 〈Πm+2; Γm+2;∆m+2〉 =
〈Πm+1; Γm+1, χm;∆m+1〉. Thus, Πm+2; Γm+2 67→ ∆m+2;2. Therefore, it
must be that Πn+1; Γn+1 67→ ∆n+1;2.
(b′′) Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 7→ ∆m+1;2. By construction, 〈Πm+2; Γm+2;∆m+2〉 =
〈Πm+1; Γm+1;∆m+1,¬χm〉. Suppose Πm+2; Γm+2 7→ ∆m+2;2. Then it
holds that Πm+1; Γm+1 7→ ∆m+1,¬χm;2. By applications of ¬E`, ∨E`,
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and, if necessary, applications of ∨I`, it must be that Πm+1; Γm+1 7→
∆m+1;2. Therefore, Πn; Γn 7→ ∆n;2, contrary to the Induction Hypothe-
sis.
By (a) and (b), Πn+1; Γn+1 67→ ∆n+1;2. Hence Πn; Γn 67→ ∆n;2 for all n by
induction. Therefore, Π∗; Γ∗ 67→ ∆∗;2.
(ii) We show that 〈Π∗; Γ∗〉 is a theory. Assume that Π∗; Γ∗ 7→ φ;2. Now suppose that
φ 6∈ Π∗. Then by the construction, for some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .} where φ = χm, it is
not the case that Πm, χm; Γm 67→ ∆m;2. Hence, it must be that Πm, χm; Γm 7→
∆m;2. Hence φ ∈ ∆m+1 ⊆ ∆
∗. Thus Π∗; Γ∗ 7→ ∆∗;2, contrary to (i) proved
above.
Assume that Π∗; Γ∗ 7→ 2;φ, or equivalently, Π∗; Γ∗ 7→ ¬φ;2 by ¬Ia. Now suppose
that φ 6∈ Γ∗. Then by the construction, for some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .} where φ = χm,
it is not the case that Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 67→ ∆m+1;2. So Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 7→
∆m+1;2. Hence ¬φ ∈ ∆m+2 ⊆ ∆
∗. Thus Π∗; Γ∗ 7→ ∆∗;2, contrary to (i) proved
above.
(iii) We show that 〈Π∗; Γ∗〉 is dual prime. Assume that φ ∨ ψ ∈ Π∗. Then Π∗; Γ∗ 7→
φ ∨ ψ;2. Now suppose that φ 6∈ Π∗ and ψ 6∈ Π∗. By the construction, for
some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .} where φ = χm and n ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .} where ψ = χn, it
is not the case that Πm, χm; Γm 67→ ∆m;2, nor that Πn, χn; Γn 67→ ∆n;2. So
Πm, χm; Γm 7→ ∆m;2 and Πn, χn; Γn 7→ ∆n;2. Hence φ ∈ ∆m+1 ⊆ ∆
∗ and
ψ ∈ ∆n+1 ⊆ ∆
∗. Therefore Π∗; Γ∗ 7→ ∆∗;2, contrary to (i) proved above.
Assume that φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ∗. Then Π∗; Γ∗ 7→ 2;φ ∧ ψ, or equivalently, Π∗; Γ∗ 7→
¬φ∨¬ψ;2 by DeMa. Now suppose that φ 6∈ Γ
∗ and ψ 6∈ Γ∗. By the construction,
for some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .} where φ = χm and n ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .} where ψ = χn,
it is not the case that Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 67→ ∆m+1;2, nor that Πn+1; Γn+1, χn 67→
∆n+1;2. So Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 7→ ∆m+1;2 and Πn+1; Γn+1, χn 7→ ∆n+1;2. Hence
¬φ ∈ ∆m+2 ⊆ ∆
∗ and ¬ψ ∈ ∆n+2 ⊆ ∆
∗. Therefore Π∗; Γ∗ 7→ ∆∗;2, contrary to
(i) proved above.
2
A.5.6. Lemma. Let Π,Γ,Σ ⊆ F such that Π;Γ 67→ 2; Σ. Then there are sets
Π∗ ⊇ Π, Γ∗ ⊇ Γ and Σ∗ ⊇ Σ such that
(i) Π∗; Γ∗ 67→ 2; Σ∗,
(ii) 〈Π∗; Γ∗〉 is a theory,
(iii) 〈Π∗; Γ∗〉 is dual prime.
Proof. Assume that Π; Γ 67→ 2; Σ for Π,Γ,Σ ⊆ F . Let χ0, χ2, χ4, . . . be an enu-
meration of F . Let m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}. We define by recursion the sequence 〈Πn; Γn; Σn〉
(n ∈ ω) as follows:
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〈Π0; Γ0; Σ0〉 := 〈Π;Γ;Σ〉
〈Πm+1; Γm+1; Σm+1〉 :=


〈Πm, χm; Γm; Σm〉, if
Πm, χm; Γm 67→ 2; Σm
〈Πm; Γm; Σm,¬χm〉, if
Πm, χm; Γm 7→ 2; Σm.
〈Πm+2; Γm+2; Σm+2〉 :=


〈Πm+1; Γm+1, χm; Σm+1〉, if
Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 67→ 2; Σm+1
〈Πm+1; Γm+1; Σm+1, χm〉, if
Πm+1; Γm+1, χm 7→ 2; Σm+1.
Then (i), (ii) and (iii) can be proved as in Lemma A.5.5. 2
A.5.7. Lemma. Let Π,Γ ⊆ F and φ ∈ F . Then
Π;Γ |= φ;2 =⇒ Π;Γ 7→ φ;2.
Proof. Suppose that Π; Γ 67→ φ;2 for Π,Γ ⊆ F and φ ∈ F . By applying
Lemma A.5.5 with {φ} as ∆, there is a dual prime theory 〈Π∗; Γ∗〉 for Π∗ ⊇ Π and
Γ∗ ⊇ Γ and ∆∗ ⊇ ∆, such that Π∗; Γ∗ 67→ ∆∗;2.
LetM (= 〈F , ν〉) be an interpretation and p ∈ A. We define an evaluation ν as:
1 ∈ νM(p) ⇐⇒ p ∈ Π
∗,
0 ∈ νM(p) ⇐⇒ p ∈ Γ
∗.
It is then asserted that the above conditions extend to all formulas:
1 ∈ νM(φ) ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Π
∗,
0 ∈ νM(φ) ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Γ
∗.
The assertion is proved by structural induction on φ.
Basis: By assumption, it holds for φ ∈ A:
1 ∈ νM(φ) ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Π
∗,
0 ∈ νM(φ) ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Γ
∗.
Induction Hypothesis: For all ψ with fewer logical operators than φ:
1 ∈ νM(ψ) ⇐⇒ ψ ∈ Π
∗,
0 ∈ νM(ψ) ⇐⇒ ψ ∈ Γ
∗.
Induction Step: There are six cases based on the connectives in φ.
1 ∈ νM(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ⇐⇒ 1 ∈ νM(ψ1) and 1 ∈ νM(ψ2) by Definition A.2.3
⇐⇒ ψ1 ∈ Π
∗ and ψ2 ∈ Π
∗ by Induction Hypothesis
⇐⇒ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ Π
∗ by Lemma A.5.3,
0 ∈ νM(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ⇐⇒ 0 ∈ νM(ψ1) or 0 ∈ νM(ψ2) by Definition A.2.3
⇐⇒ ψ1 ∈ Γ
∗ or ψ2 ∈ Γ
∗ by Induction Hypothesis
⇐⇒ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ Γ
∗ by Lemma A.5.3.
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Similarly, we have
1 ∈ νM(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) ⇐⇒ ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ Π
∗,
0 ∈ νM(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) ⇐⇒ ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ∈ Γ
∗,
1 ∈ νM(¬ψ) ⇐⇒ ¬ψ ∈ Π
∗,
0 ∈ νM(¬ψ) ⇐⇒ ¬ψ ∈ Γ
∗.
Hence the evaluation conditions defined above hold for all formulas by induction. Since
Π∗; Γ∗ 67→ ∆∗;2, we have that φ 6∈ Π∗. By the above conditions then, 1 6∈ νM(φ). But
1 ∈ νM(ψ) and 0 ∈ νM(χ) for all ψ ∈ Π
∗ and χ ∈ Γ∗. Hence Π∗; Γ∗ 6|= φ;2. Therefore,
Π; Γ 6|= φ;2. 2
A.5.8. Lemma. Let Π,Γ ⊆ F and φ ∈ F . Then
Π;Γ |= 2;φ =⇒ Π;Γ 7→ 2;φ.
Proof. Suppose that Π; Γ 67→ 2;φ for Π,Γ ⊆ F and φ ∈ F . By applying
Lemma A.5.6 with {φ} as Σ, there is a dual prime theory 〈Π∗; Γ∗〉 for Π∗ ⊇ Π and
Γ∗ ⊇ Γ and Σ∗ ⊇ Σ, such that Π∗; Γ∗ 67→ 2; Σ∗.
LetM (= 〈F , ν〉) be an interpretation and p ∈ A. We define an evaluation ν as:
1 ∈ νM(p) ⇐⇒ p ∈ Π
∗,
0 ∈ νM(p) ⇐⇒ p ∈ Γ
∗.
It is then asserted that the above conditions extend to all formulas:
1 ∈ νM(φ) ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Π
∗,
0 ∈ νM(φ) ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Γ
∗.
This assertion is proved as in Lemma A.5.7. Since Π∗; Γ∗ 67→ 2; Σ∗, we have that
φ 6∈ Γ∗. By the above conditions, then, 0 6∈ νM(φ). But 1 ∈ νM(ψ) and 0 ∈ νM(χ) for
all ψ ∈ Π∗ and χ ∈ Γ∗. Hence Π∗; Γ∗ 6|= 2;φ. Therefore, Π; Γ 6|= 2;φ. 2
A.5.9. Theorem (Completeness of ND). Let Π,Γ ⊆ F and φ ∈ F . Then
(i) Π; Γ |= φ;2 ⇐⇒ Π;Γ 7→ φ;2,
(ii) Π; Γ |= 2;φ ⇐⇒ Π;Γ 7→ 2;φ.
Proof. Directly from Theorem A.4.2, Lemma A.5.7 and Lemma A.5.8. 2
A.6 Rejection Eliminated?
Although the system ND captures the underlying idea of Dunn’s semantics, one
might argue that the introduction of rejected formulas is theoretically redundant.
The argument runs as follows. ND takes a as a falsity operator understood
semantically. So stating a φ amounts to stating that φ is false. But then a φ
is just ` ¬φ. Hence ‘a’ may be replaced by ‘` ¬’. Once we have adopted this
convention, ‘`’ can be dropped from the system, since we need not indicate the
status (asserted or rejected) of a formula anymore. For example, the rule ¬I`
becomes
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D
φ
¬¬I
¬¬φ
and ∧E u,va becomes
D1
¬(φ ∧ ψ)
[¬φ]u
D2
χ
[¬ψ]v
D3
χ
¬ ∧ E u,vχ
Moreover, if we add the De Morgan rules as primitive, there will be some rules of
inference which are redundant. For example, ¬ ∧ E u,v in the new system will be
a special case of ∨E u,v. The resulting system will then be that of [Priest, 2001],
as can easily be checked.12
These changes give rise to changes to the definitions of validity and derivabil-
ity as well. Since every (rejected) formula in Γ in our definition of validity, that
is, Definition A.2.5, can be incorporated into Π by placing ‘¬’ in front of the for-
mulas under consideration, validity is defined standardly. Similarly, derivability
is defined standardly. Then soundness and completeness can be established as in
[Priest, 2001].
The fact that ND collapses under the proposed substitution to a standard
system, such as Priest’s, however, does not imply the inferiority of the system
presented in this Appendix, as there are some obvious advantages of our combined
system over the standard ones. First, ND visually reflects the underlying idea of
Dunn’s semantics: truth and falsity are evaluated separately. Second, because of
the introduction of both asserted and rejected formulas in our proof system, our
system, contrary to Priest’s, does not have any rules for combinations of logical
operators: each operator has two introduction rules and two elimination rules,
according to the status (asserted or rejected) of the formula which serves as a
premise in the application of a rule. Rules which necessitate combinations of
operators obscure the meanings of the operators. In constructing a proof tree in
our system, at each step only the principal operator needs to be considered. This
procedure makes the construction of proofs intuitive and mechanical, which is the
main purpose of formal logics.
Third, ND has conjunction elimination rules which have the same forms as dis-
junction elimination rules. Standardly, the disjunction elimination rule includes
subproof trees, while the conjunction elimination rule does not. So they have
different forms. In ND, the conjunction elimination rule, ∧E`, has the same form
as the disjunction elimination rule, ∨Ea, and ∧Ea does the same as ∨E`. Thus
the elimination rules for conjunction and disjunction are dual. This feature of
the system, therefore, provides symmetric proofs which capture the semantics in
a natural way without any technical complications.
12[Smullyan, 1968] shows a similar result for a classical tableaux system.
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Finally, our definition of validity may be extended to capture more general
consequence relations as follows:
A.6.1. Definition. Let Π,Γ,Σ,∆ ⊆ F and φ ∈ F . Then
(i) Π; Γ; Σ;∆ |= φ;2;2;2 ⇐⇒ For allM : if 1 ∈ νM(Π) and 0 ∈ νM(Γ)
and 1 6∈ νM(Σ) and 0 6∈ νM(∆), then
1 ∈ νM(φ),
(ii) Π; Γ; Σ;∆ |= 2;φ;2;2 ⇐⇒ For allM : if 1 ∈ νM(Π) and 0 ∈ νM(Γ)
and 1 6∈ νM(Σ) and 0 6∈ νM(∆), then
0 ∈ νM(φ) ,
(iii) Π; Γ; Σ;∆ |= 2;2;φ;2 ⇐⇒ For allM : if 1 ∈ νM(Π) and 0 ∈ νM(Γ)
and 1 6∈ νM(Σ) and 0 6∈ νM(∆), then
1 6∈ νM(φ),
(iv) Π; Γ; Σ;∆ |= 2;2;2;φ ⇐⇒ For allM : if 1 ∈ νM(Π) and 0 ∈ νM(Γ)
and 1 6∈ νM(Σ) and 0 6∈ νM(∆), then
0 6∈ νM(φ).
Proof-theoretical characterizations of the above consequence relations have yet to
be investigated. However, it does not seem impossible to give a proof theory in
the style of [Konikowska, 1990]. Moreover, these general consequence relations
may be studied in the context of many logics other than fde as well.
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Samenvatting
Overzicht
In dit proefschrift leg ik verslag van een studie naar redelijke veranderingen van
mening. In drie samenhangende, maar onafhankelijke hoofdstukken verken ik
een veelbelovend alternatief voor gangbare typen van kennistheorie, waarin men
vooral beoogt grondslagen voor onze kennis te leveren. De door de traditionele
epistemologie voorgeschreven onderzoeksagenda, waarop de jacht op voorwaarden
waaronder onze kennis gerechtvaardigd of zelfs waar is, bovenaan staat, wordt
niet door mij onderschreven. In plaats daarvan volg ik in de onderhavige studie
het door Amerikaanse pragmatisten als Charles Sanders Peirce en John Dewey
gebaande pad en richt ik me in de eerste plaats op de articulatie en verdediging
van criteria volgens welke een verandering van mening tevens een verbetering is.
Het werk van twee pragmatistische filosofen, Charles Sanders Peirce en Isaac
Levi, komt in het tweede en het derde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift uitgebreid
aan bod, opdat we goed grip krijgen op hun pogingen een model op te stellen dat
beoogt optimale strategiee¨n voor een verandering van mening te formuleren. Dit
belief-doubt-belief-model is de verbindende schakel tussen de hoofdstukken van
het proefschrift.
Tijdens de behandeling van het belief-doubt-belief-model blijkt een groot aantal
logische overwegingen een rol te spelen, zodat een technisch-logische beschouwing
van formele systemen voor belief change onontkomelijk wordt. We komen tot de
slotsom dat de pragmatistische herkomst van de hedendaagse systemen voor belief
change, hun naturalistische oorsprong ten spijt, in de loop van hun ontwikkeling
steeds meer in de verdrukking is geraakt en veld heeft moeten ruimen voor een
benadering van logisch-filosofisch onderzoek waarin voor empirische overwegingen
nauwelijks plaats meer is. Met een pleidooi voor de eliminatie van elementen in
systemen voor belief change die de praktische toepassing en empirische toetsing
van deze systemen verhinderen, tracht ik het verband tussen logische theorievorm-
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ing en cognitieve praxis te herstellen.
In het vierde hoofdstuk wordt een nieuw systeem voor belief change aangebo-
den dat (1) epistemische toestanden met eindige middelen representeert, (2) in-
consistente informatie aankan, (3) eindige veranderingsoperaties kent, (4) buiten-
logische elementen niet behoeft, maar ook niet uitsluit, en (5) altijd aanleiding
geeft tot een consistente verzameling opvattingen. Een Appendix, waarin de on-
derliggende logica van het systeem voor belief change vanuit een bewijstheoretisch
oogpunt wordt bestudeerd, vormt het sluitstuk van het proefschrift.
Samenvatting
Zinnige logische en kentheoretische onderzoekingen binnen de traditie van het
wijsgerige pragmatisme worden bemoeilijkt doordat het leeuwendeel der prag-
matistische filosofen (en niet alleen zij) voornamelijk belang stelt in oplossingen
voor traditioneel-filosofische vraagstukken over wat waar en werkelijk is. Dergeli-
jke pogingen noodzakelijke en voldoende voorwaarden voor de waarheid van een
uitspraak te vatten of, anders, een werkelijkheidsbegrip te verdedigen dat beant-
woordt aan een reeds verkozen invulling van het waarheidspredikaat, hebben wijs-
gerig onderzoek te lang beperkt tot vragen die zich reeds eeuwen steeds opnieuw
aan voorgestelde antwoorden hebben ontworsteld. In het openingshoofdstuk stel
ik derhalve voor deze metafysische voetangels en klemmen op te ruimen om zo
vruchtbaarder onderzoekingen binnen het pragmatisme ruim baan te bieden.
Met dit doel voor ogen maak ik in het tweede hoofdstuk aannemelijk dat
Peirce’ metafysische streven naar definities van waarheid en werkelijkheid in ter-
men van een theorie van wetenschappelijk onderzoek binnen een pragmatistis-
che kenleer niet op coherente wijze kan worden bereikt. Om vat te krijgen op
Peirce’ definitie van waarheid als de idee¨le limiet van wetenschappelijk onder-
zoek, opent het hoofdstuk met een uiteenzetting van Peirce’ onderzoekstheo-
rie en zijn filosofische logica. Deductieve, inductieve en abductieve redeneer-
vormen en hun onderlinge relaties komen aan bod, opdat Peirce’ vroege op-
vattingen omtrent het pragmatistische belief-doubt-belief-model geschetst kunnen
worden. Met dit model beoogde Peirce de ‘wetenschappelijke methode’ te for-
muleren, een methode die ons in staat stelt ons huidige verwachtingspatroon
in het geval van een onverwachte of zelfs strijdige ervaring aan te passen en te
verbeteren. Peirce hield staande dat indien we maar conscie¨ntieus de wetenschap-
pelijke methode zouden blijven volgen, we uiteindelijk een verwachtingspatroon
zouden bereiken dat nooit door een toekomstige ervaring zou kunnen worden
weersproken. Aangezien een dergelijk verwachtingspatroon precies dezelfde prak-
tische consequenties heeft als een ware ‘theorie van de wereld’, kan op grond van
Peirce’ pragmatistische betekenistheorie het predikaat ‘waar’ niet aan dat stabiele
verwachtingspatroon worden onthouden. Zo omschrijft Peirce waarheid.
In de rest van het tweede hoofdstuk worden de argumenten van Cheryl Misak,
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de voornaamste representant van een groep van hedendaagse pleitbezorgers van
Peirce’ waarheidsopvatting, aan een kritische beschouwing onderworpen. Haar
argumenten blijken verre van afdoende, daar het principe van tweewaardigheid
op twijfelachtige wijze wordt verdedigd en omdat haar argumenten voor een
Peirceaanse waarheidsopvatting onverenigbaar zijn met een consequent pragma-
tistische kenleer. Een Peirceaanse waarheidsopvatting is derhalve een dood-
lopende weg. Een klakkeloze aanvaarding van het probleemdomein van de tradi-
tionele wijsbegeerte zou met zich meebrengen dat we, nu een Peirceaanse invulling
van het waarheidsbegrip een onmogelijkheid gebleken is, weliswaar iets wijzer zijn
dan voorheen, maar weer onversaagd verder op zoek moeten gaan naar een andere
interpretatie van het waarheidsbegrip. Ik zal echter pleiten voor een bescheidener
aanpak en stel derhalve voor zo veel als mogelijk van Peirce’ dynamische theorie
van wetenschappelijk onderzoek – zijn belief-doubt-belief-model – te behouden, en,
ongehinderd door een of andere wijsgerige queeste naar waarheid, onze aandacht
te richten op de technische bijzonderheden van hedendaagse theoriee¨n voor belief
change – de ware erfgenamen van Peirce’ belief-doubt-belief-model.
In het derde hoofdstuk wordt een begin gemaakt met de uitvoering van dit
voorstel. Een kritische uiteenzetting van de logische kenleer van Isaac Levi, de
Amerikaanse pragmatistische filosoof die het voortouw nam bij de afbakening van
het veld van logisch-filosofisch onderzoek dat bekend is geworden onder de naam
belief change, laat zien hoe het logisch onderzoek op het vlak der belief change is
ontsproten aan methodologische overwegingen van klassieke Amerikaanse prag-
matisten. Levi stelt zich dan ook ten doel Peirce’s en Dewey’s belief-doubt-belief-
model te formaliseren met gebruikmaking van klassieke logica, beslis- en waar-
schijnlijkheidstheorie.
Ter inleiding plaats ik Levi’s wijsgerige grondhouding binnen de context van
het Amerikaans pragmatisme. Zoals in het tweede hoofdstuk reeds is vermeld,
nam Peirce van de negentiende-eeuwse Engelse logische school onder meer de
belangstelling voor niet-deductieve redeneervormen over, en was hij, bovendien,
ge¨ınteresseerd in een systematische theorie waarmee redelijke meningsveranderin-
gen zouden kunnen worden gevat. Hoewel Levi deze van Peirce’ voorkeuren deelt,
wijst hij, anders dan Peirce, een invulling van het waarheidsbegrip met behulp
van een pragmatistische kenleer van de hand.
Hiervoor behoeft Levi een medium om iemands opvattingen op een bepaald
tijdstip formeel te representeren. Levi kiest voor corpora: onder deductie gesloten
verzamelingen zinnen. Ik draag twee historische en een systematische reden aan
voor deze keuze. Doordat Levi de opvattingen van een actor met corpora repre-
senteert, kan hij veranderingen van mening opvatten als transities van e´e´n corpus
naar een ander. Levi beweert dat alle transities tussen corpora kunnen worden
verklaard met twee typen basale transities: expansies en contracties.
Een expansie voegt een zin aan een actors huidige corpus toe. Met aan de
beslistheorie ontleende argumenten verdedigt Levi een criterium waaronder een
dergelijke toevoeging gerechtvaardigd is. Dit criterium schrijft ons voor de in-
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formatieve waarde van de toe te voegen zin af te wegen tegen de plausibiliteit
van deze zin. Levi legt tevens de logische uitvoering vast van een eenmaal legi-
tiem bevonden expansie. Vervolgens ontwikkelt Levi een ge¨ıntegreerde theorie
voor contracties. Een contractie verwijdert een zin uit het huidige corpus van
een actor. Parallel aan zijn uiteenzetting inzake expansie stelt Levi criteria voor
waaronder een contractie legitiem is of zelfs, in bijzondere gevallen, geboden.
Anders dan bij een expansie is het corpus dat resulteert uit een contractie niet
onmiddellijk – dat wil zeggen, aan de hand van logica alle´e´n – gegeven, zodra
een contractie van het huidige corpus van een actor met een zin eenmaal legitiem
bevonden is. Verschillende corpora, deelverzamelingen van het te contraheren
corpus, voldoen aan de logische vereisten voor de beoogde contractie. Levi raadt
ons aan da´t corpus te kiezen dat niet alleen vanuit logisch oogpunt voldoet, maar
tevens het verlies aan informatieve waarde (er worden immers zinnen opgegeven!)
zo klein mogelijk houdt. Een toepassing van Levi’s theorie voor belief change op
twee centrale thema’s uit de filosofsiche logica – modale en conditionele uitspraken
– sluit mijn uiteenzetting van Levi’s kenleer af.
De rest van het derde hoofdstuk bestaat uit een kritische evaluatie van Levi’s
logische kenleer. Als eerste nemen we Levi’s aanname dat de opvattingen van een
actor met een corpus kunnen worden gerepresenteerd onder de loep. Bij nader
inzien blijkt het ondoenlijk eenduidig te bepalen welke zinnen tot een corpus
behoren en welke niet. Een tweede punt van kritiek richt zich op Levi’s ideali-
serende uitgangspunt dat een voor de toepassing van zijn criteria benodigd stelsel
van parameters reeds vooraf is gegeven. Daar zowel zijn overwegingen inzake
expansie als zijn overwegingen inzake contractie stoelen op een eerdere bepaling
van de parameter die informatieve waarden vastlegt, probeer ik na te gaan hoe een
dergelijke bepaling in haar werk gaat. Eenzelfde strategie wordt gevolgd bij de
evaluatie van de ‘mate van lef’, een parameter die een rol speelt bij de toepassing
van het criterium voor gerechtvaardigde expansies. Het wekt bevreemding dat
het gewenste resulterende corpus uiteindelijk de doorslaggevende factor is bij de
schatting van de besproken parameters.
Het bovenstaande noopt ons, Levi’s oogmerk normatieve criteria voor belief
change te leveren ten spijt, tot de conclusie dat, zolang het onduidelijk blijft
hoe de beginwaarden van de in Levi’s systeem optredende parameters op een
overtuigende en betrouwbare wijze kunnen worden vastgesteld, Levi’s theorie
elke normatieve kracht ontbeert. Zelfs als Levi’s systeem opgevat wordt als een
beschrijving van hoe we werkelijk redeneren, weerstaat Levi’s theorie empirische
toetsing, zolang de parameters niet kunnen worden bepaald zonder een beroep op
het gewenste resultaat van een verandering van mening. Tot slot bepleit ik een
theorie voor belief change die het zonder ongrijpbare buiten-logische overwegingen
kan stellen, om zo, aan de ene kant, de voor het onderzoek op het vlak der belief
change tot nu toe kenmerkende rationalistische argumentaties te vermijden en,
anderzijds, onderzoek naar de empirische adequatie van voorgestelde theoriee¨n
voor belief change u¨berhaupt mogelijk te maken.
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Ik zet in het vierde hoofdstuk een theorie voor belief change uiteen die, ten
eerste, anders dan standaardsystemen, geen beroep doet op buiten-logische over-
wegingen en, ten tweede, inconsistente informatie aankan. Niettemin zijn de
opvattingen die worden voortgebracht door de gegeven informatie, ook als deze
laatste inconsistent is, altijd consistent. Mijn theorie kent twee niveaus: een
eerste niveau waarop de dynamiek van mogelijk inconsistente informatie wordt
behandeld, en een tweede niveau waarop een verzameling consistente opvattingen
uit het eerste niveau wordt gee¨xtraheerd.
Op het eerste niveau beschrijf ik, met first degree entailment als onderliggende
logica, een techniek om mogelijk inconsistente informatie te representeren met
een eindige toestand, die precies uit alle valuaties bestaat die minimaal vereist
zijn om de gegeven informatie waar te maken. Een algoritme dat de eindige
toestand van een gegeven formule levert, volgt. Daarna wordt een operatie
gedefinieerd aan de hand waarvan een eindige toestand met een formule kan
worden gee¨xpandeerd. Een representatiestelling, die aantoont dat mijn expansie-
operatie aan de intu¨ıtieve vereisten voor een expansie voldoet, karakteriseert de
expansie-operatie. Vervolgens definieer ik een contractie-operatie, aan de hand
waarvan een formule uit een eindige toestand kan worden geschrapt. Opmerke-
lijk genoeg onderstelt deze contractie-operatie geen buiten-logisch element, zoals
een keuzefunctie of een ordening over (verzamelingen van) zinnen. (Een derge-
lijke veronderstelling is alomtegenwoordig in de op het werk van Levi en van
Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors en Makinson gee¨nte systemen voor belief change.) Boven-
dien zijn mijn expansie- en contractie-operatoren elkaars dualen. Mijn bespreking
van de contractie-operator mondt uit in een representatiestelling die de operator
karakteriseert in termen van een verzameling postulaten. Deze postulaten worden
geformuleerd in termen van het informatie-opspansel van een eindige toestand,
een eigenschap van eindige toestanden die geen pendant heeft in de standaard
mogelijke-werelden-semantiek.
Op het tweede niveau bestudeer ik vier extractors, operaties die een consistente
verzameling ‘plausibele’ opvattingen ontlenen aan een eindige toestand. Indien de
eindige toestand consistent is, leveren alle extractors hetzelfde resultaat. In het
geval een eindige toestand inconsistent is, vallen de uit de toepassingen van de vier
extractors resulterende verzamelingen ‘plausibele’ opvattingen in het algemeen
niet samen.
Aanvankelijk worden eerst twee extractors besproken. De eerste extractor
is een vertaling van een voorstel van Restall en Slaney naar de huidige context
van eindige toestanden. De tweede extractor komt neer op een contractie van
de eindige toestand met een formule die aangeeft welke propositieletters zich in-
consistent in deze eindige toestand gedragen. Aangezien de extractors aanleiding
geven tot niet-monotone gevolgtrekkingsoperaties, worden enkele bewijstheoreti-
sche eigenschappen van de twee genoemde extractors besproken. Vervolgens
wordt een selectiefunctie voorgesteld die de meest consistente valuaties uit een
eindige toestand kiest. Deze selectiefunctie kan worden gebruikt om de eindige
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toestand te bewerken alvorens een van de twee bovengenoemde extractors toe te
passen. Zo zijn dus vier verschillende extractors gedefinieerd.
De Appendix – een in samenwerking met Koji Tanaka van Macquarie Univer-
sity in Sidney uitgevoerd onderzoek – bevat een oorspronkelijke bewijstheoretische
studie van de relevantielogica first degree entailment (fde), die, zoals vermeld, de
onderliggende logica was van het in het vierde hoofdstuk aangeboden systeem
voor belief change. Deze logica kan worden beschouwd als een generalisering van
de klassieke propositielogica (cpl), omdat ze niet alleen, zoals cpl, totale en con-
sistente valuaties toestaat, maar tevens partie¨le of inconsistente valuaties. Er
geldt dus dat alle gevolgtrekkingen die geldig zijn in fde eveneens geldig zijn in
cpl. Het omgekeerde geldt echter niet: fde kent bijvoorbeeld geen tautologiee¨n en
bovendien gaan noch het disjunctieve syllogisme noch de ex falso quodlibet-regel
van cpl op in fde.
Een beknopte geschiedenis van fde opent de Appendix. Voor fde zijn twee
logische semantieken ontwikkeld, een tweewaardige semantiek door Routley en
Routley, en een vierwaardige door Dunn. In de Appendix bedienen we ons van
de vierwaardige semantiek. Er volgt een bondige bespreking van op het bewijs-
theoretische werk van ÃLukasiewicz gestoelde ‘gecombineerde systemen’. In deze
gecombineerde systemen kunnen zowel aanvaarde als verworpen formules worden
afgeleid, die in de afleidingen van elkaar worden onderscheiden doordat ze wor-
den voorafgegaan door een teken (‘`’ voor aanvaarding, ‘a’ voor verwerping) dat
hun status aangeeft. Dit idee zal worden toegepast bij de ontwikkeling van een
systeem van natuurlijke deductie voor fde. Na definities van de taal en de vier-
waardige semantiek voor fde volgt een systeem van natuurlijke deductie voor fde
in Gentzen-vorm. De correctheid van dit systeem wordt op de gebruikelijke wijze
aangetoond. Bij het volledigheidsbewijs gebruiken we Henkin’s methode, hoewel
de voor het inbeddingslemma gebruikte constructie aangepassing behoeft om aan
de vereisten van het modelexistentielemma te kunnen voldoen, waar immers een
vierwaardig tegenvoorbeeld is vereist.
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